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 Abstract 
 
This master thesis is an in-depth study of Heidegger’s notions of death and authenticity 
in Being and Time. Heidegger’s existential notion of death is by many commentators 
considered to be radically different from the traditional metaphysical conception of death 
as the end of life. Disputing this view, I argue that Heidegger’s notion of death is a 
composite between the existential conception of being-towards-death, and the 
metaphysical conception of death as the end of life. There is a growing interest for the 
idea that Heidegger’s notion of authenticity is a descriptive, ontological foundation for a 
possible ethics. The notion of authenticity is too vacuous to have any ethical content. For 
authentic Dasein to become ethical Dasein, certain modifications of the existential web 
must be carried out. To establish the link between authenticity and ethics, I argue that the 
ontological status of das Man must be refuted, and that the temporal ecstasie of falling 
into the present must be understood differently as a movement of transcendence. The 
most important theoretical purpose of this thesis is to question the possibility of 
eliminating metaphysics. I argue that Heidegger’s notion of death is metaphysical in 
accordance with his own understanding of the term, thereby trying to show that certain 
phenomena –and most prominently death - are metaphysically constituted.   
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1  
Introduction 
 
 
This master thesis is about death. More specifically, it has three interconnected themes 
about death that run through it. The first theme is about the possibility of acquiring 
knowledge of death; the second is about death’s significance for human existence; and 
the third theme is about death as a metaphysical concept. Why is death a philosophically 
relevant topic to discuss? Death is arguably the most universal aspect of our existence, in 
that all human and living beings eventually will face their demise. Death is also the most 
certain event in life.1 These aspects of universality and certainty make death a natural 
candidate for philosophical discussion and analysis.2
 In what follows, the philosophical relevance of three themes about death will be 
accentuated and elaborated through an in-depth discussion of Martin Heidegger’s 
analysis of death and authenticity in Being and Time.
  
3
Many ingenious interpretations have been presented of the existential notion of 
death in BT. Heidegger’s notion of death is notoriously difficult to grasp in itself, and it is 
puzzling why death holds such an important position for Heidegger in his overall 
philosophical project in BT. An important driving force in this master thesis is thus 
simply to try to understand Heidegger’s existential notion of death in contrast to the 
 What is the reason for choosing 
Heidegger’s notion of death as the main subject of my discussion and analysis? 
Heidegger is clearly an important thinker to be engaged with, in that he is one of the most 
influential and controversial thinkers of the twentieth century. A more relevant answer to 
this question, however, is the fact that Heidegger’s analysis of death in BT has stirred 
much confusion and bafflement, caused lengthy theoretical debates, and brought about 
stark criticism. These facts in themselves make Heidegger’s notion of death into an 
interesting challenge for further philosophical analysis and discussion.  
                                                        1 Death is arguably even more universal and certain than birth. This is so, because every living being 
seems to be subject to the necessity of death, while birth is a contingent fact.   2 Death has been an important and recurrent theme within the Western philosophical tradition, especially 
under the influence of religiously or metaphysically inclined thinkers. At the end of the nineteenth century, 
however, death was no longer considered to be an important philosophical theme. Death was going ‘out of 
fashion’, so to speak. This fact was due to thematic changes in the philosophical fields of interest. 
However, despite of such changes and of the general process of secularisation in the Western societies, a 
few philosophers throughout the twentieth century, most notably in the so-called continental or 
existentialist traditions, took a ‘special interest’ in death. Heidegger is one of those thinkers. 3 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Malden: 
Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2007). Future references to this work will hereafter be cited as BT. 
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traditional metaphysical conception of death. I will also try to explain why death holds 
such a significant place in Heidegger’s answer to the question of the meaning of being. 
 Obviously, because of its extensive and complicated nature it is not possible to 
cover every aspect of Heidegger’s analysis of death in this master thesis. Limitations of 
space have thus raised the question of where to put the line of demarcation regarding the 
content. In general, the three themes about death that run through my thesis altogether 
organise the content and the various topics that are brought up for discussion. More 
specifically, the first theme about acquiring knowledge of death is mainly located to the 
two first chapters. Here I examine how Heidegger’s philosophical method of 
hermeneutical phenomenology is applied to establish an existential definition of death. In 
the first chapter several general questions and problems that pertain to Heidegger’s 
method of hermeneutical phenomenology, are raised. The central question in this chapter 
is in what sense death can be approached as a phenomenon. In the second chapter, I 
discuss whether death in BT is purely existentialist or a composite notion of death. Many 
commentators argue that existential death is radically different from the traditional 
conception of death as the ‘end of life’. I will argue that this view is not entirely correct, 
and that Heidegger’s notion of death is rather a composite of the existential conception of 
being-towards-death and the traditional metaphysical conception of death. 
The second theme about death’s significance for human existence is located to the 
third and the fourth chapter. In these chapters Heidegger’s notion of authenticity and its 
link to death and other elements in the existential web will be discussed. The main 
problem to be discussed in chapter three is whether the concept of authenticity has any 
ethical connotations. There seems to be a growing consensus amongst commentators that 
Heidegger’s notion of authenticity can serve as a descriptive ontological foundation for a 
possible ethics. Disputing this view, I will argue that Heidegger’s notion of authenticity 
is too empty or vacuous to have any specific ethical content. Furthermore, Dasein has 
inherent structural limitations, such as das Man and its idle talk about death. In order for 
authentic Dasein to become ethical Dasein, it is in my view necessary to make certain 
modifications in the existential web. In the fourth chapter I will thus present a lengthy 
argument for the refutation of the structural necessity of das Man. In this chapter I will 
also suggest an alternative way to understand Dasein’s relationship to temporality and the 
ecstasie of ‘falling’ into the present.  
There is a large tradition of commentaries on Heidegger’s work, which roughly 
can be divided into two ‘camps’. First, there are the ‘Heideggerians’, or those 
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commentators who mainly seek to defend the thrust of Heidegger’s analysis of death in 
BT, thereby in many cases weakening their ability to identify its obscurities and weak 
points. Second, there are those commentators who – quite vigorously – criticise 
Heidegger’s analysis of death, and accordingly tend to interpret it as a certain being reads 
the Bible.4
In this thesis I am not primarily concerned with either defending or criticising 
Heidegger’s notion of death. My methodological approach is traditional in the sense that 
it consists of a close reading of the text, especially of the many relevant sections in 
Division II. Admittedly, I engage in some of the most relevant commentary debates, and 
for this purpose I bring in commentary voices that are either sympathetic or critical 
towards Heidegger. I do, however, have a higher theoretical purpose with this master 
thesis rather than simply to discuss, criticise, or defend Heidegger’s notion of death 
within the confines of the established tradition of commentaries.  
  
In twentieth century philosophy, and especially within the so-called analytical 
tradition, there has been an expressed ambition to abandon metaphysics as a 
philosophical discipline, and to restrict philosophy to merely conceptual and logical 
analysis. For analytical philosophers assertions are typically meaningless unless they 
have empirical content. And, if assertions have empirical content they belong to the 
empirical sciences. In many ways, Heidegger agrees with the idea that metaphysics must 
be overcome or eliminated. This task, however, can according to Heidegger only be 
accomplished by an engagement with the metaphysical past, and not simply by ignoring 
metaphysics. In other words, Heidegger shares the ambition of eventually eliminating 
metaphysics, but he is suggesting a different approach by thinking through the history of 
being.  
The shared goal in modern philosophy of overcoming metaphysics defines the 
third thematic that runs through this thesis, which is death as a metaphysical concept. In 
BT Heidegger claims that his analysis of death is entirely non-metaphysical and ‘this-
wordly’, in the sense that it is not concerned with the typical metaphysical questions 
about death. Typical metaphysical questions about death would be; the meaning of death 
(and life); what may come after death; and the evil of death, etc. In the fifth and final 
chapter I will examine Heidegger’s understanding of metaphysics as historical                                                         4 The picture is, of course, not as black and white as it is painted here. There are examples of 
commentators who mainly sympathise with Heidegger, but who at the same time are able to identify the 
weak spots in his analysis. Furthermore, there are philosophers who completely ignore Heidegger’s work, 
often belonging to what is characterised as ‘analytical philosophy’.     
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background understandings of being. Then, based on an analysis of some of Heidegger’s 
assertions about death, I will argue that his notion of death is in fact metaphysical in 
accordance with his own understanding of metaphysics. The conclusion that Heidegger’s 
notion of death is metaphysical is crucial for this thesis’ fundamental theoretical purpose, 
which is to raise the question of whether metaphysics can ever be overcome or 
eliminated. In my view it is doubtful that metaphysics can be eliminated for good, or that 
this is a desirable goal for philosophers to accomplish. This doubt does not originate 
from a conviction that human capacity for knowledge and rationality is somehow 
incapable of a continued growth and expansion. Rather, it comes from the view that 
certain phenomena are constituted in such a way that they inevitably invite metaphysical 
speculation. Death is such a phenomenon. 
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1. Death and method 
 
 
 
The guiding question of this chapter is whether there is a method through which we can 
acquire knowledge of death. In BT Heidegger explicates and analyses death as a 
phenomenon, he has seemingly found some kind of methodological access to death. 
According to Heidegger death is not only possible to describe and characterise from a 
phenomenological point of view; phenomenological approach to death is also the way to 
acquire an authentic understanding of death.  
The general aim in this chapter is to investigate whether Heidegger’s method can 
provide us with a new and improved understanding of death. What does it mean to 
characterise and approach death as a phenomenon? Furthermore, how can we distinguish 
the ‘real’ phenomenon of death from what is simply a semblance or an appearance of it? 
To answer these questions, we first need to look at the characteristic features of 
Heidegger’s method of phenomenology, or what is also known as fundamental ontology. 
One of the characteristics of Heidegger’s philosophical method of 
phenomenology is that it is hermeneutical or interpretive. This raises several questions 
and problems that pertain to philosophical interpretation as such. For example, there is 
the problem of relativism and whether one interpretation of the phenomenon is just as 
good as another. There is also the problem of the truth and falsity of the interpretation of 
phenomena. Thus, how can we know that Heidegger’s analysis of death is the ‘best’ 
available, or that it describes the phenomenon of death as it is? Finally, there is the 
problem of the circularity of hermeneutics, and the presuppositions and background 
assumptions that necessarily pertain to a circular understanding of phenomena.  
For Heidegger, it is not possible to escape the interpretive circle; rather, what 
matters is finding the right entrance into it. Towards the end of this chapter I will thus 
raise the question if death in BT is a formal indication, which is a methodological tool 
applied at the beginning of a phenomenological investigation. If Heidegger’s notion of 
death in BT is a formal indication, this might suggest that death is a ‘fluid’ philosophical 
concept in the sense that it is in constant transformation. Towards the end this chapter, 
however, I will argue that death, as it is in itself, is not a fluid concept. 
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1.1 The task of philosophy: fundamental ontology 
Shortly put, Heidegger’s philosophical method in BT is phenomenology. As a method, 
however, phenomenology is not a unified method shared by all phenomenological 
philosophers alike.5 What then characterises Heidegger’s phenomenology? For 
Heidegger, as it was for his mentor Edmund Husserl, phenomenology is essentially a 
descriptive, and not a hypothetical or explanatory project. Moreover, ‘early’ Heidegger 
considered his version of phenomenology to be a science in its own right.6
According to Heidegger, the question of being cannot be answered through a 
detached third-person study, so often applied in empirical science or in traditional 
philosophy. Instead, the place to begin to answer the question of being is Dasein or 
‘being-there’, which is Heidegger’s term for what we as human beings essentially are.
 However, 
Heidegger’s conception of phenomenology also differs radically from Husserl’s, both in 
terms of method and outcome. For example, Heidegger emphatically rejects Husserl’s 
notion of the phenomenological reduction as the appropriate starting point for 
phenomenology. In Heidegger’s view, phenomena are not the subjective content of 
consciousness, but rather objective structural elements of the human constitution. The 
difference between Heidegger and Husserl becomes even sharper knowing that, for 
Heidegger, the most important philosophical question to be asked is the question of 
Being. It is on the basis of this question that Heidegger articulates what he finds to be the 
central task of philosophy, and accordingly why phenomenology is the proper method for 
fulfilling such a task.  
7
 
 
Thus, Heidegger asserts: 
With regard to its subject-matter, phenomenology is the science of the Being of 
entities – ontology. In explaining the task of ontology we found it necessary that 
there should be a fundamental ontology taking as its theme that entity which is 
                                                        5 Heidegger’s particular kind of phenomenology was developed in contrast to both empirical science and 
to contemporary philosophical movements, such as neo-Kantianism. It was specifically developed in 
contrast to Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology. Husserl considered phenomena to be the strict scientific 
study of the subjective phenomena of ‘pure’ consciousness. That is, Husserl viewed phenomena as the 
inner contents of conscious experience, standing in representational relations to outer objects, making their 
appearance in and through them. 6 A turn (Kehre) occurred in Heidegger’s thought around 1930 with his essay “On the essence of truth”. 
‘Early’ Heidegger is thus classified as his works before 1930, there amongst BT, which was released in 
1927. 7 I have chosen to use Heidegger’s original neologisms ‘Dasein’ and ‘das Man’ throughout this thesis. 
Other central concepts will be used in their English translation, whereas the original German term is put in 
brackets.  
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ontologico-ontically distinctive, Dasein, in order to confront the cardinal problem – 
the question of the meaning of Being in general. 
                   (BT 37) 
  
For Heidegger the central, most important task of philosophy is to perform fundamental 
ontology. What is it that distinguishes fundamental ontology from other forms of 
ontology? Or why is fundamental ontology more fundamental? In traditional philosophy, 
ontology is the study of the most general kinds of things, or the study of the things that 
exist ultimately.8 Fundamental ontology, on the other hand, is the study of the 
fundamental structural elements of Dasein, also called ‘existentials’. In other words, 
fundamental ontology is the analysis and the corresponding mapping out of the 
existential ‘web’ or network that constitutes the being of Dasein.9
The close relationship between fundamental ontology and phenomenology 
becomes evident, in that Heidegger thinks that phenomenology as a philosophical 
method inevitably expresses an understanding of the being of the phenomena it studies. 
That is, for Heidegger phenomenology is the science of being in the Aristotelian sense, 
i.e. as metaphysics. Thus, for Heidegger “ontology is possible only as phenomenology” 
(BT 35). However, this assertion raises the question of how phenomenology in the form 
of fundamental ontology is actually performed in order to acquire a direct access to 
phenomena. To this, Heidegger asserts the following: 
  
  
The expression ‘phenomenology’ signifies primarily a methodological conception. 
This expression does not characterize the what of the objects of philosophical 
research as subject-matter, but rather the how of that research.10
                      (BT 27) 
 
 
Phenomenology is a methodological conception that specifies not the ‘what’ (das Was), 
but rather the ‘how’ (das Wie) of philosophical research. Heidegger here introduces an                                                         8 In the Topics, Book I, chapter 9 Aristotle listed different ontological ‘categories’ as those characteristics 
that can be predicated in things, for example substance, quality, quantity, relation, place, time, position etc. 
The Aristotelian conception of the categories is alluded to in BT §9, where Heidegger distinguishes 
categories from existentials. For Kant, the categories are the a priori concepts that provide the conditions of 
possibility for understanding and unifying the manifold of intuition, or the plurality of perceived items. 
Thus, the Kantian categories are the conditions of possibility for all human cognition. See Immanuel Kant, 
Critique of Pure Reason, B105-6. Through the structural development of existentials, Heidegger contests 
the Kantian account of the categories as the pure concepts of understanding. 9 Heidegger characterises the categories of fundamental ontology as ‘existentials’ because “the essence of 
Dasein is its existence”. 10 Later on Heidegger repeats and underlines this distinction, saying that phenomenology “neither 
designates the objects of its researches, nor characterizes the subject-matter thus comprised. The word 
merely informs us of the “how” with which “what” is to be treated in this science gets exhibited and 
handled” (BT 34/35).  
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important, but in my view problematic methodological distinction between the ‘what’ 
and the ‘how’ of phenomenological research. This distinction will later be discussed; for 
now, it’s sufficient for us to simply grasp the formal meaning of phenomenology, which 
Heidegger designates as “to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very 
way in which it shows itself from itself” (BT 34).  
Heidegger explains that a phenomenon is something that shows itself as it is in 
itself and, accordingly, phenomenology as a method allows the phenomenon to be seen 
as such. But how exactly is this done? Is this, for example, a question of possessing a 
certain kind of perceptive ability? Matters get further complicated due to the ambiguity 
in Heidegger’s own characterisations of the phenomenon. On the one hand he asserts: 
“The expression ‘phenomenon’ signifies that which shows itself in itself, the manifest. 
Accordingly, the ‘phenomena’ are the totality of what lies in the light of day or can be 
brought to the light” (BT 28). On the other hand, Heidegger asserts: 
 
Manifestly, (the phenomenon) is something that lies hidden, in contrast to that 
which proximally and for the most part does show itself; but at the same time it is 
something that belongs to what thus shows itself, and it belongs to it so essentially 
as to constitute its meaning and its ground. 
                      (BT 35) 
 
What are we to make of this seeming contradiction between the hidden and the manifest 
phenomenon? As Taylor Carman points out, Heidegger’s first characterisation of the 
phenomenon (as something that shows itself) is a mere preliminary placeholder for what 
he later supplements with a more substantive concept.11
 
 Thus, phenomena in the ‘real’ or 
robust sense are not self-evidently accessible to conscious reflection - as were the case 
with Husserl’s phenomena - but rather they are hidden aspects of what lies open to view, 
and as such they are in need of evocation and interpretation. But we need to ask: hidden 
aspects of what? The answer to this question is Dasein’s being. Phenomena are the deep 
existential structures of Dasein that altogether make up the complex patchwork of the 
‘existential web’ in BT. I shall later return with an overview of the general outlines of the 
existential web. For now, it’s enough to know that Heidegger turns death into a 
phenomenon by making it part of the existential web.  
                                                        11 Taylor Carman, “The Principle of Phenomenology”, in The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, 
second edition, edited by Charles B. Guignon, 97-119  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 
100-101. 
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1.2 Is death a phenomenon? 
Heidegger characterises death, “in the widest sense, as a phenomenon of life” (BT 246), 
and he is thereby telling us that death in principle can be studied or disclosed as a 
phenomenon in its own right. From his characterisation of death as a phenomenon, it is 
clear that Heidegger thinks that death is structurally embedded as part of Dasein’s being. 
But in what sense, we might ask, can death be studied as a phenomenon?  
In BT §7 Heidegger presents his formal definition of the phenomenon as “what 
shows itself”. He then makes a threefold distinction amongst kinds of phenomena in this 
sense. First, a phenomenon can show itself either as it is in itself or as it is not; that is, 
falsely. Heidegger employs the term “semblance” for the latter, or what he calls the 
“privative modification of phenomenon” (BT 29). Examples of semblances include 
optical illusions, perceptual errors, etc. The second distinction is that some phenomena 
are appearances, examples of which include “indications, presentations, symptoms, and 
symbols” (BT 29). Although the appearance y is a phenomenon, what appears is not. In 
other words, all semblances and appearances are phenomena, but that not all phenomena 
are either semblances or appearances. Thus, Heidegger asserts: “Both appearance and 
semblance are founded upon the phenomenon, though in different ways” (BT 31). A third 
distinction is mere appearances, which Heidegger defines as those entities that are 
immune to the possibility of semblance, whereas what appears is defined as what is 
necessarily always beyond the reach of our experience. That is, a phenomenon y is a 
mere appearance (of x) if and only if y is an appearance of x and x can “never” show 
itself, i.e. must forever and “constantly” be “concealed” (BT 30).12
 From Heidegger’s detailed distinction between phenomenon, semblance, 
appearance, and mere appearance, one problem naturally emerges. How can we be 
assured that Heidegger’s notion of death in BT is a fully disclosed phenomenon, rather 
than just an appearance or a semblance of it? In other words, how is it possible to 
distinguish the ‘real’ phenomenon from what is simply a distorted or false version of it? 
Several commentators have recognised the methodological problems in relation to 
turning death into a phenomenon. As Stephen Mulhall points out, such a procedure 
seemingly presents us with a constitutive resistance to Heidegger’s own philosophical 
 
                                                        12 The notion of ‘mere appearances’ here resembles the Kantian notion of ‘das Ding an Sich’. In his 
discussion of the phenomenon, Heidegger mentions Kant and his use of the term ‘appearance’. According 
to Heidegger, Kant uses this term in a twofold way: first, appearances are what show themselves as 
‘objects of empirical intuition’. At the same time, an appearance is an emanation of something which hides 
itself in that appearance (BT 30).    
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method.13
At this point we seem forced to admit that death represent an exceptional 
epistemic, conceptual and methodological challenge. What makes it extraordinary as a 
phenomenon is on the one hand that death is indeed a visible and concrete part of human 
life: we do witness other people die, and we can easily infer from this fact that death 
eventually will occur to ourselves. On the other hand, death as it is in itself is not a 
tangible phenomenon that anyone can watch or grasp directly. Furthermore, even though 
it is possible to acquire knowledge of death in a narrower scientific sense, questions like 
the ultimate cause of death, why death is part of life, or what being dead is like, seems 
impossible to give definite answers to.  
 The resistance stems from the fact that death cannot be experienced directly. 
We can, of course, observe death in a straightforward sense as it occurs to other living 
beings. However, when we reach our own end we are not there anymore to experience it. 
In this sense, my own death is not a phenomenon on a par with any other phenomena in 
the world. The fact that our own death is so alien to us is because it is virtually 
impossible to imagine what being dead would be like. Since death in this sense seems to 
evade all conceptualisation, then how can we possibly acquire a satisfactory knowledge 
or understanding of it?  
Given the space and importance Heidegger confers on to death in BT, he 
evidently seems to think that there is a need for an improved understanding of death. This 
brings up the question of what is wrong with the traditional understanding of death. 
According to Heidegger, death as a philosophical concept has been covered up and 
handed over to us in a wrongful and distorted fashion by the philosophical tradition. 
Because of this long-standing philosophical and scientific distortion, death needs to be 
reinterpreted and disclosed anew as a phenomenon. But in what way is death as a 
philosophical concept covered up? Heidegger explicates the different ways in which 
phenomena can be covered up. First, a phenomenon can be covered up in the sense that it 
is still quite undiscovered; it is thus neither known nor unknown. Second, a phenomenon 
can be buried over, in that “it has at some time been discovered, but has deteriorated to 
the point of getting covered up again” (BT 36). When a phenomenon is buried over it can 
be so in a complete way. Or, what has been discovered earlier may still be visible but 
then only as a semblance. The third sense of covering-up, is disguising. Heidegger                                                         13 Stephen Mulhall, “Human mortality: Heidegger on How to Portray the Impossible Possibility of 
Dasein”, in Blackwell Companion to Philosophy: A Companion to Heidegger, edited by Hubert L. Dreyfus 
& Mark A. Wrathall,  297-310 (Malden: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2007), 298-299. 
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characterises the disguised phenomenon as both the most frequent, and as the most 
dangerous form of covering-up. This is so, because “here the possibilities of deceiving 
and misleading are especially stubborn” (BT 36). 
In addition to introducing the different distinctions between the covering up of 
phenomena, Heidegger points out that they in turn have two possibilities. First, there are 
necessary coverings-up that are grounded in what the thing discovered consists in. 
Second, there are coverings-up that are accidental and as such contingent on the use of 
different philosophical approaches. Clearly, Heidegger does not think that the covering-
up of death is entirely necessary due to the phenomenon itself, given his own efforts to 
disclose it as a phenomenon. The covering-up or disguise of death is thus a contingent 
fact that can be rectified by the use of correct method, which is phenomenology or 
fundamental ontology.14
 
  
1.3 Death in the hermeneutical process  
We have so far looked at the characteristic aspects of Heidegger’s phenomenology as 
fundamental ontology. We have also seen some of the preliminary problems that pertain 
to approaching death as a phenomenon. However, there are further elements to be 
included in order to complete the methodological picture. Heidegger distinguishes the 
ordinary concept of truth (as “correctness” or “correspondence”) from truth as “un-
concealment” (a-letheia). According to Heidegger, all ways of encountering entities 
involve unconcealment. The claim that unconcealment is the essence of truth is 
motivated by the recognition that we have to see truth in the broader context of Dasein 
and its ‘world of significance’. An assertion is thus true when it directs us to a state of 
affairs as that state of affairs in fact is. In other words, assertions and beliefs do not 
represent entities; they rather present them as ways of being oriented within the world so 
that a certain state of affairs can show up. The phenomenological analysis is an 
investigative process through which we can discover an assertion’s truth by being 
oriented to a state of affairs just as it is in itself. Accordingly, Heidegger says: “To say 
that an assertion is true, signifies that it uncovers what is, as it is in itself. It asserts, it 
points out, it ‘lets’ what is ‘be seen’ in its uncoveredness” (BT 154).                                                         14 Any objection to treating death as phenomenon may rest upon a conception of death as simply ‘being 
dead’, that is, as an instance non-existence. In our ordinary everyday understanding of the term, however, 
the concept death has at least three distinctive meaningful applications: death as the process of dying, death 
as an event, and death as the state of being dead. When we refer to “death”, we thus implicitly refer to 
these three aspects, either separately or in conjunction. 
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  In addition to his view of truth as unconcealment, Heidegger considers the task 
of fundamental ontology to be “the science of being” (BT 37). Thus, as a scientific 
method phenomenology consists in letting the ordinarily unseen or hidden dimensions of 
what is seen (phenomena) be seen. And, such ‘letting be seen’ is essentially an 
interpretive or hermeneutic effort: “The phenomenology of Dasein is a hermeneutic in 
the primordial signification of this word” (BT 37). Fundamental ontology is thus a 
circular process of using Dasein’s encounters of entities as the basis for explicit 
interpretations of its understanding of being, and then confirming or revising these 
ontological interpretations in the light of further concrete cases. Heidegger’s technical 
term for the elaborate process of unconcealment is apophantic interpretations, whose 
unique goal is apo-phansis; allowing entities to show themselves from themselves, just 
as they are in themselves.  
The process of apophantic interpretation is better known as the hermeneutic 
circle. What is perhaps less known is that there is not just one single step, but altogether 
four hermeneutical circles in Heidegger’s phenomenology. These circles emerge from 
the fourfold sense of the unconcealment involved in apophantic interpretations.15
The second step of fundamental ontology is phenomenological construction, 
which consists in making and confirming assertions about being, thereby bringing them 
out of concealment. From this aspect a second kind of hermeneutic circle emerges, 
between the meaning and comprehension of ontological assertions and the phenomena 
they indicate. Now, the aspect of phenomenological construction can be especially 
critical when it comes to the unconcealment of traditional philosophical concepts, such as 
 The 
first step in conducting fundamental ontology in the form of apophantic interpretation is 
phenomenological reduction, and it consists of making the entities’ ‘how-being’ into a 
phenomenon, i.e. to get it to show itself to us. Heidegger employs the term ‘formal 
indications’ to characterise the preliminary assertions found toward the beginning of an 
ontological investigation that are intended to get us to perform the phenomenological 
reduction. The theme in the phenomenological reduction is not being itself, but rather 
Dasein’s understanding of being. This first step of fundamental ontology thus involves 
the first hermeneutic circle between Dasein’s implicit understanding of being, and its 
explicit ontological interpretations of it. 
                                                        15 Edgar C. Boedeker Jr., “Phenomenology”, in Blackwell Companions to Philosophy: A Companion to 
Heidegger, edited by Hubert L. Dreyfus & Mark A. Wrathall, 156-172 (Malden: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
2007), 160. Boedeker presents us with an overview of the hermeneutic circles of unconcealment in 
phenomenology. 
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death. Why is that? The danger here lies in the thin line between the construction that 
actually stems from the phenomenon itself, and the construction that is more or less 
projected onto the phenomenon by phenomenologist. In other words, there is always the 
question of how much is coming from the phenomenon itself in the analysis, and what is 
projected onto it by the phenomenologist. As we shall later see, part of the problem with 
Heidegger’s notion of death is that this distinction tends to become more uncertain and 
blurrier the deeper we move into his existential-ontological analysis of death. 
The third step of fundamental ontology as apophantic interpretation is 
phenomenological obstruction or destruction. This step in the hermeneutic process 
consists of ontologically ‘illuminating breakdowns’ which allows one to get the right sort 
of access to ontological phenomena, thereby allowing for the phenomenological 
reduction and construction to occur. For Heidegger, a primary example of obstruction is 
anxiety, which is a mode of the primordial existential ‘attunement’, as part of Dasein’s 
‘facticity’.16
The fourth and final step of apophantic interpretation is to unconceal being by 
removing the distortions of it that arise from the use of concepts inappropriate to it. 
Heidegger calls this methodological step phenomenological deconstruction of the history 
of ontology. The task of BT is to retrieve the question of being by ‘destroying’ the history 
of ontology. This task can only be accomplished by attending to the enigmatic character 
of Dasein’s everyday existence, and thus by exposing the unnoticed metaphysical 
presuppositions that are concealed behind the ordinary. The purpose of 
phenomenological deconstruction is to keep ontology open to the possibility of progress 
through revolution or ‘crisis’. Heidegger’s insistence on the importance of deconstruction 
is closely connected with his view of ontology as a science. The purported consequence 
of deconstruction is to demonstrate the proper boundaries of traditional philosophical 
 The mood of anxiety thus serves “a fundamental methodic function for the 
existential analytic” (BT 187). Ontological phenomena, as structures in one’s own 
particular encounters of entities, can according to Heidegger only be glimpsed when 
something out of the ordinary occurs that disrupts the smooth flow of apophantic 
interpretations in daily life. Thus, we can see Heidegger’s obvious break with the 
traditional ideal of scientific detachment and neutral objectivity in that he finds moods or 
affectivity to be necessary methodological tools.   
                                                        16 An overview of further central elements of the ‘existential web’ will be presented at the beginning of 
chapter two.  
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concepts, so that they do not end up distorting the interpretation of ontological 
phenomena.  
As we have now seen, hermeneutical phenomenology is an elaborate 
philosophical method, involving several interpretive layers and intricate circular 
movements. If Heidegger’s notion of death is necessarily an interpretation of the 
phenomenon that emerges as a result of the hermeneutical process, this raises many 
questions. First, what happens to the traditional concept of death after being subjected to 
the process of apophantic interpretation? Is it completely destroyed or deconstructed, or 
are there traces of the old concept left in the new phenomenon?  
In addition to these questions, there is also a group of more general 
methodological problems to be addressed. First, as a method, philosophical interpretation 
is often seen as threatened by the problem of relativism. If all interpretations of 
phenomena are relative to the interpreter’s point of view, then how can we distinguish 
certain interpretations as ‘better’ or as more preferable than others? In particular, why 
should we accept Heidegger’s interpretation of death? According to Heidegger, relativity 
to a standpoint does in fact not entail a relativism wherein one standpoint is just as good 
or acceptable as the other. Neither does it entail that we are cut off from access to the 
phenomenon itself. Rather, what we encounter through phenomenological analysis is a 
presentation of a phenomenon as it shows itself from a particular point of view. Every 
phenomenon has a different mode of encounter proper to it, and it is only when we let it 
encounter us in the right way that it can show itself as it is in itself.17
Charles Guignon argues that Heidegger’s recognition of the forever present 
relativity to a standpoint is in fact consistent with realism that affirms the reality of what 
shows up for us.
 Certain existential 
phenomena, like death, can only show themselves to the one who is engaged with the 
world in the right kind of way. But, how can being engaged in the right way solve the 
problem of relativism? And how do we know which way is the right to be engaged?  
18                                                        17 Heidegger distinguishes between two kinds of interpretation in BT, Auslegung and Interpretierung. The 
first includes everyday phenomena of ordinary human skills, such as the primary examples Heidegger puts 
forth in Division I: hammering, driving a car, etc. The second form of interpretation is said to be a derived 
form of Auslegung, and includes discursive articulation and theorisation. Heidegger claims the status of 
philosophical Interpretierung for his analysis of death, in that it is a more reflective, articulated or explicit 
form of interpretation than the phenomenal activity of ordinary world interpretations. Philosophical 
interpretation is according to Heidegger not threatened by the problem of relativism because it is a case of 
the primary understanding of the world.  
 In a similar vain, Mark Wrathall points out that assertions about things 
18 Charles B. Guignon, “Introduction”, in The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, second edition, edited 
by Charles B. Guignon, 1-41 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 14. 
15  
cannot be true unless there is way that things are; that is, unless they are real with 
essential properties.19
Another question that has plagued hermeneutics is whether some 
phenomenological interpretations are true, while others might be false. As shown above, 
this problem is brought up in Heidegger’s discussion of the phenomenon as appearance 
or semblance. Thus, there is the question of whether we should accept Heidegger’s 
notion of death as a ‘true’ account of the phenomenon. It can be argued that the 
traditional philosophical obsession with the truth or falsity of interpretive claims is on the 
wrong track, and that the interpretive understanding of phenomena is better judged by 
different labels than true or false.
 We might agree with these commentators that the way a 
phenomenon shows up for me, always contains a certain element of reality or truth. Thus, 
it is only possible for things to manifest themselves in themselves if there is a way that 
that the world really is, and that it shows itself to us as it really is. But, we might ask; is it 
likely that every phenomenon will show up in this way? As we shall see, this seems to be 
a particular dilemma when it comes to death and how it shows up for us as a 
phenomenon. Part of the problem is thus that death shows up in many different ways, 
depending on our assumptions and on the circumstances. How can we then decide which 
way that is correct or ‘true’, so to speak?    
20 However, a pertinent question to ask of 
phenomenological texts is whether the description of phenomena is convincing or not.21
A third problematic feature of hermeneutical philosophy stems from the fact that 
all understanding of phenomena is necessarily circular. The insistence on the circularity 
of understanding on Heidegger’s part raises the problem of whether the interpreter of 
phenomena is necessarily always trapped within her own presuppositions and 
assumptions, and of whether there is some way to escape the interpretive circle. 
 
The credibility of the phenomenological analysis is indebted to the phenomena as they 
are in themselves, and not only on internal consistency. In other words, we need to ask 
whether Heidegger’s description of death as a phenomenon is - at the very least - 
recognisable in that it essentially matches ‘the thing in itself’.  
                                                        19 Mark Wrathall, “Unconcealment”, in Blackwell Companions to Philosophy: A Companion to 
Heidegger, edited by Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall, 337-357 (Malden: Blackwell Publishing 
Ltd, 2007), 349. 20 David Couzens Hoy, “Heidegger and the hermeneutic turn”, in The Cambridge Companion to 
Heidegger, second edition, edited by Charles B. Guignon, 177-201 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), 188. 21 Anne Granberg, Mood and Method in Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit, PhD-thesis (University of Bergen, 
2003), 168. 
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Heidegger asserts that the term ‘phenomenology’ expresses a maxim that can be 
formulated as ‘To the things themselves!’ (BT 34). This phrase might suggest that there 
is a domain outside the circle of interpretation against which our beliefs and assumptions 
can be tested and evaluated. However, Heidegger’s point is that beliefs and assumptions 
can only be checked or corrected against other beliefs and assumptions; understanding is 
thus necessarily holistic and includes a pattern of interlocking beliefs and skilful know-
how. There is no radically independent outside of the hermeneutic circle, and thus no 
escape from it. Rather, for Heidegger what matters is to find the right entrance into the 
circle. 
According to Heidegger, the possibility of neutral perception of present-to-hand 
objects, prototypical for detached scientific studies and characteristic of traditional 
philosophical thinking must be unmasked as a myth.22 Instead, the existential analytic of 
Dasein must provide an analysis of the conditions of possibility of understanding 
(Verstehen), which is what Heidegger calls the fore-structure of understanding.23
 
 What 
Heidegger means by understanding is not simply one form of cognition among others, 
but rather our most basic ability to live in and cope skilfully with our world. 
Understanding is thus a fundamental existential of Dasein, while explanatory knowledge 
and interpretation are derivate forms of understanding. For Heidegger, knowledge and 
interpretations presuppose a primary understanding of the world that runs through them. 
Furthermore, as features of our world are constantly changing, this requires us to change 
our interpretations and explanations of it. Thus, understanding of the world is always also 
a self-understanding, or Dasein’s interpretation of itself. Understanding involves, 
therefore, more than the discovery of facts about particular features of the world, which 
is characteristic of scientific research. Understanding is more primordially the disclosure 
of possibilities, or Dasein’s concrete possibilities in the world, which are never chosen 
arbitrarily or in complete freedom. 
 
                                                         22 Heidegger thinks that we most of the time we do not approach or understand things in an objective or 
detached way. Thus, Heidegger distinguishes between different approaches we have to things in the world 
and to ourselves: we rarely approach things as mere objects or as present-at-hand (vorhanden). Instead, 
most of the time we treat thing as ‘available’, or as ready-to-hand (zuhanden). 23 Heidegger analyses the fore-structure of understanding into three components: “fore-having” (Vorhabe), 
“fore-sight (Vorsicht), and “fore-conception” (Vorgriff). These three aspects of understanding (Verstehen) 
are the hermeneutic conditions of interpretation. 
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1.4 Leaping into the circle: death as a formal indication 
As earlier mentioned, Heidegger employs the term ‘formal indication’ (formale Anzeige) 
to characterise the preliminary assertions, found toward the beginning of an ontological 
investigation, that are intended to get us to perform the phenomenological reduction.24
According to Heidegger, what is to be analysed in phenomenology cannot be 
classified as ‘objects’. Rather, what is to be analysed is the relating-to (Verhalten) of 
factical life-experience. Thus, the task of hermeneutics is to make the ‘how’ of this 
experience explicit, and the task of formal indications is to lead the attention to how it is 
given. What a phenomenon is can only be ‘formally indicated’ by approaching the 
meaning of the phenomenon in both its ‘what’ and its ‘how’. A formal indication is thus 
supposed to draw the attention away from the given fact of experience, and towards the 
attitude in which it is experienced. Formal indications makes explicit that we always 
stand in a specific relation to that which is experienced. In other words, formal indication 
makes the subject matter accessible in such a way that its ‘how-being’ (Wiesein) 
becomes a definition of its authentic ‘what-being’ (Wasein). In addition to the relational 
aspect, the formal indication points towards a possible concretion (Vollzug) or enactment 
of the phenomenon. The formal indication only gives a certain direction for enactment, 
and it is the interpreter or philosophising individual’s concrete task to fulfil the 
enactment in application. Heidegger’s point is thus that a genuine understanding of a 
philosophical concept only can take place through application.  
 
As methodological tools, formal indications belong to the early steps of the 
hermeneutical process, and as such they are meant to represent a specific philosophical 
conceptuality that is to function non-objectifying. In other words, formal indications are 
meant to run counter to the theoretical or detached attitude that has haunted philosophy 
for centuries, and which Heidegger thinks conceals the most fundamental way in which 
human beings relate to the world. 
Granberg argues that death and other central philosophical concepts in BT are 
formally indicating in the sense just mentioned.25
                                                        24 Heidegger developed formal indications (also called prinzipielle Definitionen) as methodological tools 
in the 1920s in connection with his project of a hermeneutics of facticity. Formal indications are discussed 
in detail in GA 60/61, but they also appear in other writings from this period. 
 To the extent that Granberg’s view is 
25 Anne Granberg, Mood and Method, 24. Granberg argues that Being and Time as a whole can be seen as 
formally indicative in that it is an attempt to induce a certain mood (Stimmung) in order to effectuate the 
process of becoming authentic in the reader. See also Edgar C. Boedeker, “Phenomenology”, 165. 
Boedeker points out that one implication of the ontic basis of ontology is that what would appear to be 
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correct, it can certainly explain much of the debate, criticisms and downright confusions 
that have followed in the footsteps of Heidegger’s analysis of death. Furthermore, it 
explains why death as a formally indicating concept seems to be so emptied of concrete 
content. This is so, because as formal, formal indications will not refer to any specific 
‘ontic’ content; however, as indicative they are supposed to give a direction of the ‘how’ 
of enactment or application. 
 If death in BT is a formal indication in the sense suggested here, we should expect 
to discover the following after examining Heidegger’s full existential definition of death. 
First, as a non-theorising concept, Heidegger’s definition should mainly be about the 
‘how’ before about the ‘what’ of death. Furthermore, it should be non-speculative and 
without reference to the traditional metaphysical conception of death.26 We should also 
expect Heidegger’s notion of death to be ‘empty’ in the sense that we are not told 
specifically how to relate to death. Also, there should be enough direction in the 
definition to guide us on the right path so that we can relate authentically to death. In 
other words, Heidegger’s notion of death should be applicable in that it gives us guidance 
on how to act upon it. Finally, through an individual enactment of it, we should expect 
the existential notion of death to transform us in an existentiell (ontic) sense. In other 
words, such an enactment should contribute to make us authentic, and thereby open for 
considerable changes to take place in our lives.27
 As earlier mentioned, Heidegger’s methodological distinction between the ‘what’ 
and the ‘how’ of phenomena is problematic. Based on the discussion of death as a formal 
indication, we are in a better position to understand why. If death in BT is formally 
indicatory, then its ‘what’ is in fact determined by its ‘how’, and as such the being of 
death is inextricably linked to how we choose to relate to it. In other words, the 
determination of what death is goes from the relational aspect to the material, rather than 
the other way around. Now, in my view this is not only highly contra-intuitive; I find it to 
be simply wrong. I think we can agree with Granberg in her view that some of the central 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
ontological assertions are also really imperatives, and that what Heidegger comes to mean by “indication” 
is just this imperative nature of ontological assertions.  26 Granberg, Mood and Method, 165. Granberg points out that Heidegger does not merely demand a “first 
person perspective” on death; he appears to want to do away with all generality and universality 
whatsoever in relation to death. In other words, formalisation does not imply generalisation. Rather, 
“formal” in formal indication refers merely to the “how” of relating-to.  27 Granberg, Mood and Method, 7, 25. Granberg argues that BT has a maieutic intent in that it presents us 
with a normative ideal for Dasein to become authentic. However, the problem is that this makes it very 
difficult to perform a critical reading of the work, in that it leads to a form of immunisation against 
critique.  
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philosophical concepts in BT are indeed formally indicatory. This tendency is explicit in 
Heidegger’s notion of anticipatory resoluteness, or the way that we can relate 
authentically to death. When it comes to Heidegger’s definition of death, however, I will 
try to show that things are slightly more complicated. 
 
1.5 Is death a ‘fluid’ concept? 
One of the themes that run through this thesis is whether there is a method through which 
we can acquire knowledge of death. As we have seen, Heidegger denies that there can be 
any definite knowledge of death as a phenomenon outside the circle of interpretation. For 
Heidegger, knowledge in the traditional sense is a derivate form of the more primary 
phenomenon of understanding as a necessary aspect of being-in-the-world. It is because 
we already are in the world with a basic ability to live and cope skilfully, that we can 
acquire knowledge of anything at all. Thus, to have ‘knowledge’ of death is not know 
what death is in the traditional sense of acquiring knowledge of something. Rather, to 
‘know’ death is to comport oneself to it with either an authentic or an inauthentic 
understanding of it.  
Now, it is admittedly possible to acquire definite ‘ontic’ knowledge of death 
through the use of certain methodological approaches. A trained physician, for example, 
can identify the various causes of death, as can the coroner performing an autopsy. 
Because we observe the death of others, after a certain age most of us will ‘know’ that 
death is a part of our lives, and that everyone eventually will die. However, these are not 
the kinds of knowledge of death that is relevant for this discussion. Rather, what is 
sought after here is the general knowledge of what death is in the ontological sense. 
In the previous section the question was raised whether death in BT is a formal 
indicator. Behind the methodological notion of a formal indicator lies Heidegger’s view 
of the peculiar character of philosophical concepts. In contrast to the concepts of the 
positive sciences, philosophical concepts are vague, uncertain, and in a constant flux. 
According to Heidegger, this fluidity belongs to the essence of philosophical 
conceptuality as such. This is so, because to understand philosophical concepts is at the 
same time to be part of the ‘world’ in the form of factical life-experience.  
Above we saw the many problems and questions that pertain to subjecting death 
to the hermeneutical process. Together with these general problems, there is thus an 
additional question to be taken into consideration. This question concerns how many 
interpretations it is in fact possible to have from death as a phenomenon. An endless or 
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large series of possible interpretations would suggest that death is a genuinely fluid 
philosophical concept in Heidegger’s sense. As we shall later see examples of, death is 
indeed a ‘fluid’ concept in the sense that it has been understood and acted upon very 
differently throughout the history of the Western culture. Furthermore, as a consequence 
of cultural differences, death is currently understood and related to in very different ways 
throughout the world. In this cultural-historical sense, death is in fact a more fluid and 
transformable concept than Heidegger himself opens up for in his ontological explication 
of das Man, or the public interpretation of death.  
The historical and cultural fluidity of death stems from deep changes in what 
Heidegger characterises as the background understanding of being. The historical and 
cultural fluidity of death, however, does not entail that death, as it is in itself, is in a 
constant flux. Rather, it is plausible that death as it is in itself is unchangeable and 
untouched by historical changes and cultural influences. This claim, however, brings up 
an inescapable dilemma: if definite knowledge of death is impossible to acquire, then 
how can we know what it is in itself? And, if we cannot know the being of death, then 
how can we possibly determine which way that is the best or most appropriate to relate to 
it? As we shall later see, there are not an unlimited number of possible interpretations of 
death. Rather, a few available interpretations emerge from different sets of background 
understandings of being, or what Heidegger calls ‘metaphysics’.   
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2. Death in Being and Time 
 
One of the fundamental methodological problems of reaching a phenomenological 
understanding of death arises because death in the traditional metaphysical sense as ‘end 
of life’ is not experientially available to us. Heidegger, however, claims to avoid this 
problem by redefining death as a phenomenon of life. In this chapter I will examine how, 
through the application of the method of hermeneutical phenomenology, Heidegger turns 
death into a phenomenon. I will, furthermore, examine how Heidegger finally arrives at 
his full existential definition of death. Is the redefining of death as being-towards-death a 
fully legitimate methodological move on Heidegger’s part? And, is Heidegger’s 
definition of death purely existentialist?   
 At a crucial point in the analysis, Heidegger internalises death into the existential 
web, thereby analysing it as an inherent part of Dasein’s care-structure. In what follows I 
will thus present an overview of the different layers and essential elements of the 
existential web. Next, I will dicuss why death is brought into the existential analysis in 
the first place, and why it has significance for Heidegger’s philosophical project in BT.  
 A crucial premise for my thesis’ overall argument is to show that Heidegger’s 
notion of death is a composite rather than a purely existentialist notion. Thus, after first 
having followed in Heidegger’s methodological steps to see how he gradually redefines 
death, I will present several reasons for why I think that Heidegger necessarily ends up 
with a composite definition of death. On the basis of these reasons I will argue that 
Heidegger’s notion of death in BT is a composite of the traditional metaphysical 
understanding of death as ‘end of life’, and the existential understanding of death as 
being-towards-death.  
 One of the puzzling features of Heidegger’s existential definition of death is his 
characterisation of death as a ‘pure’ possibility. This characterisation has created much 
debate and criticism. Towards the end of this chapter I will make suggestion of what is 
the metaphysical background assumption is for the characterisation of death as a 
possibility, and thereby taking the first step in pointing towards the theme about death as 
a metaphysical concept.  
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2.1 The existential web  
In BT Heidegger famously poses the question of Being. Shortly put, this question is 
about the “meaning of being”. Heidegger thinks that this question can only be answered 
through the fundamental ontology of Dasein, which is “the only being whose Being is an 
issue for it” (BT 12). Thus, hermeneutical phenomenology as practiced by Heidegger, is 
the effort of ‘wresting’ the phenomenon of being from Dasein. The guiding idea behind 
the question of being is for Heidegger the “idea of existence”, which he calls “the Being 
of Dasein” (BT 42). “Existence” as the guiding idea for the analysis, indicates the 
movement from Dasein’s particular experience of being-in-the-world, to the structural 
totality of Dasein. 
 In BT, the analysis of Dasein’s being consists of three structural ‘layers’, so to 
speak. Altogether these analytical layers constitute the existential ‘web’ of Dasein, which 
contains a large number of fundamental structural categories or ‘existentials’.28
Being-in-the-world is the structural concept that most clearly and explicitly 
indicates the vague familiarity we all have with Being. Thus, the structure of Being-in 
has three elements that are all part of Dasein’s disclosedness (Entschlossenheit); that is, 
how Dasein inevitably experiences its ‘world’. These three elements are: attunement 
(Befindlichkeit)
 The 
existentials are interconnected both vertically and horizontally, and make up an intricate 
structural patchwork. They are portrayed as universal and timeless structures that pertain 
to Being as such, and thus they are not supposed to be relative to historical changes or to 
cultural variations.   
29
 The primary structural layer of attunement, understanding, and discourse or 
Being-in-the-world intersects with two other elements, thrownness and projection 
, understanding (Verstehen), and discourse (Rede) (BT 160/161). 
Heidegger calls these three the ‘originary’ or ‘fundamental’ existentials since they 
structure our being in the world. Attunement, understanding, and discourse determine the 
whole of Dasein and show its inner structuring or articulation. In other words, Being-in-
the-world reveals our understanding of being, and as such it constitutes the first structural 
layer in the existential web of Dasein. 
                                                        28 In contrast to the traditional metaphysical concept of ontological categories (for example in Aristotle), 
Heidegger calls the fundamental structures of Dasein ‘existentials’. This is because it is Daseins being that 
is analysed, and “the ‘essence’ of Dasein lies in its existence” (BT 42). 29 There are many translations of Heidegger’s term Befindlichkeit or Stimmung, such as state-of-mind, 
mood, etc. I here use the translation ‘attunement’ because I find that it captures well the meaning of being-
in-the-world as already attuned to it.  
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(Geworfenheit and Entwurf), which further articulate the totality of Dasein from a 
different angle. According to Heidegger, Dasein finds itself both “thrown into” the world 
and “throwing itself forward” (projecting) towards the world. It is attunement in the form 
of moods such as anxiety or boredom that reveals Dasein’s thrownness into the world. 
We are never free of moods, in that they indicate that things always matter to us, in one 
way or the other. Moods not only indicate thrownness, but that we are and have to be. 
Projection, on the other hand, designates the way Dasein relates to its being. Because of 
its projection, Dasein is always more than itself at any given moment. Dasein is the 
potentiality-for-Being, and in attunement, understanding, and discourse it makes its 
possibilities its own (BT 145). 
The second structural layer in the existential web is care (Sorge), which 
Heidegger considers to be the ‘ground’ of Being-in-the-world. Care is thus more 
concrete, but also wider in scope than the first structural layer of the existential web. 
Thus, the first element of the care-structure, Being-already-in or facticity, encompasses 
attunement, understanding, and discourse. The second element of the care-structure is 
Being-ahead-of-itself or existentiality, and it signifies Heidegger’s notion of the self as a 
transcending process. In other words, for Heidegger the self is not like an entity or a 
spiritual substance. It is rather a process that - because Dasein is already engaged in the 
world - discloses Being itself. The third element of the care-structure, Being-alongside or 
fallenness, signifies Dasein as always already fallen or dispersed among other beings 
(tools, instruments, objects, and other people) in the world.     
The third and deepest structural layer in the existential web is temporality, which 
Heidegger explicates as having three elements or ‘ecstasies’: future, having-been or the 
past, and present. For Heidegger, it is futurity that lies at the bottom of Dasein’s 
existence. Thus, futurity is the most important element of temporality, in that it is the 
condition of the possibility of projection. Having-been or the past corresponds to the 
care-structure’s Being-already-in as Dasein’s thrownness and facticity. The last element 
of temporality, the present or falling, corresponds to Being-alongside or the fallenness of 
the care-structure. 
The above is a general and simplified outline of the existential web, and it is 
important to know that it contains many more elements that are not included here. The 
existential web is thus an extremely complex structural fabric with many overlapping 
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layers and intricate interconnections between the various structural elements.30
 
 The point 
of mapping out the general outlines of it here, is that Heidegger at the beginning of 
Division II defines death in terms of the care-structure: 
If indeed death belongs in a distinctive sense to the Being of Dasein, then death (or 
Being-towards-the-end) must be defined in term of these characteristics. We must, 
in the first instance, make plain in a preliminary sketch how Dasein’s existence, 
facticity, and falling reveal themselves in the phenomenon of death. 
                     (BT 249) 
 
 
Throughout the remaining parts of this thesis I will discuss Heidegger’s notion of death 
with respect to the elements of the care-structure. Furthermore, there is one particular 
‘strand’ in the existential web that is of higher interest for the discussion. This is the 
strand that ‘originates’, so to speak, in the temporal aspect of falling; continues through 
Being-alongside or fallenness of the care-structure; becomes explicit in Heidegger’s 
structural determination of das Man; and, ‘expires’ in Dasein’s dominant mode of being, 
which is inauthenticity.31
  
  
2.2 The existential significance of death 
Death obviously holds great significance for Heidegger in his overall search for an 
answer to the question of the meaning of Being. Why this is so, is less obvious. The 
general view that death is of great importance for human life did of course not originate 
with Heidegger. This view has, for example, been shared by religions and spiritual 
traditions throughout the world-history.32 Despite its widespread acceptance, however, it 
is not a self-evident truth that death matters in any significant way for human existence. 
According to the Stoic view, “death is nothing to us” and thus contemplating it or the 
prospects of an afterlife is a waste of time.33                                                        30 Reiner Schürmann, “Heidegger’s Being and Time”, in On Heidegger’s Being and Time, edited by 
Steven Levine, 56-131 (New York: Routledge, 2008), 103. Schürmann points out that the inner articulation 
of the care-structure is so complex that it is that it is very difficult to map out the exact configuration of its 
various elements.  
 Against the Stoic view of death’s non-
31 As mentioned, all the different elements of the existential web are interconnected. This is not an effort 
on my part to isolate the mentioned elements from the larger existential context. The point is, rather, to 
expose this particular ‘strand’ in the existential web as more vulnerable for critique and in need of 
modifications.  32 In some religions death is seen as one of the most important aspects of human life, in that it is viewed as 
a preparation and/or transition to the afterlife. This is the case in both Buddhism and Hinduism, and to as 
certain extent it is also the case in Christianity and Islam.  33 This view was held, amongst others, by the ancient stoic philosophers Epicurus and Lucretius. I will 
return to the Stoic view about death in chapter five. 
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importance, it can be argued that the awareness and acceptance of mortality and finitude 
is one of the distinguishing traits of being human. Contemplating death and its 
inevitability can thus lead to a major rearrangement of the priorities in our lives because 
we, at the very least, begin to realise that our time on earth is limited. Thus, in the long-
standing Memento Mori-tradition, reflections over death were instigated to make people 
realise certain essential facts about their lives, for example that nobody, not even the 
most fortunate or healthy person, is exempt from death.34
 In BT Heidegger is not arguing for the significance of death from a religious point 
of view. He is neither identifying himself as part of the Memento Mori-tradition. What is 
it, according to Heidegger that makes death existentially significant? Heidegger’s 
analysis of death takes off with a reminder that “care is the basic state of Dasein” (BT 
249). What is then the essential connection between death and this particular structural 
layer in the web? One way to answer the question could be that care is the basic state of 
Dasein, because Dasein is concerned about its being. Thus, care is Dasein’s basic state 
because Dasein always is, and understands itself as, a mortal creature.
 
35
Heidegger further claims that death or the ‘end’ must be brought into the analysis 
so that the interpretation of Dasein can become primordial, and so that light can be 
brought existentially to Dasein’s being in its possibilities of authenticity and totality (BT 
233). What are the possibilities of authenticity and totality about? For a start, Heidegger 
thinks that death is what defines Dasein as a unity. In other words, death individualises 
Dasein, and thus it makes it possible for Dasein to become authentic. However, 
Heidegger immediately recognises the problem of how Dasein can ever become a totality 
in the sense of something completed or fulfilled:   
  
  
As long as Dasein is, there is in every case something still outstanding, which 
Dasein can and will be. But to that which is thus outstanding, the ‘end’ itself 
belongs. The ‘end’ of Being-in-the-world is death. This end, which belongs to the 
potentiality-for-Being – that is to say, to existence – limits and determines in every 
case whatever totality is possible for Dasein. 
             (BT 233/234)                                                         34 As part of Christianity, the Memento Mori-tradition acquires a moralising purpose in Medieval Europe. 
The prospect of death serves to emphasise the emptiness and fleetingness of earthly pleasures. In this 
sense, thinking about death can teach us the lesson that we ultimately are all equal, and that it is pointless 
to spend one’s life chasing after worldly goods and possessions. These awakening and liberating 
consequences is in essence why contemplation of death is important. 35 Piotr Hoffman, “Death, time, history: Division II of Being and Time”, in The Cambridge Companion to 
Heidegger, second edition, edited by Charles B. Guignon, 222-240 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), 224. Hoffman points out that because death holds such an intimate connection to the care-
structure, it holds an analogous position to the Cartesian Cogito Sum: death in BT is the Moribundus Sum. 
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Now, if there is always something outstanding in Dasein, then how can it ever become 
whole or a totality? Dasein is according to Heidegger not equivalent to a substance or to 
a present-at-hand object. Instead, the web of existential structures that constitutes Dasein 
is essentially non-objectifying. As Mulhall points out, the fundamental aspect of Dasein’s 
being as care seems to resist the very idea of completeness, and thus brings out a 
structural paradox in Heidegger’s analysis.36
 Mulhall argues that the dilemma of totality is reduced by the fact that human 
beings relate to themselves as subject to death, and that this relating-to-death constitutes 
a non-eliminable aspect of their self-understanding, and hence of their understanding as 
being-ahead-of-themselves. As certain conception of wholeness is thus inextricably 
involved in Dasein’s conception of its existence as ahead-of-itself. However, my 
objection to this is that having a conception of totality is not the same as actually being a 
whole person. So far, the question of totality or unity seems to lead into perplexity; it is 
uncertain whether Dasein’s death implies totality in the sense of fulfilment or 
completion. It is, furthermore, uncertain whether any kind of totality is possible for 
Dasein. Thus, at this point in the analysis Heidegger concludes that “for the most part, 
Dasein, ends in unfulfilment, or else by having disintegrated and been used up” (BT 244). 
Ending, in the sense of Dasein’s end, does not necessarily imply human fulfilment in the 
sense of perfection or completion.  
 This is so, because the structure of care 
makes Dasein always be ahead of itself, projecting itself upon existential possibilities, to 
something that is not yet. Thus, as the temporal structure of care implies, Dasein’s 
totality cannot be reified at any point in time. Yet, Heidegger’s notion of Dasein’s totality 
– as defined and secured by its ‘end’ – demands a whole that can be limited in some way. 
But, if Dasein cannot bring its own existence into view as a whole, then how can it 
produce an existential analytic of its own kind of being that might bring it into view as a 
fulfilled totality? 
 The quest for Dasein’s totality raises several problems, and one of them is what it 
really means to be a whole or complete human being. Does being complete involve a 
personal fulfilment in the narrow sense, or does it also involve a moral dimension, that in                                                         36 Stephen Mulhall, “Human mortality”, 298. Mulhall points out that when Heidegger tells us that the care-
structure includes Dasein’s being-ahead-of-itself, he alludes to what he elsewhere calls Dasein’s 
existentiality – the fact that it projects itself upon existential possibilities and that its existence is a matter 
of its being endlessly delivered over to the task of actualising some particular possibility of its being. But 
this undeniably means that Dasein can never achieve wholeness, in that it will always be ahead of itself, 
essentially related to a possibility or to something that is not yet.  
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a wider sense includes other people and society? Furthermore, is this kind of morally 
‘perfected’ completeness even possible to achieve for human beings? Apparently not, 
according to Heidegger’s analysis. In addition to bringing about a possible totality of 
Dasein, the perhaps most significant function of death in BT is heuristic. The analysis of 
death is thus preparatory for revealing Dasein’s temporality, and to make the temporality 
of being itself thinkable.  
As earlier shown, the deepest structural layer in BT is temporality, consisting of 
the ‘ecstasies’ past, present, and future. For Heidegger, the primary ‘ecstasie’ of 
temporality is the future, or the ‘not yet’. The future is thus the condition of the 
possibility of Dasein’s projection. Now, because of its futurity, Dasein is necessarily 
incomplete. Since there is always something outstanding, Dasein can never entirely be 
itself, and hence it cannot be ‘perfected’. As Taylor Carman argues, any ideal of self-
realisation, self-actualisation, or completion is in principle impossible for an entity like 
Dasein.37
In addition to the problems just mentioned about Dasein’s lack of totality, there is 
also the question of the timeliness of death. Is there ever a right time to pass away, or is 
death always untimely and inappropriate?
 What distinguishes Heidegger’s image of Dasein is thus his radical rejection of 
any conception of a finished, integrated self, or a complete present-at-hand entity. 
Carman’s view about Dasein’s lack of totality seems to be correct, in that it corresponds 
with Heidegger’s view that Dasein can never become fully authentic in a lasting, non-
deteriorating sense.  
38
                                                        37 Taylor Carman, “Authenticity”, in Blackwell Companions to Philosophy: A Companion to Heidegger, 
edited by Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall, 285-296 (Malden: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2007), 
287.  
 If there is such a thing as a right or 
appropriate time to die, this seems to imply that human beings can be fulfilled or 
complete in the sense that there is nothing left for us to accomplish during this lifetime. 
Thus, a paradox seems to follow from Heidegger’s analysis: on the one hand, death is 
always untimely in that for Dasein, there is always has something outstanding. On the 
other hand, death is what confers a possible totality on Dasein. In this sense, the question 
of a possible human fulfilment or completion seems to stand unresolved in Heidegger’s 
analysis. I will later return to this question with a suggestion of how the structural 
explication of Dasein must be modified in order to make it permanently whole and 
authentic.  
38 The common sense view is that dying old is always preferable to dying young and healthy. But is this 
necessarily always the case? 
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2.3 The search for existential death 
Since for the most part Dasein ends unfulfilled, Heidegger points out that it is urgent to 
find out in what sense death must be conceived as the ending of Dasein (BT 244). From 
this point in the analysis Heidegger tries out a variety of ways to find phenomenological 
access to Dasein’s ‘end’. He begins the search by giving examples of the type of ending 
involved in three domains of what-is other than Dasein (BT 245). These three endings 
are: the end or fulfilment of what-is in the domain of nature (as when a fruit is ripe), the 
end or disappearing of what-is ready-to-hand (as when the bread is finished), and the end 
of what-is present-at-hand (as when a painting is finished). However, in regard to these 
examples, Heidegger comments:  
 
By none of these modes of ending can death be suitably characterized as the ‘end’ of 
Dasein. If dying, as being-at-the-end, were understood in the sense of an ending of 
the kind we have indicated, then Dasein would thereby be treated as something 
present-at-hand or ready-to-hand. In death Dasein has not been fulfilled nor has it 
simply disappeared; it has not become finished nor is it wholly available as 
something ready-to-hand. 
                     (BT 245)  
 
None of the above three endings, then, involve ceasing to be or vanishing from the 
physical world as an entity. In other words, these different domains of what-is have 
different appropriate ends, which let them be in a particular way as either nature, ready-
to-hand, or present-at-hand. One might find it slightly peculiar that Heidegger mentions 
these endings of what is not Dasein. However, at this early point in the analysis he is 
simply trying to find a viable mode of access to death, which is why he canvasses a 
number of different ‘ends’ by asking whether Dasein’s relation to its end might be 
figuratively represented.  
After having dismissed the above endings as relevant for Dasein, Heidegger 
continues his search for the phenomenon. There is a crucial turning point in the text 
where Heidegger asserts the following:  
 
Just as Dasein is already its “not-yet”, and is its “not-yet” constantly as long as it is, 
it is already its end too. The “ending” which we have in view when we speak of 
death, does not signify Dasein’s Being-at-an-end (Zu-Ende-sein), but a Being-
towards-the-end (Sein zum Ende) of this entity. Death is a way to be, which Dasein 
takes over as soon as it is. 
                     (BT 245)  
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From this point in the analysis death is gradually understood as a way of being, as 
Heidegger turns away from the traditional understanding of death as an event that ends 
life. However, in section 49 Heidegger follows his earlier methodological strategy, in 
that he asserts that the ontological interpretation of death must be strengthened by 
bringing explicitly to mind what such an interpretation can not inquire about (BT 246). 
Heidegger now brings into the analysis different endings that are, more or less, 
applicable to Dasein. Carol White points out that the characteristic of these endings is 
that they “let Dasein be what it is, in that it takes a stand toward being”.39 Which are the 
endings that apply exclusively to Dasein? First, because we as Dasein are human beings 
with ‘life’, we also confront the end of life, which is what Heidegger calls ‘perishing’ 
(Verenden).40 All organisms will eventually perish, but according to Heidegger “Dasein 
never perishes” (BT 247). This is not because Dasein is immortal, but because it is not 
equivalent to a living organism in the biological sense. When people perish they instead 
go ‘out-of-the-world’ and lose their world as the context of significance.41
The next kind of ending that pertains exclusively to Dasein is ‘demise’ (Ableben). 
What is the difference between perishing and demise? Dasein, Heidegger says, “can 
demise only as long as it is dying” (BT 247). But what does this mean?  As White points 
out, demise is a ‘crossbreed’-phenomenon between perishing and the distinctive end 
connected to Dasein’s ownmost being. Demise is then perishing understood in particular 
ways, as when we take a stance towards what it is to be as perishing. White contends that 
Heidegger calls perishing demise to indicate the end of life as it has been taken up in a 
particular understanding of being.
  
42
                                                        39 Carol J. White, Time and Death: Heidegger’s Analysis of Finitude, edited by Mark Ralkowski 
(Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005), 67. According to White, Heidegger distinguishes (at least) 
nine kinds of ‘ends’ in BT, whereof six of these are both distinctively human and applicable to Dasein. In 
addition to ‘perishing’ and ‘demise’, White distinguishes the other four endings as: first, ‘being-at-the-end’ 
(BT 245-46), which is equivalent to the traditional understanding of death; second, ‘dying’ (BT 247); third, 
‘being toward the end’ (BT 250); and fourth, ‘the possibility of the impossibility of existing’ (BT 262). 
 
40 John Haugeland, “Truth and Finitude: Heidegger’s Transcendental Existentialism” in Heidegger, 
Authenticity and Modernity: Essays in Honor of Hubert L. Dreyfus – Volume 1, edited by Mark Wrathall 
and Jeff Malpas, 43-78 (Cambridge: the MIT Press, 2000), 66. According to Haugeland, ‘perishing’ is 
equivalent to the cessation of systematic biological function in an organism. However, Heidegger 
introduces yet another distinction to fully capture the biological sense of death, the medical concept of 
‘exitus’.     41 The absolute distinction between animal and human life is controversial. It could at least be speculated 
if not certain animals, for example higher mammals, experience perishing, and perhaps even demise, in the 
Heideggerian sense.  42 White, Time and Death, 70. This is where views of life after death enter in, for example, as the gateway 
to heaven or hell, the cycle of karma, or the cessation of consciousness. See also John Haugeland, “Truth 
and Finitude”, 66. On this point there is also a disagreement amongst interpreters: whereas Haugeland 
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At this point we need to pause and ask ourselves the following question: what is 
the real purpose of distinguishing between perishing and demise? At a general level, 
Heidegger tries to distance himself from a metaphysical and naturalistic conception of 
death through all the different distinctions of Dasein’s ‘end’. Moreover, the traditional 
metaphysical and modern naturalistic conceptions of death are not possible to access as 
phenomena, in that death is determined as ‘nothing’ in the sense of being the end of life. 
The purpose of distinguishing between perishing (or exitus) and demise is thus to make 
clear that neither of these endings should be identified with existential death proper. In 
other words, Heidegger aims to show that there are many different ways of understanding 
and relating to death, but that none of these ‘ontic’ ways takes a stand towards being as 
such. The analysis that follows after the explication of perishing and demise thus seems 
to be the critical point in the analysis where Heidegger’s notion of death departs 
altogether with the traditionally metaphysical, the scientific and the commonsensical 
views of death.43
After having distinguished the existential analysis of death from other possible 
interpretations of the phenomenon (exitus, perishing, and demise), Heidegger sets out to 
give a preliminary sketch of the existential-ontological structure of death. He points to 
the necessity of interpreting the phenomenon of death as Being-towards-the-end, and in 
terms of the basic structure of care (BT 249-50). Thus, Heidegger asserts “Being-at-an-
end implies existentially Being-towards-the-end (BT 250). At this point in the analysis 
death is ‘interiorised’ as a part of the existential web, and redefined as a way of being 
towards death.  
  
The question arises whether this is a fully legitimate move on Heidegger’s part. 
What theoretical justifications can Heidegger possibly have for redefining death in this 
way?44                                                                                                                                                                    
characterises demise in a similar way as White as a social-cultural phenomenon, Hubert Dreyfus sums up 
demise as “inevitable terminal death”. See Hubert Dreyfus’ foreword to Carol J. White, Time and Death: 
Heidegger’s Analysis of Finitude, xxxiv. 
 Critics claim that by redefining death as a way of being-towards-death, 
43 Heidegger’s many distinctions of death are confusing, but they are also helpful in that they may clarify 
the many possible ways of understanding death. For example, a medical scientist is most likely to view 
death mainly as a combination of ‘exitus’ and ‘perishing’, thereby emphasising the biological and 
physiological causes leading up to terminal death. A social scientist or an historian, on the other hand, will 
probably tend to approach death as ‘demise’, thereby emphasising the social-cultural factors involved in 
dying and death. Finally, a combination of ‘perishing’ and ‘demise’ probably come close to a widespread 
commonsensical view of death. Characteristic for all of these perspectives on death is that they in general 
tend to relate to death from an objective or detached third-person point of view. This ‘present-at-hand’ 
manner of relating to death is precisely what Heidegger tries to distance himself from in BT.   44 Sean Ireton, An Ontological Study of Death: From Hegel To Heidegger (Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press, 2007), 18-19. Ireton shows that Heidegger is not the only thinker who seeks to ground 
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Heidegger is not really analysing death as a phenomenon. For example, Herman Philipse 
argues that no new discoveries about death are made in BT, and that the methodological 
problems are not solved.45
Can this criticism be countered? Mulhall points out that we cannot grasp 
Heidegger’s account of death except against the horizon of his account of the ontological 
difference, that is, the division between the ontic and the ontological.
 Heidegger instead simply confuses our attitudes toward our 
own death with death itself. Thus, in Philipse’s view a phenomenology of death itself is 
impossible, because the only thing we really can study is our concern about our own 
death. 
46
How far does this perspective take us when it comes to the question of the 
legitimacy of redefining death? Mulhall’s claim that life in the form of Dasein’s 
existence is the only available option we have for acquiring phenomenological 
understanding of death is, I believe, on the correct path. Thus, if there is a way to 
approach death, the only option we might have is to do so indirectly through life. This 
solution, however, brings up a further dilemma. If life is death’s proxy, much seems to 
depend on how we understand the notion of ‘life’. As we have seen, Heidegger explicates 
Dasein’s existence structurally. The validity of death as a ‘phenomenon of life’ thus 
seems to hinge on whether the existential web presents us with an ontologically correct 
image of the human constitution. 
  Thus, because 
death cannot be grasped ontically, it must be ‘ontologized’ as a part of Dasein’s 
structural web. In other words, Heidegger’s notion of death remains forever beyond any 
direct existential (and phenomenological) grasp. It is at the same time shown to be 
graspable essentially indirectly, as an omnipresent condition of every moment of 
Dasein’s existence. In this sense, life is death’s representative or a proxy through which 
death’s resistance for being grasped is at once acknowledged and overcome. Death can 
thus only show up as a phenomenon in and through life, which makes being-towards-
death as, essentially, a matter of being-towards-life. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
death ontologically. As Sean Ireton shows, Heidegger’s efforts are rooted in a major trend of “ontological 
totalism” in German literature and philosophy. Ireton points out that by ‘ontologising’ death, Heidegger 
can be seen as reacting towards the rising trend of the denial of death during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. 45 Herman Philipse, Heidegger’s Philosophy of Being: A Critical Interpretation (New Jersey: Princetown 
University Press, 1998), 365. 46 Mulhall, “Human mortality”, 304-5. 
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2.4 A ‘pure’ existential definition of death? 
A major part of Heidegger’s efforts in trying to establish a new and improved 
interpretation of death as a phenomenon, is to ‘wrest’ the concept of death away from its 
traditional present-at-hand understanding. We have so far followed the steps of the 
hermeneutical process of redefining death from the traditional conception of death as the 
end of life to the existential conception of being-towards-death. The question that 
naturally arises at this point is whether Heidegger in fact manages to establish a ‘pure’ 
existential definition of death. The importance of this question stems, in part, from the 
many methodological considerations that were raised in the foregoing chapter. A pure 
existential definition of death seems to imply that the method of hermeneutical 
phenomenology is successfully applied, in that a ‘new’ phenomenon of death is 
disclosed, rather than simply an appearance or a semblance of the old concept. It further 
implies that the ‘how’ of death decides how we come to understand its ‘what’. Finally, it 
implies that the metaphysical understanding of death as the end of life is no longer part of 
the existential definition.  
Heidegger points out that in order to be fully existential or ontological, his notion 
of death must be “unaccompanied by any existentiell commitments”. Thus, he asserts: 
“The existential problematic aims only at setting forth the ontological structure of 
Dasein’s Being-towards-the-end” (BT 249). Here, the emphasis on the term “towards”, 
seems to suggest that Heidegger believes his definition to be entirely about death in its 
‘how-being’.  For the sake of the discussion of the nature of Heidegger’s notion of death, 
I now take a big leap in the text to finally arrive Heidegger’s full definition of death:  
 
Death, as the end of Dasein, is Dasein’s ownmost possibility- non-relational, certain 
and as such indefinite, not to be outstripped. Death is, as Dasein’s end, in the being 
of this entity towards its end. 
             (BT 258/259) 
  
This definition has several parts and distinctions, each of which will be discussed in 
detail throughout the following chapters. The prevailing view amongst commentators is 
that Heidegger’s definition is entirely existential, and that it has nothing to do with the 
metaphysical understanding of death as ‘the end of life’ or demise.47
                                                        47 There are many different interpretations of Heidegger’s notion of death that defends the view that it is 
entirely existential. I have chosen the following two examples because I find them to be ‘clear cut’ 
examples.  
 This view is, of 
course, in accordance with Heidegger’s own understanding. Thus, White argues that 
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most discussions of Heidegger’s notion of death - and in particular the critical 
interpretations of it - are based on mistaken assumptions.48
 
 The main widespread and 
mistaken assumption is that when Dasein dies, it ceases to be ‘actual’; that is, it 
undergoes physical death or perishing. Another mistaken assumption – while based on 
the recognition of death as a ‘way to be’ – at the same time takes death to be a matter of a 
person’s relationship to her physical death; that is, as a way of caring about one’s demise 
or perishing. According to White these assumptions are mistaken because existential 
death is not grounded in the biology of our bodies, but rather in Dasein’s relation to 
being. Accordingly, any criticism founded on one of these mistaken assumptions is 
bound to fail. The essence of White’s view is that Heidegger has managed to establish a 
purely existential definition of death. She is not alone in arguing for this view, and 
according to Carman:  
Heidegger’s account of existential death therefore departs significantly from 
commonsense beliefs and attitudes about death, but he has not simply redefined the 
word in a wilful or arbitrary way. Indeed, Heidegger’s conception of death as the 
essential finitude of projection and the constant closing down of possibilities 
arguably cuts right to the heart of what we find so disturbing and depressing about 
the prospect of our own death (my italics). 49
 
  
Carman’s view is, in short, that existential death is a constant closing down of 
possibilities, and that it as such is far removed from any ordinary understanding of death. 
A fundamental structural element of Dasein’s being is its existence, and as a thrown 
projection its existence consists of its possibilities. Thus, when Dasein dies, its 
possibilities accordingly run out. Carman’s interpretation is focused on the individual 
level, in that existential death occurs when a Dasein is running out of possibilities. In this 
respect it differs from White’s, which is far more radical and extensive. According to 
White, existential death is equivalent with the world-collapse that can befall entire 
cultural epochs.50
                                                        48 White, Time and Death, 72. 
 ‘Dying’, on this account, is the strife to preserve the culture’s 
understanding of being, while at the same time being ready to sacrifice it when 
confronted with anomalous practices that portend the arrival of a new cultural world. For 
White, existential death occurs when old worlds die and new ones are born, as when a 
49 Taylor Carman, Heidegger’s Analytic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 283. 50 White, Time and Death, 89-90. 
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change in the background understanding of being leaves old possibilities behind and lets 
new ones take place. 
We have now seen two examples of interpretations that essentially defend the 
view that Heidegger’s definition of death is purely existentialist, and as such not 
concerned with the traditional understanding of death. I find these interpretations, 
however, rather difficult to accept and in the following I will give reasons for why I think 
they should not be endorsed. The first reason emerges directly from Heidegger’s 
definition itself, where death is characterised as “certain, indefinite, and not to be 
outstripped”. If White’s radical interpretation were correct, we would be left with an 
understanding of death as something like “a cultural world-collapse that is absolutely 
certain to happen, can happen any moment, and is not to be avoided”. This not only 
sounds strange; it must surely be wrong.51 To see why, consider Hubert Dreyfus’ claim 
that there is something special about the final collapse of being-in-the-world, in the sense 
that terminal death - unlike other forms of death - is not to be outstripped. Thus, 
according to Dreyfus there is indeed an essential difference between terminal death 
(perishing/demise), and all other forms of existential breakdown, in the sense that it is 
only the first one that seems to be necessary and inevitable.52
I think we need to agree with Dreyfus that it is not necessary for an individual to 
experience death in the form of an existential breakdown of identity. It is neither 
inevitable for the members of a culture to experience a total cultural collapse. 
Furthermore, it is arguably only possible to experience existential breakdowns if the 
collapse in question is not the terminal one.
  
53 In other words, terminal death as perishing 
or demise is unique in the sense that it seems to be the only kind of death that is both 
certain and indefinite.54
                                                        51 Iain Thompson, “On the Advantages and Disadvantages of reading Heidegger Backwards: White’s Time 
and Death”, in Inquiery, Vol. 50, No. 1 (February 2007), 103-120.Thomson points to the absurdity in 
White’s interpretation of death, by claiming that the thrust of it is to eliminate the need to account for the 
difference in Heidegger’s early and later views on death. Thus, Thomson thinks that White puts up an 
uncompromising, hyper-orthodox defence of Heidegger as a philosopher that never changes his mind about 
his main philosophical project – or, even worse: that he can never be mistaken in his views.  
  
52 See Hubert L. Dreyfus’ foreword to Carol White’s Time and Death, xxxiv. 53 Dreyfus, foreword to Time and Death, xxxi-xxxiii. On this point it is possible to trace a contradiction in 
Dreyfus’ view, in that he first claims White’s interpretation of existential death to be the most plausible. He 
concludes, however, by asserting that terminal death or demise must be what Heidegger was referring to all 
along.  54 I will return with a discussion of death’s certainty and indefiniteness in chapter five on metaphysics and 
death. There I will try to show that the question of death’s indefiniteness is not so obviously answered.  
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What then about Carman’s interpretation of existential death as a constant closing 
down of possibilities? On several places in BT Heidegger asserts that Dasein is “dying 
constantly”; a point that has created debate. Carman’s account does indeed offer an 
answer to the question of how Dasein can be constantly dying, as an essential part of its 
own being. But again, Carman’s interpretation is implausible because it does not account 
for the fact that Dasein’s possibilities are also constantly opening up as a part of its 
essential being, and thus making Dasein’s death impossible to attain.55 As we can see, 
Dreyfus’ remarks here make clear that Heidegger’s definition of death in the end relies 
on the ordinary conception of death (as ‘end of life’) in order to make sense.56
The second reason why Heidegger’s notion of death should not be accepted as 
entirely existentialist stems from what is arguably one of Heidegger’s overall purposes 
with his ontological analysis of death; namely to instil in the reader a transformation in 
her understanding of the phenomenon of death, and thereby bringing her towards an 
authentic understanding of being. Heidegger seems to think that there is something 
inherently distorted about the commonsensical or public interpretation of death. Thus, 
according to Heidegger, das Man has an essentially inauthentic way of relating to death 
based on certain wrongful views about it. Now, if it is part of Heidegger’s project to 
provide an improved interpretation of death, and thereby informing us about the correct 
existential grounds by which we should relate to death, he must also be referring to the 
traditional interpretation of death as demise in his definition. Why? It is the traditional 
understanding of death as a future event that furnishes the ground for the acceptance of a 
new interpretation. Thus, Heidegger cannot present us with a totally new and unfamiliar 
existential interpretation without somehow appealing to the old, familiar understanding 
of death. 
  
We have now seen the first two reasons for why Heidegger’s definition of death 
is not a purely existential notion. There is, however, a third reason that further presses 
this point. This reason has to do with the internal logic of Heidegger’s neologism ‘being-
towards-death’, which is often used as the shorthand expression for his full definition of 
death. In order to avoid a complete circularity Heidegger must refer to death in the                                                         55 Dreyfus, foreword to Time and Death, xxi-xxii. 56 Dreyfus, foreword to Time and Death, xxxv. In fact, Dreyfus suggests that in Being and Time Heidegger 
lays out two existential-ontological accounts of how to live in the face of death, that are in fact in tension 
with each other. Sometimes Heidegger is proposing a formalized account of the essence of existential-
ontological collapse in general (as in White’s interpretation), and sometimes he is giving an account of the 
distinctively final character of terminal death.  
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traditional sense, the last term ‘death’ cannot mean ‘being towards death’ as well, on 
pains of an infinite regress.57
I have now presented altogether three reasons for why Heidegger’s analysis 
constitutes a composite existential conception of death. However, we need to reflect a bit 
more on why this has been such an important issue to discuss. On the general level, the 
disagreement and confusion that surround Heidegger’s analysis of death demonstrate the 
immense difficulties involved in trying to establish a methodological access to death. 
More specifically, they tell us something about the difficulty to dispose of the traditional 
understanding of death (as perishing or demise), precisely because this understanding 
constitutes the necessary basis for the hermeneutic process of a reconstruction of the new 
phenomenon. Furthermore, the question of the composite ‘nature’ of Heidegger’s notion 
of death raises the possibility that the relation between the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of death 
is the opposite from what is the case if death is a formal indication. In other words, it is 
what death is that determines how we should relate to it, rather than the other way 
around. This, however, throws us right back into the dilemma of how death can be 
known or approached as it is. 
 Hence, the shorthand expression being-towards-death is a 
composite of both the ‘how’ of death as being-towards-death, and the ‘what’ of death in 
the traditional sense as end of life. 
 
2.5 Death as possibility 
One of the striking features of Heidegger’s definition of death - apart from its apparent 
complexity - is arguably its strangeness or unfamiliarity. Certainly, we can recognise and 
understand characterisations such as “certain”, “indefinite”, and “not to be outstripped”. 
These phenomenological descriptions of death are seemingly uncontroversial, and 
thereby easily acceptable. When Heidegger characterises death as Dasein’s “ownmost, 
non-relational possibility”, however, things immediately become more complicated and 
confusing. For what are these characterisations referring to?  
As we saw examples of in the previous section, one of the keys to an existentialist 
interpretation of death lies in the term possibility. Thus, Carman’s existentialist 
interpretation finds support in Heidegger’s claim: “Death must be understood as a 
possibility, it must be cultivated as a possibility, and we must endure it as a possibility”                                                         57 Philipse, Heidegger’s Philosophy of Being, 361. Philipse makes the point about circularity and regress, 
in that ‘being towards death’ would come to mean ‘being-towards being-towards-death’. On this particular 
point, I find Philipse’s critique to be quite pertinent.    
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(BT 261). According to Heidegger, the only way we can comport ourselves towards 
death is when it stands before us as a pure possibility throughout our existence. Death is 
thus the only pure possibility of Dasein insofar it is free of any admixture of actuality and 
necessity.58
Heidegger asserts that regarding death’s “ontological possibility, dying is 
grounded in care”.
 But here we are faced with an obvious puzzle: for how can death remain a 
possibility? Is death not rather a possibility that, after a certain time, turns into actuality 
by necessity whereupon it loses its character of possibility? 
59
Critics point to what they find to be certain deep flaws in Heidegger’s reasoning 
of death as a possibility. Philipse points out that when Heidegger characterises death as a 
possibility of Dasein, the word possibility must have a very different sense than when he 
claims that Dasein is its possibilities in the sense of being a thrown projection. This is so 
because death is clearly not a possible course in life that one might take or fail to 
realise.
 This means that in attunement, understanding, and discourse Dasein 
makes its possibilities its own. Furthermore, Dasein as a “ thrown projection” designates 
the way Dasein relates to its own being. In other words, Dasein is always more than itself 
at any given moment, since it holds its own being before itself as a possibility; it is the 
potentiality-for-Being. Dasein is its possibilities, so to speak, in the sense that it 
constantly projects into further possibilities and is concerned with its future being. To 
explain how we should relate to death as possibility, Heidegger says: “The closest 
closeness that one may have in being-toward-death-as-a-possibility, is as far as possible 
from anything actual” (BT 262). 
60 Philipse thus contends that Heidegger misleadingly pictures possibility and 
actuality as scalar magnitudes, in that he seems to think that if we run toward a 
possibility, then we at the same time run away from an actuality.61
                                                        58 Possibility (Moglichkeit) is one of the key terms of the existential analysis of BT. Heidegger’s 
understanding if this term is threefold: possibility; potentiality-to-be (Seinkonnen); and to render possible 
(Ermoglichen).  
 Heidegger seems to 
think that if something is not actuality, then it must be possibility; hence, he characterises 
death as the “possibility of the measureless impossibility of existence” (BT 263). Philipse 
argues that there are logical blunders to Heidegger’s view of death as possibility, and we 
59 Piotr Hoffmann, “Death, time, history: Division II of Being and Time”, 363. Hoffmann points out that 
Dasein’s basic state of care is dependent on Dasein’s sense of being a mortal creature. Thus, if we were not 
threatened by death, our basic state would not be care. And vice versa, if our basic state were not care, our 
death would not be felt as threatening.  60 Philipse, Heidegger’s Philosophy of Being, 363. 61 Philipse, Heidegger’s Philosophy of Being, 366-67. 
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must therefore conclude that there is no way that death can be a pure possibility, 
completely detached from actuality and necessity. 62
Is there a way to counter this criticism? One could argue that Heidegger’s concept 
of potentiality must be distinguished from the logical use of possibility, as one of the 
categories of modalities in transcendental logic. It is thus only for things present-at-hand 
that possibility and actuality can be opposed. According to Heidegger, Dasein is not 
present-at-hand; it is rather a potential in the sense of projection into possibilities. 
However, as Mulhall points out, there is indeed no way that death can coherently be 
regarded as even a very unusual kind of existential possibility. This is so, because any 
genuine existential possibility is one that might be made actual by Dasein. Death cannot 
be the possibility of our own non-existence; it is rather an existential impossibility. Thus, 
we can only relate to death in and through its relation to what is graspable in its 
existence; that is, to those genuine possibilities that constitute it from moment to 
moment. 
  
63
Notwithstanding its ingenuity, this solution does not quite answer the question of 
how death can remain a pure possibility. Is there any viable solution to this puzzle? There 
is an important, but largely overlooked aspect of Heidegger’s analysis that might 
contribute to spread some new light on the discussion of death as a possibility. This is 
where Heidegger asserts: “Higher than actuality stands possibility” (BT 38). The 
subversion of the traditional metaphysical priority of actuality over possibility represents 
the thrust, so to speak, of Heidegger’s project to ‘destroy’ traditional metaphysics. By 
defining our fundamental way of being-in-the-world as possibility, Heidegger intends to 
overcome the standard metaphysical definitions of existence in terms of ‘presence’
 
64
                                                        62 Philipse, Heidegger’s Philosophy of Being, 362. The logical blunder is found in the following 
syllogism: a) Dasein is its possibilities; b) death is a possibility of Dasein; therefore, c) death is a mode of 
existing. 
. 
Heidegger proposes an ontology that, in contrast, will reveal time as a horizon of 
possibilities that ‘possibilises’ and grounds the present. In other words, Heidegger sees 
the possible as the transcendental horizon of Dasein. My suggestion is that we need to 
reach down to this theoretical level in BT in order to accept or refute the view of death as 
63 Stephen Mulhall, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Heidegger and Being and Time, second edition 
(New York: Routledge, 2006), 127, 304. This is essentially the same view as when Mulhall claims that 
death can only be studied by life “going proxy” for death. Thus, death is shown to be graspable essentially 
indirectly, as an omnipresent condition of every moment of Dasein’s existence. 64 Classical metaphysics has since Aristotle viewed time as an addition of present movements. Hence, the 
well-known metaphysical definitions of existence in terms of presence: Ousia, Substantia, Res Cogitans, 
etc. 
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possibility. We must, in fact, either endorse or dismiss the primacy of possibility over 
actuality. The primacy of possibility is thus the metaphysical presupposition that serves 
as ground, not only for Heidegger’s analysis of death, but also for the whole of BT.   
Time has finally come to gather the threads of this discussion. The main questions 
that have been raised in this chapter are, first, why death is brought into the analysis of 
Dasein’s being, and second, whether Heidegger’s notion of death is purely existentialist 
or not. We have seen that death is ‘interiorised’ into the existential web in order to make 
Dasein whole and authentic. We have also seen several reasons for why death in BT is a 
composite, rather than a purely existentialist notion. There are the unresolved dilemmas, 
however, of whether Dasein can become an authentic totality, and furthermore, what it 
means to be authentic. The problem of authenticity will thus be discussed in greater 
detail in the following chapters.  
Several methodological problems and questions were raised in the previous 
chapter, and some of these can now be resumed. First, there is the question of whether 
Heidegger’s phenomenological descriptions of death are ‘true’ or correct. It is not really 
possible to decide whether Heidegger’s assertions about death are true or false outside 
the context of background assumptions from which they emerge. This is the main reason 
for why Heidegger’s notion of death is ‘metaphysical’, a theme I will expand on in the 
last chapter. Second, it was suggested that death in BT is a formal indication. By arguing 
that Heidegger’s notion of death is a composite, I have already implicitly suggested that 
the relationship between its ‘how’ and ‘what’ is different from the typical formal 
indication. Thus, the ‘what’-part of Heidegger’s definition of death is more prominent 
than what commentators usually acknowledge. This conclusion is important for the 
overall purpose of my thesis, and in particular for the theme of death as a metaphysical 
concept. 
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3. Death and authenticity 
 
The main conclusion in the previous chapter was that Heidegger’s definition of death in 
BT is a composite of the metaphysical notion of death as ‘end of life’, and of the 
existential notion of ‘being-towards-death’. This conclusion is important for this 
chapter’s main purpose, which is to examine in greater detail why and how Heidegger 
thinks that death is significant for human existence. In this chapter I will thus probe 
deeper into the ‘how-being’ of death, by examining Heidegger’s notion of authenticity. 
To be authentic is a possible mode of Dasein’s being, as opposed to being in its 
inauthentic or everyday mode. Heidegger holds the view that to face up death in a 
specific way is the key to Dasein’s authentic existence. Thus, the way to attain 
authenticity is through the attitude of anticipatory resoluteness. What exactly does 
anticipatory resoluteness amount to, and how is this twofold way of relating to death 
attained and maintained? Furthermore, why is this necessarily the most appropriate way 
of relating to death? These are some of the questions that will be addressed in this 
chapter. 
In BT Heidegger insists that authenticity is an ontological category without any 
ethical content or connotations whatsoever; when Dasein is authentic, it simply is its own 
self in a non-evaluative sense. The most fundamental problem up for discussion in this 
chapter is whether being authentic is a non-evaluative category, or whether it might have 
certain irreducible ethical dimensions to it. Can the notion of authenticity function as a 
descriptive ontological foundation for a possible ethics? This problem concerns the 
general thematic of death’s significance for human existence. The question is, in short, 
how deeply death and our relationship to it can affect the quality of human life.  
Based on a discussion of different perspectives on Heidegger’s notion of 
authenticity, I will argue that being authentic does not necessarily have ethical bearings 
or connotations. This is so, because part of the problem with Heidegger’s notion of 
authenticity is that it’s too empty or vacuous to have ethical content. Another problem is 
the structural limitations that pertain to Dasein’s being as such. The challenge that is 
raised towards the end of this chapter, is thus to find a way to modify the existential web 
so that authentic Dasein can become ethical Dasein.  
 
 
41  
3.2 Anticipation of death 
The full formal concept of authenticity in BT comprises two distinct, but equally 
important elements: anticipation and resoluteness (Vorlaufen Entschlossenheit).65
 As shown in chapter two, part of Heidegger’s definition of death is its impending 
possibility. Thus, Heidegger’s explication of anticipation as the appropriate attitude 
towards death arises as a direct consequence of his characterisation of death as an 
existential possibility. Since death is a pure possibility that is never weakened or turned 
into actuality, it should be constantly anticipated: “Being-towards-death, as anticipation 
of possibility, is what first makes this possibility possible, and sets it free as a possibility” 
(BT 262). 
 Since 
these are interconnected but yet separate aspects of authenticity, I will first discuss the 
attitude of anticipation and then move on to the notion of resoluteness in the next section. 
What are the distinguishing features of anticipation, and why is this the most appropriate 
attitude towards death? 
Except from anticipating death, what other possible ways of relating to death are 
there? According to Heidegger, when death is treated as an actuality or as a possibility 
that eventually will become actuality, we tend to relate to it by simply thinking about it, 
brooding over it, or by expecting it (BT 261/262). Heidegger claims that to wait for death 
to actualise, or to dwell or ponder upon it’s when and how, are essentially inauthentic 
ways of being-towards-death. This is how everyday Dasein or das Man relates to death in 
ignorance of its true impending ‘nature’, by avoiding it as something that will become an 
actuality in the distant future. In contrast to this, anticipation of death as a possibility has 
the liberating effect in that it “does not evade the fact that death is not to be outstripped; 
instead, anticipation frees itself for accepting this” (BT 264). Moreover, Heidegger says 
that anticipation “discloses to existence that its uttermost possibility lies in giving itself 
up, and thus it shatters all one’s tenaciousness to whatever existence one has reached” 
(BT 264). Heidegger claims that anticipation of death has a truly liberating effect on 
Dasein in making it face up to and accept the inevitable. Dasein will thereby stop 
clinging to its own existence, which it - at any rate - eventually will have to let go of. 
Thus, Heidegger seems to say that we should fully integrate the attitude of total 
acceptance of death as a permanent part of our mindset. Anticipation of death also has                                                         65 Some commentators translate Vorlaufen as ‘forerunning’. I prefer to use the more common translation 
‘anticipation’, because I think it better preserves the meaning of Vorlaufen as an attitude, rather than an 
action.  
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the function that it discloses for Dasein precisely that it is not itself, but that it is rather 
primarily inauthentic and lost in das Man’s distorted interpretation of death:  
  
Anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it face to face 
with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by concernful solicitude, 
but of being itself, rather, in an impassioned freedom towards death - a freedom 
which has been released from the Illusions of the “they”, and which is factical, 
certain of itself, and anxious.  
                                                                                                          (BT 266) 
  
As we can see, anticipation is the attitude that simultaneously reveals to Dasein that it has 
lost itself, but that it also has the possibility of finding back to itself again. Furthermore, 
Heidegger thinks that adopting the attitude of anticipation towards death is appropriate 
because this attitude discloses death as it is, and thus it holds death for true (BT 265). It is 
the liberating effect of facing up to one’s own death as a possibility that das Man literally 
escapes from in fear. It thus seems as if anticipation is comparable to a complete 
directional change in one’s attitude towards death: instead of running away from it in fear 
as most people tend to do, one turns around 180 degrees and faces up to it without doubt 
or hesitation. In Dreyfus and Rubin’s description of the phenomenon, the transformation 
from an inauthentic to an authentic existence is comparable to a “gestalt switch”, or a 
total transformation in Dasein’s being.66 That is, to anticipate or forerun into death means 
to project willingly or wholeheartedly into the double aspect of possibility and 
impossibility that constitutes (death as) an essential structure of existence.67
 Obviously, anticipation of death is problematic. First of all, it seems to be a very 
demanding, on the verge of exhausting, attitude to uphold. To confront death is what 
people ordinarily do for shorter or longer periods of their lives, especially when they for 
natural reasons are forced to do so. Thus, facing up to death is what usually happens 
when fatal illness strikes; when someone close to us dies; or, when we move towards the 
end of life. On such occasions, people usually face up to death in one way or another. It 
could thus be argued that the constant anticipation of death seems to be a somewhat 
laborious and unnecessary life-project. Moreover, ‘thinking about death’ in the sense of 
  
                                                        66 Hubert L. Dreyfus and Jane Rubin, “Appendix: Kierkegaard, Division II, and Later Heidegger”, in 
Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-world: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I 
(Cambridge: the MIT Press, 1991), 317. 67 Taylor Carman, Heidegger’s Analytic, 297. Carman points out that the concept of anticipation is 
reminiscent of Kierkegaard’s famous ‘leap of faith’, wherein one takes up one’s personal commitments as 
irreducibly one’s own, even though they may be irreconcilable with standard ethical norms. See also: 
Carman, “Authenticity”, 291. 
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contemplating or meditating upon the fact that we are mortal, does not necessarily mean 
that one either expects it to happen or that one regards it as an actuality. As is the case in 
the Memento Mori-tradition, simply contemplating death without anticipating it can 
prove to be beneficial. This can be a both mind and heart-opening process in the sense 
that one becomes increasingly aware of the universal conditions and limitations every 
human being is subject to. It can, in other words, result in an increased feeling of 
interdependence and solidarity with other people, regardless of their cultural background 
or social standing. 
Heidegger, however, thinks that contemplation of death is an inappropriate 
approach towards death. As Mulhall points out, being-towards-death is essentially 
anticipatory, because death as a possibility can only be anticipated. Thus, to live in the 
light of a proper awareness of one’s mortality is to make one’s choices in the light of an 
extreme and constant threat that emerges from one’s own being.68
 
 This claim brings up 
the question of whether death in fact ‘behaves’ in this particular way, as a constant 
impending threat. Heidegger does characterise death as “indefinite” and as a “constant 
threat” (BT 265). But it remains to see whether these characterisations are correct. In 
other words, how we most appropriately can relate to death seems to be somehow 
contingent upon how death is constituted. Indeed, if death can strike at any moment, then 
the attitude of anticipation seems to be the appropriate to adopt. But if this is not the case, 
then why should we constantly anticipate death?  
3.2 Resoluteness and the Situation  
The other aspect of authentic-being-towards-death is resoluteness (Entschlossenheit). 
Even though anticipation and resoluteness are distinct aspects of authenticity, Heidegger 
insists that there must be an essential connection between them. Why is that? Heidegger 
explicates anticipation as the ontological possibility of authentic-being-towards-death. 
But, as he admits, unless Dasein can in fact throw itself into the possibility of its own 
death, anticipation is nothing but a “fantastical exaction” (BT 266). Heidegger here seems 
to acknowledge the difficulty of maintaining an attitude of anticipation towards death. 
Thus, anticipation needs to be verified in a corresponding ontical potentiality-for-Being, 
which is the notion of resoluteness. 
                                                        68 Mulhall, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Heidegger, 131. 
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 At the beginning of Division II Heidegger’s explication of resoluteness takes off 
with a reminder of his purpose for bringing death into the analysis: since Dasein in its 
everyday mode is essentially lost and dispersed in das Man’s inauthentic attitudes and 
manners towards death, it is urgent that Dasein becomes a whole and authentic self. 
Heidegger claims that Dasein can only find itself and become authentic by listening to its 
own inner ‘voice of conscience’ (Stimme des Gewissens): 
 
Conscience gives us ‘something’ to understand; it discloses. By characterizing this 
phenomenon formally in this way, we find ourselves enjoined to take it back into the 
disclosedness of Dasein. This disclosedness, as a basic state of that entity which we 
ourselves are, is constituted by state-of-mind, understanding, falling, and discourse. 
If we analyse conscience more penetratingly, it is revealed as a call (Ruf). Calling is 
a mode of discourse. The call of conscience has the character of an appeal to Dasein 
by calling it to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-itself; and this is done by way of 
summoning it to its ownmost Being-guilty. 
                     (BT 269) 
 
There are several elements to take notice of here. First, the call of conscience summons 
Dasein to realise its ‘guilt’ (Schuld), but what exactly does this mean? The traditional 
understanding of guilt is associated with contingent indebtedness and moral 
responsibility. Thus, we feel guilty when we have actually done something wrong, or 
because guilt is induced in us from outside sources, for example, from the norms in 
society. This traditional understanding of guilt is what the ordinary sense of conscience is 
ready to inform us about. However, existential guilt is not equivalent to sin or moral 
transgression, or to the sense of being obliged. Instead, Heidegger defines guilt formally 
by a ‘not’, as in “Being-the-basis of a nullity” (BT 283). Thus, ontological guilt refers to 
an inherent ‘lack’ in Dasein, in that Dasein never has power over its being from the 
ground up.69
 As with the ontological notion of guilt, conscience has lost its traditional and 
deeply embedded social significance in Heidegger’s analysis. As the term ‘call’ suggests, 
Dasein’s inner voice of conscience is a mode of discourse – a form of communication 
 This ‘not’, Heidegger says, belongs to the existential meaning of 
‘thrownness’ (BT 284). 
                                                        69 Michael Zimmerman, “Heidegger, Buddhism, and Deep Ecology”, in The Cambridge Companion to 
Heidegger, second edition, edited by Charles B. Guignon, 293-325 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), 308-311. Zimmerman points out the affinity between Heidegger’s notion of nullity and the 
Buddhist conception of nothingness, which is about the flux and conditioning of all phenomena, in contrast 
to their permanence and independence. Despite the ontological similarities between Heidegger and 
Buddhism on this point, there are also huge differences in terms of ethics and morality. In Buddhism, and 
especially in Mahayana Buddhism, an elaborate system of virtues and moral rules is developed in order to 
counterbalance the dangers inherent in the doctrine of nothingness, which is pure nihilism.   
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that tries to disrupt das Man’s idle talk about death. Thus, rather than having an exterior 
source, the source of ontological conscience is Dasein’s own self: “In conscience Dasein 
calls itself” (BT 275). Authentic Dasein calls to itself in discretion (Verschwiegenheit) 
and silence (Schweigen), and the call is devoid of content. 
 Heidegger’s notion of resoluteness is inspired by, but not identical with the 
Aristotelian account of phronesis in book VI of the Nichomachean Ethics.70 Thus, by 
anticipating its death, resolute Dasein has a subtle understanding for the particular 
demands of its situation and how to deal with them. In this sense, resoluteness is the 
active counterpart of anticipation, and consists of a kind of focused engagement Dasein 
has with its own existence. Resolute Dasein has the integrity and insight to know what to 
do, and to make the right choices in the current situation. The ‘situation’ thus signifies 
resolute Dasein’s choices of its own possibilities, which is its own distinct way of being-
in-the-world.71
 Heidegger claims that the authentic self is a state that is only attained by a project 
(Entwurf) of self-being. Heidegger’s analysis must here be contrasted with Sartre’s 
doctrine that ‘man is what he makes himself to be’ as a result of natural and spontaneous 
self-creation. Heidegger’s notion of a project rather entails that most people are ‘made’ 
by their social environment rather than being completely self-made. 
 Furthermore, Dasein’s situation entails facing up to its empty openness, 
or the ‘nullity’ that defines its very being. Resoluteness is thus essentially about 
acknowledging and accepting ontological guilt; that is, to take responsibility for the 
nullity that one is. 
 Heidegger calls the moment of resoluteness the Augenblick, literally translated as 
the glance of an eye or “the moment of vision”.72
                                                        70 Franco Volpi, “Dasein as praxis: the Heideggerian assimilation and the radicalization of the practical 
philosophy of Aristotle”, in Critical Heidegger, edited by Christopher Macann, 27-66 (London: Routledge, 
1996), 27. Volpi gives a thorough discussion of the importance of Aristotle for Heidegger’s thinking, 
wherein he argues that it is possible to trace the influence of Aristotle on Heidegger throughout the entire 
extent of his thinking.  
 This is thus the specific moment of 
transformation from being inauthentic to being authentic. However, several problems 
emerge from Heidegger’s notion of the moment of transformation. First of all, it is clear 
71 Douglas Kellner, “Authenticity and Heidegger’s challenge to ethical theory”, in Martin Heidegger: 
Critical Assessments, edited by Christopher Macann (London: Routledge, 1992), 203. Kellner points out 
that through his notion of the ‘situation’, Heidegger modifies the idealist or Kantian notion of the self as 
constituting the world. In contrast to this, authentic Dasein constitutes its own situation through its projects 
and resolves.  72 Dreyfus and Rubin, “Appendix”, 321. Macquarrie and Robinson translate the Augenblick as “the 
moment of vision”, but Dreyfus and Rubin points out it would be better translated as “the moment of 
transformation”.  
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that this moment will not last (since no moments lasts), which again implies that 
Dasein’s state of authenticity will not endure for very long. Second, the transformation 
from being inauthentic to being authentic is arguably a profound alteration of Dasein’s 
being. Profound changes, however, do usually not happen momentarily with human 
beings. Rather, in most cases they seem to be time and energy-consuming processes that 
may go on for a lifetime. The relevant contrasting view here is Kierkegaard’s notion of 
the Oieblik, which is the moment of an unconditional commitment that will transform the 
content of one’s life. For Kierkegaard, however, making an absolute commitment is 
anything but momentary; it is rather experienced as a permanent or eternal commitment. 
This brings up a third problem. As Dreyfus and Rubin points out, the transformation to 
authenticity seems to entail a transformation only of the form, and not of the content of 
Dasein’s activities.73
We have so far seen that Heidegger’s notion of authenticity amounts to the 
twofold structure of anticipating death, and the resolute choice of facing up to guilt in the 
form of nullity. We have further seen some of the problems that pertain to being resolute 
in the moment of transformation. However, a final problem now comes to the surface. 
This problem pertains to whether Heidegger’s portrayal of Dasein as a thrown projection, 
and as ‘guilty’ in the form of being a nullity, is the ontologically correct image of human 
beings. It is clear that Heidegger wants to instil a new understanding of human beings as 
an essentially ‘groundless’ Dasein, in that it can never choose itself from the ground up. 
But why should this particular image be accepted as true or as ontologically correct?  
 This could turn out to be a problem for those who argue that 
Heidegger’s notion of authenticity has ethical content.  
 Dreyfus and Rubin argue that existential guilt reveals what seems to be an 
essentially unsatisfactory structure definite of even authentic Dasein. Thus, even if 
Dasein has done nothing wrong, “there is something wrong with Dasein”, in that its own 
being is not under its power.74 For Carman, it is a mistake to construe Dasein’s nullity as 
if there is something ‘wrong’ with Dasein, because this threatens to read something 
ontically contingent back into Heidegger’s formal existential structure of guilt.75
                                                        73 Dreyfus and Rubin, “Appendix”, 322. 
 The 
point with existential guilt is thus that not even being the ground of its own nullity 
affords Dasein any fixed, positive metaphysical character. Because Dasein is thrown into 
the world, it has to take full responsibility for its situation, even though it is not 
74 Dreyfus and Rubin, “Appendix”, 306-307. 75 Carman, Heidegger’s Analytic, 288-289. 
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responsible for it in the ordinary sense. In my view, it is pertinent to bring up the 
question if there is something inherently ‘wrong’ with Dasein, in that this question 
further accentuates the problem of whether Heidegger’s structural-ontological 
determination of Dasein is correct. Is this a timeless and non-contingent image of human 
beings that is founded on a well-secured philosophical anthropology? As I will later 
suggest, it is both possible and necessary to make certain modifications in the existential 
web. Such modifications will alter the image of Dasein and its possibility for lasting 
freedom, and thus for being authentic and ethical.  
   
3.3 Why be authentic?  
So far, we have looked at the formal aspect of authenticity in the dual form of 
anticipatory resoluteness. The question now is whether anything substantial can be said 
about the experience of being authentic. In comparison to Heidegger’s rather elaborate 
descriptions of everyday inauthentic Dasein, he does not have much to say about the 
positive experience of being authentic.76
 
 In a concrete description of it, he asserts: 
Along with the sober anxiety, which brings us face to face with our individualized 
potentiality-for-Being, there goes an unshakable joy in this possibility. In it Dasein 
becomes free from the entertaining ‘incidentals’ with which busy curiosity keeps 
providing itself – primarily from the events of the world. 
                     (BT 310) 
 
As we can see, at the heart of being authentic lies Dasein’s experience of freedom. By 
facing up to death with anticipation and resoluteness, Dasein can also experience an 
“unshakeable joy”. Freedom and joy are thus amongst the positive aspects of being 
authentic. Anxiety, however, is the most basic mood pertaining to the experience of 
being authentic: “Being-towards-death is essentially anxiety” (BT 266). As earlier shown, 
anxiety is a fundamental mood in that it uncovers Dasein as a radical thrown projection: 
“Dasein’s mood brings it face to face with the thrownness of its ‘that it is there’ (BT 
265). Dasein’s primary form of disclosure is affective, and this affective disclosure 
reveals Dasein as thrown into existence. In short, anxiety reveals Dasein’s facticity, 
which is one of the three elements of the care-structure. Anxiety forces inauthentic 
everyday Dasein to confront the true structure of its existence, and thus it gives access to                                                         76 One reason for the lack of substantial description of the positive aspects of being authentic can be that 
Heidegger does not consider it to be a mode of being that is often achieved or maintained by anyone. Has 
anyone ever been truly authentic? 
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a single unifying articulation of Dasein’s being. In short, it is not only death, but also 
anxiety that individualises and totalises Dasein.  
Anxiety also has the function of disclosing entities (everything that is not Dasein) 
in a particular way. In anxiety, things show up for us as radically unfamiliar, as having an 
intrinsic irrelevance to our projects. Thus, anxiety constitutes a primitive element in 
Dasein’s understanding of being, revealing entities as radically indifferent to its 
practices. Moreover, by confronting Dasein with itself, anxiety forces it to recognise its 
everyday existence as essentially ‘fallen’, or as completely absorbed in the world, with 
things and other people. Thus, anxiety discloses that Dasein is always in the midst of 
objects and events of daily life, but that it is typically ‘lost’ in them, in flight from 
acknowledging that its existence is always more than its present actualisations. Put in 
different terms, anxiety reveals Dasein’s world as ‘uncanny’ (unheimlich), in the sense 
that Dasein is never fully at home in the world. Uncanniness or homelessness is thus the 
fundamentally threatening experience of Dasein’s groundlessness and meaninglessness. 
Heidegger describes anxiety as the experience of coming face to face with the ‘nothing’, 
and hence there is an essential connection between anxiety, guilt, and Dasein’s death. 
As a general rule, I find that Heidegger is basically correct in thinking that human 
beings for the most part find themselves as having a mood. Thus, because we are thrown 
into the world and into a particular social environment, we experience moods that are 
somehow out of our personal control, such as anxiety, boredom, and aggression. This is 
simply a fact of life; hence it is part of Dasein’s facticity. For Heidegger, there is no such 
thing as being without a mood, or completely detached from moods in the sense of being 
a mere rational observer to life. However, at this point it is crucial that we ask the 
following questions. First of all, is it not possible that socially conditioned moods can be 
modified and transformed over time and with a conscious effort? Second, why is anxiety 
necessarily the most basic mood for disclosure of Dasein’s being? Why can’t anxiety be 
transformed to, say, pure joy? 
Being authentic implies the willingness of Dasein to resolutely face up its finitude 
and guilt in the form of its ‘nullity’, and in a permanent mood of anxiety, to experience 
the uncanniness of its world. Thus, being resolute opens for the experiences of freedom 
and anxious joy, and for the possibility of attaining moments of authenticity. However, at 
this point it becomes increasingly clear that the effort to be authentic is neither an easy 
attainable, nor a particularly enjoyable experience. The general impression is rather that 
this is a demanding and strenuous process, with few lasting benefits. This impression 
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raises the question of why anyone would strive for authenticity in the first place. Why 
should we embark on a project that constantly reminds us of the uncanny fact of our 
‘nullity’, and of our inability to become whole and authentic?  
The pertinence of this question is perhaps best illustrated by the use of literary 
analogy, in this case by comparing Dasein’s situation to Joseph K.’s in Kafka’s novel 
The Trial. 77 Anyone who is familiar with the novel will know that its main character, 
Josef K. is found guilty before an intangible court. His guilt, however, has no legal or 
psychological reality. Josef K. has committed no crime whatsoever, and yet he is found 
guilty despite his own repeated categorical denial of having done anything wrong. The 
inexplicable form of guilt that defines K.’s destiny, but which he still must take full 
responsibility for, is somewhat comparable to the uncanniness of Dasein’s situation, in 
the sense that human existence is utterly ephemeral and uncertain.78
In my view, part of the dilemma here lies in Heidegger’s structural explication of 
Dasein’s faciticity. Heidegger’s claim is, as we have seen, that Dasein always find itself 
attuned in a mood or affective disposition, and that moods furthermore disclose Dasein as 
thrown into the world. Attunement, moods, and thrownness are thus interconnected in 
bringing out the nature of facticity. But the question is: how determining is facticity as a 
fundamental structure of our existence? In short, given the demands and pressures of 
Dasein’s situation; why would anyone choose to be authentic in the first place? Why not 
just remain inauthentic, since this seems to be the easier and more comfortable choice?  
 
Mulhall argues that the point of being authentic is that it is only in this state that 
we can become properly attuned to the real modalities of human existence.79
                                                        77 Franz Kafka, Prosessen (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag A/S, 1992). It is probably no coincidence that 
Kafka’s novel The Trial and Heidegger’s Being and Time are published almost simultaneously, 
respectively in 1925 and in 1927.    
 Authentic 
being-towards-death is in essence a matter of relating to one’s life as utterly mortal or 
finite. It further shows us that there is no moment of our existence in which our being is 
not at issue. Thus, by being authentic we recognise the non-necessity of our life’s 
continuance and furthermore, its thoroughgoing contingency. In other words, we should 
become authentic because this is the only way of stripping out false necessities from life. 
78 Peter Kraus, “Death and metaphysics”, in Death and Philosophy. Edited by Jeff Malpas and Robert C. 
Solomon, 98-111 (London: Routledge, 2002), 104. Kraus points out that Dasein’s recognition of its own 
intrinsic nothingness, as being-towards-death, is necessary for Dasein to persist in its authentic relationship 
to nothingness – and thereby to Being. 79 Mulhall, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook, 129. 
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But, we should ask, why are these necessarily the ‘real’ modalities of human existence, 
and how do we know this to be true?  
Another way to put the point of being authentic is that when being inauthentic, 
Dasein understands itself out of the notion of present-at-hand or as something objectively 
given, and it remains dispersed in the world with other beings. Inauthenticity thus 
involves the willingness to believe, and to sustain the belief that one is identical with 
one’s present state. Authenticity, on the other hand, diminishes dispersion and enables 
Dasein to transcend what is given or factual. This is thus the point where authentic being-
towards-death is connected to temporality, in that authenticity presupposes Dasein’s 
openness to time. Or, one could say that human existence most fundamentally is 
temporality, which is a self-transcending process. In other words, authentic Dasein 
understands itself as an ongoing ‘event’ or a ‘project’, and not as an object amongst other 
objects in the world. Death is thus the horizon of projection within which all projects are 
made possible, and as such it shows us that our being is at stake in whatever project we 
undertake in life. 
    
3.4 Authenticity and ethics 
We have just seen that being authentic is supposed to reveal our being as it actually is; as 
‘ecstatic’ or as a self-transcending process in time. In other words, being authentic 
somehow requires that changes occur in our lives, and such changes presuppose the 
necessary freedom for change. Since freedom is a precondition for human morality, this 
brings up the question of whether there are ethical dimensions to authentic life-
transformations. Do we, for example, become better or improved people by being 
authentic? Or, does authenticity entail moral conduct in any relevant or concrete sense?  
Heidegger explicitly denies that the notion of authenticity indicates a ‘moral’ or 
ethical distinction. On the contrary, according to him the terms “Eigentlichkeit” and 
“Uneigentlichkeit” were chosen in “the strict senses of the words” (BT 43). Heidegger 
strongly emphasises this point when he asserts: 
 
It may not be superfluous to remark that our own Interpretation is purely ontological 
in its aims, and is far removed from any moralizing critique of everyday Dasein, and 
from the aspirations of a ‘philosophy of culture’. 
                     (BT 167) 
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According to Heidegger, the notions of authenticity and inauthenticity refer to whether 
Dasein finds itself in its ‘ownmost’ mode of existence or not. In other words, authenticity 
refers solely to Dasein’s possible totality. Accordingly, many commentators hold the 
view that the notion of authenticity is an entirely non-evaluative and descriptive mode of 
Dasein’s being. As such, they argue that Heidegger is not trying to give us moral advice 
on how to live our lives, but that he is rather trying to explain how moral perspectives 
can emerge in the first place from the basis of Dasein’s universal ontological structures.80
 Underneath the interpretation of authenticity as a strictly descriptive-ontological 
category lies an effort based on respect for Heidegger’s own view of his philosophical 
project as solely concerned with the ontological question of being. The question is, 
however, whether this view can be fully endorsed. As many commentators have duly 
noted, there is an unmistakably normative pathos in BT. Thus, Douglas Kellner points out 
that Heidegger’s concepts have an unmistaken evaluative connotation if one takes them 
in both their ordinary signification and in their philosophical usages. Moreover, 
Heidegger’s description of das Man seems to disclose a rather thoroughgoing 
condemnation of inauthentic everydayness.
  
81
There seems to be an inherent ambiguity in BT because many of Heidegger’s 
chosen terms do double duty both as descriptions of neutral ontological structures and as 
names for the specifically negative manifestations of those structures.
 Heidegger’s notion of authenticity thus 
seems to indicate that being authentic is an ideal he is recommending as a modification 
of inauthenticity. It can thus be argued that Heidegger wants his readers to strive for 
authenticity instead of being trapped within an everyday inauthentic existence.  
82
                                                        80 White, Time and Death, 43. Carol White argues that Heidegger is strictly concerned with the ‘question 
of Being’, and not with ethical questions. See also Haugeland, “Truth and Finitude: Heidegger’s 
Transcendental Existentialism”, 62-63. Haugeland’s translates authenticity as “ownedness” in order to 
preserve the etymological link to Heidegger’s choice of the German term “eigentlich”. According to 
Haugeland, the normative edge of the terms are removed in that “ownedness” and “unownedness” 
(inauthenticity) are viewed as different modes of Dasein’s being, grounded in the fact that Dasein is 
defined ‘in each case its own’ (Jemeiningkeit). The only difference between authenticity and inauthenticity 
is thus a difference in modes of disclosedness: inauthentic defaulted disclosedness is the public idle talk of 
das Man, while authentic disclosedness is resoluteness.  
 This ambiguity is 
especially acute when it comes to the terms authenticity and inauthenticity. As Carman 
81 Kellner, “Authenticity and Heidegger’s challenge to ethical theory”, 200-201. 82 Carman, Heidegger’s Analytic, 269-270. When functioning as a technical term, ‘authentic’ plays two 
very different roles, where one is evaluative and the other not. Carman correctly points out, in my view, 
that it is not possible to come away from reading BT with the idea that it is completely value-neutral. What 
I find lacking in Carman’s perspective, though, is an account of the deeper causes for Heidegger’s 
ambiguity in BT.  
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points out, ‘authentic’ occurs throughout BT in both technical and non-technical senses.83
It is difficult to disagree with the view that Heidegger’s concepts of authenticity 
and inauthenticity are essentially evaluative. This is in particular the case with 
Heidegger’s pejorative descriptions of das Man. However, the pressing question now is 
whether authenticity as an evaluative category can form the ontological foundation for 
ethics. Some commentators emphasise the ethical implications of authenticity, and even 
find this notion useful for a revision of modern ethical theory.
 
Authenticity obviously functions as an evaluative term describing a desirable mode of 
existence: it is something good and thus worth striving for. Under this normative aspect 
of the term, Heidegger distinguishes altogether three possibilities: inauthenticity, modal 
indifference, and authenticity. Everydayness or indifference is a neutral form of 
existence, wherein Dasein is neither “owning up” to itself nor “disowning” itself. In 
contrast, to exist authentically is to own up to one self – wholeheartedly – in one’s 
existence. 
84 For example, Charles 
Guignon argues that Heidegger’s concept of authenticity is supposed to point to a way of 
life that is higher than that of average everydayness.85 Heidegger’s description of 
authenticity thus points to certain character ideals, or what Guignon calls “meta-
values”.86
In a similar vain, Kellner argues that it is a mistake to characterise Heidegger’s 
notion of authenticity as either purely descriptive ontology or an evaluative ethics, 
because the analysis in BT cuts beneath that distinction.
 These include traits such as resoluteness, courage, integrity, and clear-
sightedness about one’s life as a finite, thrown projection. Thus, the meta-values in 
Heidegger’s analysis provide basis for taking a meaningful stand on first-order moral 
commiments.  
87
                                                        83 Carman, “Authenticity”, 285-86, 289. 
 In other words, a distinctive 
feature of authenticity is the interconnection of what is usually viewed as separate 
normative and descriptive disciplines. Heideggerian ontology can thus function as a court 
of jurisdiction that validates or criticises ethical theories according to whether they are in 
84 See, for example, Lawrence J. Hatab, Ethics and Finitude: Heideggerian Contributions to Moral 
Philosophy, 79-80. Hatab argues that a Heideggerian approach to ethics would challenge both everyday 
familiarities and traditional constructions by recommending a cultivated bearing of finitude. Hatab further 
suggests that there is a feedback loop between ontology and ethics. 85 Charles C. Guignon, “Authenticity, Moral Values, and Psychotherapy”, in The Cambridge Companion 
to Heidegger, second edition, edited by Charles C. Guignon, 268-291 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 2006), 281. 86 Guignon, “Authenticity, Moral Values, and Psychotherapy”, 285.  87 Kellner, “Authenticity and Heidegger’s challenge to ethical theory” 206-207. 
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accordance with the being that is in question, as disclosed by the analysis of a well-
grounded ontology. What is at stake is the question of the conditions of the possibility of 
ethics; the ‘ought’ (ethics) must thus be shown to be grounded in the ‘is’ (ontology). 
Kellner makes the point that Heidegger at the very least lays the foundation for a new 
type of ethical theory grounded in a well-secured philosophical anthropology.88
In the first chapter of this thesis it was suggested that central philosophical 
concepts in BT, such as death, authenticity, etc, are formally indicatory, and in chapter 
two I concluded that death is not a formal indication in the full-blown sense. The notion 
of authenticity, however, seems to fit well with the category of a formal indication. In 
other words, when it comes to decide whether authenticity as anticipatory resoluteness 
has ethical connotations, part of the problem with the concept is its vacuity: the empty, 
formal-ontological concept is given priority, but is at the same time devoid of any 
substantial content.  
 This 
claim, however, goes straight to the heart of the earlier mentioned problem of whether 
Heidegger’s ontological image of Dasein is correct or not. Thus, what kind of being can 
be moral, and what does it mean to be good? 
 Even though authenticity and inauthenticity clearly are evaluative categories, this 
does not entail that resolute Dasein knows how to act morally in the situation. Being 
resolute means to openly face up the unique concrete ‘situation’ in which one finds 
oneself. Resolute Dasein is thus supposed to possess a subtle understanding for the 
particular demands of its situation and how to handle them with intelligence and finesse. 
However, it seems to me that even a bad person can develop such a skilful understanding 
of the demands of his or her situation. A bad or cunning person will understand which 
possibilities the particular situation has to offer, and thus which choices to make based on 
the overall objective for taking action.  
What is it then, that is required for authentic Dasein to become a moral being? In 
general, the moral outcome of being resolute seems to depend both on the person’s 
background, her motives in the current situation, and on her future goals and objectives. 
In other words, for Dasein to know how make the correct moral choice based on the 
possibilities in the situation seems to require far more than simply the ability to be 
resolute. More concretely, Granberg points out that if resoluteness is to give any ground 
for an ethics, then the existential definiteness – the how – must involve a relation to                                                         88 Kellner, “Authenticity and Heidegger’s challenge to ethical theory”, 211. 
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others.89 Thus, the most basic ethical problem in relation to a possible morality based on 
resoluteness and choice is according to Granberg that Heidegger’s image of 
responsibility and guilt does not transcend the circular relationship of Dasein to itself.90
There is a definite truth to the claim that relationships with others are an 
important and necessary element of ethics. Indeed, one could argue that all moral 
conduct is essentially relational. It is not quite sufficient, however, to point out that 
Heidegger’s analysis is lacking on this particular point. What is also needed is an account 
of how ethically binding relationships to others is established in the first place, and 
furthermore, how they are developed and continually affirmed. Such an account can in 
my view be found in Aristotle’s Nicomahcean Ethics.
  
91
In NE II Aristotle describes how the moral virtues and wisdom of the phronimos 
– the virtuous hero – become integrated as a result of gradual habituation and social 
conditioning from early childhood on (1095b1-9 and 1103a18-25). The particular 
decisions made by the phronimos based on the immediate range of alternatives in the 
situation, reveals her character, which again determines her basic values. As we can see, 
Aristotle’s moral philosophy places great emphasis on the efficacy of moral training: as 
members of a society we must be well trained and habituated, under the guidance of the 
community’s laws, customs, education, and the discipline of the family. Aristotle seems 
to think that the insight and knowledge of how to make the right moral choices in any 
particular situation, is in fact provided and secured by the right kind of social upbringing 
(1103a14 and 1179b24-35). There is thus a deeply ingrained trust in Aristotle’s ethics to 
the positive aspects of being a member of a community.   
  
 There is a seeming theoretical distance between Heidegger and Aristotle on this 
particular point, in that Heidegger holds a far more ambiguous view on the public sphere 
of society and its negative influence on the individual. This ambiguity is especially acute 
when it comes to his explication of das Man and its idle talk about death. However, the 
first impression of theoretical distance might be premature, in that Heidegger develops                                                         89 Granberg, Mood and Method, 234. According to Granberg the relation between self and other, and that 
of sociality, is not really a theme in BT. There is rather an overall emphasis on self-sufficiency, wherein 
Dasein has all the necessary resources within itself to give birth to the authentic Self. Since Heidegger’s 
analysis of guilt and responsibility is kept squarely within the intra-subjective frame, it becomes hard to see 
how ontological guilt can give basis for inter-subjective responsibility.  90 Granberg, Mood and Method, 234-35. See also: Carman, Heidegger’s Analytic, 301. In a similar vain as 
Granberg, Carman points out that Heidegger’s account of selfhood is incomplete because it fails to 
describe our characteristically human understanding of ourselves as others understand us. In other words, it 
omits an account of the hermeneutic conditions for understanding oneself as another.  91 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, transl. by Christopher Rowe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
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his notion of authenticity to include the resolute choice of one’s authentic possibilities as 
a repetition (Wiederholung) of authentic possibilities from one’s heritage:  
 
Repetition is the explicit handing-down, that is, the going back into the possibilities 
of the human beings that have been. The authentic repetition of a past possibility of 
existence, the choosing of one’s hero, is grounded in advancing resoluteness; for in 
resoluteness one first chooses the choice that makes one free for the struggle of 
loyalty and the struggling succession of the repeatable possibility.   
                                             (BT 385) 
 
 
Heidegger here introduces the view of a culture’s history as a source of superior 
possibilities. In other words, this passage might suggest that Heidegger has somehow 
integrated the Aristotelian perspective of the positive function of being a member of a 
cultural tradition, in the sense that the heritage confers authentic possibilities onto the 
individual. However, there are some unresolved dilemmas to this. For example, do 
authentic possibilities necessarily entail possibilities in the form of moral values? 
Moreover, as a member of a certain cultural heritage, how is it possible to truly 
distinguish that heritage’s authentic from its inauthentic possibilities, and hence, that 
culture’s moral from immoral values?92
Obviously, an even deeper problem with choosing a hero from one’s cultural 
heritage is that such a choice might turn out to be fatally wrong. In the twentieth century 
millions of Germans – including Heidegger himself - chose Hitler as their heroic 
leader.
 Furthermore, to choose a hero from the cultural 
heritage one is born into could be explicated as a choice of a role model within that 
culture to guide one in one’s life-projects. But, many different kinds of ‘heroes’ emerge 
from a cultural tradition, and how does one know which particular hero to choose as a 
true moral guide? 
93
                                                        92 Dreyfus and Rubin, “Appendix”, 331-32. Dreyfus and Rubin points out that Heidegger does not seem to 
ask himself whether the culture might become so conformist and media-dominated that no unlevelled 
heritage is left to repeat. In other words, the individual might find herself part of a cultural tradition where 
there are no authentic possibilities left or no true heroes to choose from.  
 This proved to be a choice with catastrophic and – I might add – severely 
immoral consequences. An even deeper and worrying problem for Heidegger’s concept 
of authenticity is thus that a person like Hitler can in fact be considered as authentic, in 
the sense that he realised his ownmost potentiality for being by seizing upon his culture’s 
93 Several examples from the recent world history that points in the same direction: millions of Chinese 
chose Mao; the Russians choose Stalin and Lenin; and, more recently, the American people chose Bush as 
their president (twice!). All of these leaders have risen from their respective cultural traditions, and 
choosing them seemed like the right thing to do at that particular time in history.   
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distinctive possibilities at that point in history. In other words, authentic resolute Dasein 
can be seen as a deeply immoral individual.94
Interestingly, the problem of distinguishing the authentic from the inauthentic 
possibilities in one’s cultural heritage resembles the methodological problem that was 
brought up in the first chapter, about the disclosure of phenomena. We recall that this 
problem is about how one can tell the ‘true’ phenomenon from the false, the semblance, 
or the appearance of the phenomenon. Translated into an ethical language, the problem 
of truth and falsehood now becomes the problem of how we can tell the good from the 
bad in a wider cultural context. As I shall later argue, the ability to distinguish the good 
from the bad in a wider context takes an exceptional individual who is not only able to 
live with other people in a society, but who at the same time manages to see through and 
stay untouched by the society’s negative possibilities and influences. 
  
It follows from the above discussion that the prospects of a Heideggerian ethics 
are not very high. Being authentic encompasses Dasein’s bad as well as its good 
possibilities; it offers destructive as well constructive ways of being within the confines 
of a cultural heritage. It seems, then, that what is required for authentic Dasein to become 
ethical Dasein, is some sort of modification of Heidegger’s structural determination of 
Dasein. But which part of the existential web is the most appropriate to modify or 
change? Furthermore, can such modifications be performed without conferring drastic 
alterations to the being of Dasein? 
 
3.5 Back to relational conscience? 
Time has come to gather the threads and see where this discussion about authenticity has 
brought us. First of all, it is evident that Heidegger’s explication of authenticity concurs 
with the view that death has great significance for human existence. For Heidegger, 
death’s significance lies in the fact that it individualises and totalises Dasein. By 
anticipating death and resolutely facing up to its guilt or ‘nullity’, an authentic or self-
owned existence is within reach for Dasein. Furthermore, death has the heuristic function 
of revealing Dasein’s being as essentially temporal. Authentic existence is ‘ecstatic’ or                                                         94 Christopher Macann, “Who is Dasein? Towards an ethics of authenticity”, in Martin Heidegger: 
Critical Assessments, edited by Christopher Macann (London: Routledge, 1992), 242. Macann makes the 
interesting point that we can here catch a glimpse of a possible philosophical ground for Heidegger’s major 
historical error. This is so, because Hitler did indeed succeed in realizing his ownmost potential for being. 
Now, if a person like Hitler can be conceived as authentic, this threatens to empty the notion of authenticity 
of any ethical content whatsoever.  
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‘outstanding’ in that it stands explicitly towards death and introduces death into every 
moment in our lives.    
 In this chapter I have examined different interpretations of Heidegger’s notion of 
authenticity and its relation to ethics. I have argued that even though authenticity is an 
evaluative category in the sense that it is a better mode for Dasein to be in, this is in itself 
not sufficient as an ontological foundation for ethics. Heidegger’s description of 
resoluteness as Dasein facing up the possibilities of its ‘situation’ is too empty and 
formalistic to secure a deeply embedded morality in Dasein’s being. As shown above, 
even a highly immoral person could be considered as authentic. The possibilities the 
individual chooses in the moment are arguably dependent on such factors as her 
established character; her life-project as a whole; and on the values she holds. Something 
in the direction of an Aristotelian theory of the development of virtues and practical 
wisdom thus seems to be needed in order to explain how morality becomes a 
permanently ingrained part of the individual. 
 A stable and unified sense of self is arguably one of the necessary elements for 
acquiring personal moral responsibility and fulfilment. Thus, wholeness in the sense of 
lasting state of authenticity seems to be a necessary element in a deep-rooted individual 
morality. As authentic, Dasein has the possibility for self-transcendence. However, 
Dasein can never achieve a lasting authentcity because it is constantly projecting itself 
into future possibilities, and is thereby never a finished project. Part of the problem for 
remaining in an authentic state thus lies in Dasein’s temporality. Moreover, Dasein will 
not remain authentic because of structural limitations pertaining to its own being, such as 
das Man. As Dreyfus and Rubin points out, there is a double contradiction in Heidegger’s 
notion of authenticity, in that being inauthentic seems to be both inevitable and 
incomprehensible.95
Earlier in this chapter I pointed out – in contrast to Dreyfus and Rubin – that the 
prevailing state of being inauthentic is perhaps not that incomprehensible after all, given 
that attaining authenticity seems to be a demanding and strenuous project. The main 
dilemma here is thus the inevitability of being inauthentic, and not so much its 
incomprehensiveness. If being inauthentic is unavoidable, there seems to be an even 
lesser reason to think that the notion of authenticity can function as an ontological 
foundation for a possible ethics.  
 
                                                        95 Dreyfus and Rubin, “Appendix”, 334. 
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The question thus remains whether there are any prospects of an ethics based on 
the notion of authenticity. It was argued above that there is a need for some kind of 
modification of Heidegger’s analysis in order to establish the connection between 
authenticity and ethics. The non-relational image of conscience that is presented in BT 
has made certain commentators suggest that the key to a Heideggerian ethics is to restore 
conscience back to its original relational meaning. As earlier shown, the function of the 
call of conscience is to call Dasein back to itself so that it can become whole and 
authentic. On this account, conscience has completely lost its traditional relational or 
social significance. In fact, Heidegger thinks that it is only when Dasein has authentically 
individuated itself through the call of conscience, “…it can become the ‘conscience’ of 
others” (BT 298). The condition for a collective authenticity or even a possible collective 
morality is thus the ‘mineness’ of individual conscience. Thus, Mulhall argues that the 
‘call of conscience’ must be articulated by a third party, in order to constitute an external 
disruption of Dasein’s self-reinforced dispersal in das Man. This would then be a way to 
recall Dasein to its own possibilities without requiring an incoherent process of ‘internal 
bootstrapping’.96
 Simon Critchley suggests that the call of conscience can be retained as a voice 
within Dasein. Its source, however, is not really Dasein itself but another’s voice that 
calls Dasein to respond. On this picture, conscience is the ontic testimony of a certain 
splitting in the self, which denies it from achieving self-mastery.
 
97
 It is not sufficient, in my view, to restore Heidegger’s notion of conscience back 
to its original relational meaning in order to establish the ontological connection between 
authenticity and ethics. If Dasein’s conscience is essentially relational and thereby 
developed in a social environment, we are immediately faced with the problem of das 
Man and its pervasive influence on Dasein. By portraying Dasein as predetermined to 
 In other words, it is 
the failure of autarky that makes the self fundamentally relational. The relational 
experience of conscience calls Dasein to a responsibility for the other that might be 
considered as ethical. Thus, Critchley’s ingenuous solution is that a relational and ethical 
experience of conscience only becomes possible by remaining inauthentic, or in a state of 
“originary inauthenticity”.  
                                                        96 Mulhall, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook, 144-145. Mulhall calls this third party “a friend”.  97 Simon Critchley, “Originary inauthenticity”, in On Heidegger’s Being and Time, edited by Steven 
Levine, 9-55 (New York: Routledge, 2008), 146. Critchley justifies this picture of conscience by use of the 
Freudian concept of the super-ego as the psychical imprint for a series of transferential relations to the 
other.  
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being inauthentic, Heidegger is thereby missing out on death’s full significance for 
human existence. Thus, in order to bring out this aspect I will in the following chapter 
suggest a different theoretical strategy that involves a deeper modification of the 
existential web. Rather than suggesting that the solution for a Heideggerian ethics lies in 
relational conscience or in originary inauthenticity, I will argue that what is needed is to 
refute the structural necessity of das Man. If it can be shown that das Man is not an 
existential or an ontological feature of Dasein, this can open up for the possibility that 
authenticity can be achieved as a permanent state.    
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 4. Death and das Man 
 
In BT Heidegger portrays Dasein as for the most part being in its everyday or inauthentic 
mode of being. A great obstacle for Dasein to attain a lasting and non-corruptive state of 
authenticity is thus that it is predominated by the inauthentic, levelling ways of das Man 
and its idle talk about death. Because of das Man, Dasein can never own up to itself fully 
and completely, and it can only achieve authenticity by a perpetual repetition of the 
authentic moment.  
At the heart of the dilemma lies Heidegger’s structural determination of das Man 
as an inherent and inescapable part of Dasein’s being. By turning das Man into an 
essential structure of the human constitution, being predominantly inauthentic seems 
inevitable. There is, in my view, a deterministic fallacy in Heidegger’s analysis that is 
particularly striking in his explication of das Man. If a lasting sense of being a whole self 
is a minimum requirement for individual morality, then it must be shown that Dasein is 
not predetermined to being inauthentic. My aim in this chapter is thus to scrutinise and 
question the ontological status of das Man. In what follows, I will thus argue that das 
Man is not an essential structure that belongs with necessity to the human constitution.  
If das Man is not an essential structure of Dasein, then what is it? This is one of 
the important questions to be raised in this chapter. In order to answer this question, I 
will first point to some of the peculiar features of das Man’s idle talk about death. I will 
then appeal to historical evidence of variations in the public interpretations of death. 
Finally, I will suggest an alternative view on the structural elements of ‘discourse’, and 
the primordial temporal element of ‘falling’. 
Based on a critical examination of the structural elements of discourse and 
falling, I will argue for the view that das Man is a phenomenon that has emerged as a 
consequence of certain historical and cultural contingencies. By questioning the 
structural necessity of das Man I hope to show that it is possible for Dasein to remain 
authentic despite the fact that it is also socially constituted. If this can be shown, a new 
and richer view of death’s significance for human existence can emerge. 
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4.1 Das Man’s idle talk about death 
According to Heidegger, das Man “is constituted by the way things have been publicly 
interpreted, which expresses itself in idle talk. Idle talk must accordingly make manifest 
the way in which everyday Dasein interprets for itself its Being-towards-death” (BT 252). 
In Division I Heidegger shows how das Man manifests itself from the perspective of 
disclosedness, in the form of idle talk (gerede), curiosity, and ambiguity. Here we learn 
that Dasein becomes curious and ambiguous because it is constantly distracted by new 
possibilities, and systematically detached from its environment. In its inauthentic state, 
Dasein cannot distinguish genuine from false understanding, and it confuses superficial 
with deep a understanding of phenomena. This process happens automatically because 
Dasein is thrown into existence.   
In Division II Heidegger further expands his analysis of das Man, and describes 
its idle talk about death in detail. Idle talk is the form of average intelligibility manifest in 
everyday communication. Now, all communication necessarily involves both an object 
and a claim about the object. Heidegger’s point is that in idle talk, the concern for the 
claim itself eclipses the concern for its object. Thus, idle talk is shallow and groundless, 
and has lost touch with the object of the communication. In this sense, idle talk closes off 
the object instead of disclosing it. Das Man’s impersonal and uprooted understanding of 
death dominates Dasein, and thus prevents it from becoming authentic. 
What is the specific content of das Man’s idle talk about death, and how is it 
expressed? In the public understanding, Heidegger says, death is ‘known’ as a mishap 
that is constantly occurring – as a ‘case of death’ (BT 253). The result of this wrongful 
understanding is that death remains in inconspicuousness, because:  
 
The “They” has already stowed away (gesichert) an interpretation for this event. It 
talks of it in a ‘fugitive’ manner, either expressly or else in a way that is mostly 
inhibited, as if to say, “One of these days one will die too, in the end; but right now 
it has nothing to do with us”. 
                     (BT 253) 
  
We see from this that Heidegger obviously thinks that das Man possesses a 
fundamentally distorted understanding of death as an event that will occur some time in 
the distant future. In the public way of interpreting death, it is spoken of as a ’case’ or as 
something ‘actual’, and thus its character of possibility gets concealed. Furthermore, the 
idle talk of Das Man is always ambiguous and “perverts death into an event of public 
occurrence” (BT 253). Das Man, Heidegger says, “gives its approval and aggravates the 
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temptation for Dasein to cover up its ownmost Being-towards-death” (BT 253). In this 
way, das Man provides Dasein with a constant tranquillisation about death, and in this 
“evasive concealment” Dasein is not permitted to have the courage for anxiety in the face 
of death. Instead, das Man concerns itself with transforming anxiety into fear of an 
oncoming event (BT 254). Finally, das Man’s cultivation of a ‘superior’ indifference 
towards death alienates Dasein from its ownmost non-relational potentiality, that is, from 
being authentic.  
There are several peculiar features of Heidegger’s characterisation of das Man’s 
idle talk about death. First of all, Heidegger seems to present idle talk as a universal and 
inescapable aspect of how the public relates to phenomena. Second, as shown in the 
previous chapter, it is difficult to miss out on the evaluative tone in Heidegger’s overall 
description of the public’s relationship to death. Even though Heidegger insists that idle 
talk “is not to be used in a disparaging signification”, his choice of words and the 
pejorative tone suggests that these are not merely neutral, non-evaluative descriptions of 
an ontological phenomenon. In other words, if Heidegger thinks that authenticity is the 
preferable mode for Dasein to be in, it should not come as a surprise that he also reveals 
a denouncing attitude towards das Man.   
A third striking feature of das Man’s idle talk is the lack of diversity and variety 
in its content, in that it boils down to a few assertions, accompanied by a few, but strong 
inhibitive actions directed towards Dasein. On Heidegger’s account, idle talk comes 
across as a singular, conformist way of relating to and talking about death. The lack of 
complexity in the public discourse is quite remarkable, in that there seems to be more 
room for diversity in the public’s relationship towards death than Heidegger’s account 
allows for.98
                                                        98 Jonathan Dollimore, Death, Desire, and Loss in Western Culture (New York: Routledge, 2001) 122. 
Dollimore points out that theoretical generalisations about how people have related to death in any 
historical period can be challenged. For example, social historians have shown that social class and wealth 
has made a difference to how death was experienced regardless of period.   
 There is, in other words, a need to examine the view that the public 
interpretation of death is necessarily always conformist, inhibitive, and alienating. There 
is also the need to question whether there is one single, identifiable motive behind the 
public way of relating to death. According to Heidegger’s description, das Man’s idle 
talk seems to be entirely about distracting Dasein away from an authentic encounter with 
its own death. But why can’t one of the driving forces behind it be love and care for the 
dying person, rather than just a ‘perverse’ turning away from the truth about death? 
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A final peculiar feature of das Man’s idle talk is the ambiguity in Heidegger’s 
description of it. On the one hand, Heidegger asserts that das Man “puts itself in the right 
and makes itself respectable by tacitly regulating the way in which one has to comport 
oneself to death” (BT 254). Furthermore, Heidegger asserts that idle talk is not about 
“consciously passing off something as something else” (BT 169).  Thus, he seems to 
think that the pervasive influence of idle talk happens unnoticeably or without anyone 
really becoming aware of it happening. On the other hand, Heidegger’s terminology (das 
Man “approves”, “aggravates”, “provides”, “does not permit”, “concerns and engages 
itself”, “tempts”, “alienates”, and “tranquillises) seems to indicate that these are 
intentional actions that are actually performed by someone. 
The many problematic features of das Man’s idle talk that we have just seen raise 
the question of das Man’s identity. Who or what is das Man? Who is it that tempts, 
tranquillises, and alienates Dasein away from its authentic being? Certain Heideggerians 
have taken great pains to defend the view that idle talk is a universal and inescapable of 
how the public interprets and relates to phenomena. 99 For example, Carman argues that 
idle talk is what makes a genuine sharing of meaning and understanding possible in the 
first place.100 It is thus neither possible nor desirable to eschew idle talk anymore than it 
is possible to get rid of das Man, in that both are just aspects of the mundane authority of 
normality.101
As we have seen, the ontological status of das Man seems to hinge partly on the 
necessity of being levelled and inhibited by its idle talk. Heidegger insists on the 
necessity of such levelling, since there in his view is never a possibility for Dasein to 
extricate itself from the public interpretations. Heidegger presses this point further by 
asserting: “In no case is a Dasein, untouched and unseduced by this way in which things 
have been interpreted, set before the open country of a “world-in-itself” so that it just 
beholds what it encounters” (BT 169). The message here is that because we are not 
detached subjects who discover meaning and truth in isolation from our social 
environment, there is no way of escaping the influence of public interpretations. But, we 
should ask: is idle talk about anything at all, a necessary and inescapable element of the 
human constitution? As I will soon try to show, there is a possible middle ground 
  
                                                        99 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, 143. A notable exception to this is Dreyfus who points out that 
Heidegger’s explication of das Man is the “most confused” part of his analytic.  100 Carman, Heidegger’s Analytic, 142. 101 Carman, Heidegger’s Analytic, 143. 
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between the lonely subject’s quest for knowledge and that of being completely lost in the 
distorted public interpretations of das Man.  
  
4.2 Who is das Man?  
In Division I of BT Heidegger explicates the essential structures of Dasein that make the 
shared intelligibility possible. Thus, he interprets the publicness of Dasein’s 
understanding in terms of the existentials of being-with (mitsein), and Dasein-with 
(mitdasein). These two structures point to the fact that Dasein can be at home with 
entities in the world only because - at the very deepest level – it is in a “with-world” 
(Mitwelt). For Heidegger, being-with is “equiprimordial” with being-in-the-world, in that 
both are coordinated aspects of the single unified basic structure of Dasein’s existence. 
Thus, human existence is socially constituted at its very core; our very being is 
characterised by being with others, even when we are alone or isolated.  
 Where in this picture does das Man fit in? Heidegger raises this question himself: 
“When Dasein is absorbed in the world of its concern – that is, at the same time in its 
being-with towards others – it is not itself. Who is it, then, who has taken over being as 
everyday being as everyday being-with-one-another?” (BT 125). Heidegger’s explication 
of das Man is supposed to supply an answer to the question of the “who” of everyday 
Dasein, and it is clear that he explicates das Man as an essential existential; that is, as a 
“primordial phenomenon belonging to Dasein’s positive constitution” (BT 167). His 
early analysis of the phenomenon shows that the elements of ‘distantiality’, 
‘awerageness’, and ‘levelling down’ constitute the public character of das Man. In this 
sense, das Man is a permanent structural condition of Dasein that cannot be escaped or 
overthrown. 
Many commentators accordingly defend the view that das Man is a structural 
determination of Dasein’s being.102                                                        102 See, for example Michael Zimmerman, The Eclipse of the Self: The Development of Heidegger’s 
Concept of Authenticity (London: Ohio University Press, 1981), 48. See also: Theodore R. Schatzki, “Early 
Heidegger on Sociality”, in Blackwell Companions to Philosophy: A Companion to Heidegger, edited by 
Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall, 233-247 (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 244. In general, 
I find that the problem of the “who” of das Man is unsatisfactorily handled by ‘Heideggerian’ 
commentators. Instead of being willing to radically question the ontological status of das Man, these 
commentators either openly or tacitly approve with Heidegger’s analysis on this point. Zimmerman argues 
that the correct interpretation of das Man is to see it as an inherent part of each of us; it is not a group of 
‘real’ people, but rather a way in which we as individuals exist. Schatzki emphasises that das Man clearly 
is an essential feature of Dasein’s existence in that it is a singular space of disclosure into which different 
individuals are thrown. These interpretations emphasise the purely formal-ontological aspect of das Man, 
and it is thus clear that there is no release or permanent escape from it.  
 Thus, Mulhall argues that das Man cannot be thought 
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of as a group of genuinely individual human beings; neither does it constitute a sort of 
communal self.103
  It is well known that Heidegger is influenced by Kierkegaard in BT.
 Rather, das Man is comparable to a free-floating, impersonal 
construct, a sort of consensual hallucination for which Dasein gives up its capacity for 
authenticity. But how viable is this view, and why is it so important to hold on to?  
104 In some 
of Kierkegaard’s writings there is an expressed concern with the ‘levelling tendencies’ in 
modern society. In The Present Age Kierkegaard criticises the so-called advanced 
cultures for having elevated the art of self-deception to its highest level as “mass-
culture”, in that the anonymous mass epitomises the dehumanisation of modern life.105 
Moreover, in The Sickness unto Death Kierkegaard argues that because of the decline of 
individual responsibility in modern society, the sense of sin and personal responsibility 
has disappeared from our culture.106
There is clearly a resemblance between Kierkegaard’s criticism of the anonymous 
masses of modern society and Heidegger’s description of das Man. The difference is that 
whereas Kierkegaard sees the mass-culture as a contingent sickness of his own age, 
Heidegger insists that das Man is an existential structure, and as such not identifiable 
with particular people, and not even with anonymous groups of people. Heidegger thus 
dismisses Kierkegaard’s account of the public mass as a historical or ‘ontic’ 
phenomenon, while he portrays das Man is a timeless, universal, and inescapable 
structural part of Dasein.  
 When social functions take the place of authentic 
selfhood, the mass with its characteristic lack of responsibility and its refusal of 
commitment becomes “the truth”. On this background, Kierkegaard asserts that the 
modern form of sickness is dread and despair. The modern individual is not “sick” in 
isolation; rather, he or she participates in the despair of an anxiety-ridden and sick 
society. 
The natural question to ask at this point is whether Heidegger’s structural 
determination of das Man is sustainable. When assessing the ontological status of das                                                         103 Mulhall, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook, 68. 104 Dreyfus and Rubin, “Appendix”, 299. In BT Heidegger refers to Kierkegaard in altogether three 
footnotes. As Dreyfus notes, Heidegger takes over from Kierkegaard much more than he acknowledges, 
for example Kierkegaard’s understanding of the self. Drefyfus’ general point is that Heidegger secularises 
Kierkegaard’s account of Religiousness A.  105 Søren Kierkegaard, Two Ages: The Age of Revolution and the Present Age, trans. H. V. and E. H. Hong 
(Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1978) 106 Søren Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, trans. H. V. and E. H. Hong (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1980) 
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Man, there are two important issues to be addressed. First, if Heidegger is correct in his 
existential determination of das Man, its chiefly negative influence on the individual 
should be questioned. Second, if the structural determination of das Man can be refuted, 
it must be possible to show how the individual can remain authentic, without having to 
completely extricate herself from the society in the sense of becoming non-social or a 
recluse.   
In general, I think we need to agree with Heidegger that human beings are born 
into a society that has already settled public interpretations of various phenomena. It is 
also true that most people integrate such public interpretations more or less passively, 
without ever questioning them or being able to overthrow them when so is necessary or 
required. Thus, the passive and unnoticeably integration of public attitudes and norms is 
part of the explanation for how positive as well as negative cultural practices are 
sustained throughout the course of time. The problem, however, is that Heidegger 
presents us with what seems to be an overly deterministic image of the negative aspects 
of social conditioning. It is this image that must be adjusted in order to bring out the full 
potential for human growth and freedom. 
Earlier in this chapter the process of examining the ontological status of das Man 
started off by pointing out the peculiar and problematic features of idle talk about death. 
This, however, is not sufficient to disproof Heidegger’s structural determination of das 
Man. What is needed is more concrete evidence of historical variations in the public 
interpretation of death. As the cultural historian Philippe Ariès’ research shows, from the 
Middle Ages up until the twentieth century essential changes have occurred in the 
Western society’s view of death.107
                                                        107 Philippe Ariès, The Hour of Our Death, transl. by Helen Weaver (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1991). Ariès has developed a socio-historical model of death wherein he tracks the mutations in our 
attitudes towards death based on four psychological themes: first, the defense of society against untamed 
nature; second, the belief in the existence of evil; third, the belief in the afterlife; and finally, the awareness 
of the individual. In addition to this, Ariès postulates five historical models, each of which varies in its 
respective emphasis on the above four motives: “tame death”, “the death of the self”, “remote and 
imminent death”, “the death of the other”, “dirty death”, and “hidden death”. 
 Ariès characterises death in the Middle Ages as 
“tame”, whereas it in modern society has become increasingly unfamiliar, traumatic, and 
“wild”. As the general trend toward secularisation in the West succeeded in diminishing 
the belief in evil and the afterlife, this contributed to the formation of an unfamiliar and 
untamed death. On Ariès’ account, in the modern age death has been “driven into secrecy 
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and dissimulation has become the rule”.108 Invisible death, hidden death, and medicalised 
death – all of these labels designate the modern attitude toward what in previous ages of 
our culture had been a profoundly human and social experience, rather than an object of 
science and bureaucracy. Interestingly, Ariès characterises the modern change in the 
public attitude as a “lie” that everyone becomes an accomplice to, and he explains the 
public lie as stemming from a temptation to protect the dying person by leaving him in 
ignorance of his imminent end.109 According to Ariès, Tolstoy’s story The Death of Ivan 
Ilyich (1886) is the perfect illustration of the transition from “the public death of the 
past” to “the hidden death of the future”. Tolstoy’s moral tale thus heralds the age of 
medicalised death.110
There are two especially noteworthy things in Ariès’ empirically based study of 
Western man’s changing attitudes towards death. First of all, Ariès historical presentation 
of the specific modern attitude towards death fits remarkably well with of Heidegger’s 
description of das Man. This can, in turn, suggest that das Man’s idle talk about death is a 
phenomenon that has emerged from within the modern industrialised societies. This 
suggestion, again, has the possible implication that the portrayal of das Man as a 
universal, timeless, and structural phenomenon can be refuted. Second, Ariès’ study 
shows that there have been historical periods where people have related differently to 
death than in the modern way. This opens for the possibility that public interpretations of 
death can in fact ‘hit the target’, and that there can be positive or even truthful ways of 
relating to death in society at large. But, the question is, how much weight can be put on 
Ariès historical account in order to refute the structural determination of das Man?
   
111
It is important to acknowledge that Heidegger is not oblivious to the importance 
of history or to fact of historical changes. In BT §§72-5 he makes the distinction between 
history and historicality, whereupon he claims that no particular historical findings (such 
 
                                                        108 Ariès, The Hour of Our Death, 562 . This has had the practical effect of removing or delaying all the 
signs that warned the sick person about his or hers forthcoming death, especially the staging of death as a 
public act.  109 Ariès, The Hour of Our Death, 561-562. Note Ariès’ choice of the term ”temptation”, which is exactly 
the same as in Heidegger’s description of das Man’s inauthentic stance toward death. There is no 
references whatsoever to Heidegger in Ariès’ work.  110 Ariès, The Hour of Our Death, 573. There is also a reference to Tolstoy’s story in BT.  111 Jonathan Dollimore, Death, Desire, and Loss in Western Culture, 63, 121.  Dollimore points out that 
Ariès’ study is silent about earlier historical epochs than the Middle Ages, and similarly about the 
development in other cultures. Thus, Ariès’ thesis is questionable in several respects; for example, Ariès is 
arguably more descriptive than analytic, and often he does not explain the changes he charts. Dollimore 
also finds the underlying argument that people in the West have moved from a healthy to a pathological 
relationship to death to be questionable. In any case, it is clear that Ariès exposes a preference for the 
attitudes to death allegedly found in the earlier ages.  
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as Ariès’) will cast light on Dasein’s historicality, which is the structural condition for 
the human capacity to explore the past. Heidegger here intends to bring light upon the 
temporal significance of Dasein’s existence as a thrown projection by explicating it as 
historical. Is this distinction a problem for Ariès’ account? Not necessarily. It is not 
Dasein’s ability to explore its own past that is at stake here, but rather its ontological 
capacity for becoming whole and authentic.     
Furthermore, there is room for ‘ontic’ variations in idle talk in Heidegger’s 
analysis. Thus, he points out that the extent to which das Man’s “dominion becomes 
compelling and explicit may change in the course of history” (BT 129). Such change and 
variation is thus what is disclosed in Ariès research. In other words, Heidegger’s 
existential account of das Man does not necessarily predetermine “its various 
possibilities of becoming concrete”. Notwithstanding this fact, there seems to few 
possibilities in Heidegger’s analysis for positive or truthful public ways of relating to 
death. This is so, because: 
 
Dasein is equiprimordially in the untruth. Anticipatory resoluteness gives Dasein at 
the same time the primordial certainty that it has been closed off. In anticipatory 
resoluteness, Dasein holds itself open for its constant lostness in the irresoluteness of 
the “they” – a lostness which is possible from the very basis of its own Being. As a 
constant possibility of Dasein, irresoluteness is co-certain.  
                                                                                                         (BT 308) 
 
On Heidegger’s account, Dasein is primordially lost in das Man and in the untruth as a 
matter of fact. Dasein’s interpretation of death will thus always be distorted by the 
levelling of das Man’s idle talk, even though the strength of its dominion may vary over 
time. 
Whether we choose to accept all the possible the implications of Ariès’ research 
or not, it at least shows that people throughout the history of the Western culture have 
changed profoundly in their understanding of death. Whether these are changes for the 
better or the worse is here besides the general point that public opinions about and 
practices towards death actually do change fundamentally. This opens for the possibility 
that the alleged universal negative impact of das Man’s idle talk can be refuted. 
Moreover, it shows that society’s current ways of understanding and of relating to death 
can change fundamentally again, in the future. 
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4.3 Truthful ‘talk’ and immediate access to phenomena 
From the basis of historical evidence of radical changes in the public understanding of 
death, we begin to see that it is possible to question the ontological status of das Man as a 
permanent structure of Dasein. However, at this point we are forced to face an even 
deeper structural problem. This problem occurs because the levelling forces of das Man’s 
idle talk is a mode of the existential structure of ‘discourse’ (Rede). But what is 
discourse, and does it necessarily and always degenerate into idle talk?  
As earlier shown, discourse is together with attunement and understanding, an 
element of Dasein’s ‘facticity’, which all pertain to the care-structure. In the same way as 
Dasein is always attuned to the world by being in a mood; and, in the same way as it 
always has some understanding of its world, Dasein is always ‘in’ discourse, too. 
Discourse is thus constitutive to Dasein’s disclosedness; it is a way in which entities 
show up and are intelligible for us, and as such it is a fundamental structure of being-in-
the-world. Perhaps one could say that discourse is the way in which the world is 
articulated through expression and communication, in terms of how it makes sense to 
express our understanding and convey it to others. Discourse is thus essentially 
communicative, but not necessarily solely in terms of language.112
As a hermeneutic condition, discourse constitutes the bridge, so to speak, between 
the anonymous social norms of das Man and the concrete interpretive practices of 
individual human agents. This is one of the main reasons why authentic resoluteness can 
never be a stable or self-sufficient mode of existence, but rather is a perpetual struggle 
against the levelling forces inherent in discursive practices. Heidegger asserts that there 
are many things with which we become acquainted with through public interpretation, 
and that “there is not a little which never gets beyond such an average understanding” 
(BT 169). In Heidegger’s view, the way things are expressed or communicated is by 
conforming to the public and anonymous norms that govern our shared background 
 Rather, discourse is 
the hermeneutic condition par excellence. Idle talk is thus an instance of the inauthentic 
mode of discourse, in contrast to Dasein’s inner silent voice of conscience, which is an 
instance of its authentic mode.  
                                                        112 Carman, Heidegger’s Analytic, 221-223. See also: Charles Guignon, Heidegger and the Problem of 
Knowledge (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983), 118. Carman points out that Guignon 
advances an interpretation of BT wherein he attributes to Heidegger a “constitutive” view of language. 
Carman, however, argues that there is abundant evidence in BT that discourse and language are not 
identical; indeed that language is just one manifestation of discourse among others.  
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practices. Thus, discourse is always essentially shaped to the normative authority of das 
Man, with the inevitable result of Dasein being predominantly inauthentic.  
Heidegger is correct in his view, I think, that human beings are essentially 
socially constituted from the outset of their lives. Put in structural terms, the self only 
emerges in Dasein’s being-with (mitsein). Thus, we are not lonely, isolated Cartesian 
subjects from the outset, and for the most part we discover meaning and truth in a social 
environment, rather than on our own. The pertinent question to ask at this point in the 
discussion, however, is whether the interpretation of phenomena is always and 
necessarily subject to a levelling process. Or, put in different terms: can the public 
discourse move in the opposite direction and thereby disclose things and phenomena as 
they truly are? These questions are important, not only because what is at stake is the 
possibility for Dasein to become a fully, lasting authentic self. What is also at stake is the 
fundamental value of being part of a community, and whether this is basically a positive 
or negative condition for human development and growth.  
As earlier shown, Carman is convinced that Dasein cannot escape the influence of 
das Man’s idle talk about death. Just as idle talk gives us access to the public meaning 
and understanding in general, public interpretation is simultaneously subject to 
conformity and levelling. Carman calls this process the “generic drift of discourse”.113
 
 
For Carman, interpretation is constantly subject to this generic drift; in this way das 
Man’s anonymous and banal practices naturally tend to obscure the particularity of 
Dasein’s unique situation. But, is it necessarily true that all interpretations are subject to 
conformity and levelling? To realise the importance of this question, we need to take a 
closer look at the thrust of Carman’s argument: 
What is intelligible is precisely what “one” understands. It is constitutive of making 
sense that one do so according to the standards of das Man. Interpretation has no 
choice but to accommodate and exploit the prevailing criteria of intelligibility, 
which means at least to some extent trading the irreducibility particularity of one’s 
own factical situation for generally adequate, but always more or less loosely fitting 
means of expressing and communicating it. The effort to make oneself intelligible in 
discourse therefore tends to drift into ever shallower water, eventually bottoming out 
in sheer banality and cliché.114
 
 
                                                        113 Taylor Carman, “Must we be inauthentic?”, in Heidegger, Authenticity, and Modernity, Volume 1, 
edited by Mark A. Wrathall and Jeff Malpas, 13-28 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000), 20. 114 Carman, “Must we be inauthentic?”, 21-22. 
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Now, there are three important points to take notice of here. First of all, in Carman’s 
view, we have no other choice than to submit to das Man’s interpretations. Second, and 
as already mentioned, Carman thinks that discourse is always subject to levelling 
mechanisms, which thus is a necessary and not a contingent process. As a third point, 
Carman adds that the only intelligible interpretations are those that to some degree 
accommodate the average or levelled understanding of das Man.  
As a matter of fact, I believe that all of these points can be refuted or modified. 
Thus, what needs to be shown is; on the one hand, how the individual can evade the 
negative levelling aspects of public interpretation. In other words, an explanation is 
required for how it is possible for the individual to relate to phenomena as they are in 
themselves without succumbing to the corruption of public interpretation. Furthermore, it 
must be possible to show that even the public opinion can move close to a truthful, 
uncorrupted interpretation of phenomena.  
As we have already seen, a society’s attitudes and practices towards certain 
phenomena can change quite radically during the course of history. Ariès’ study of the 
historical changes in our attitudes towards death is a strong testimony to that. However, 
Ariès historical research also shows that these changes occur very slowly, and that they 
emerge as a consequence of deep transformations in the Western culture’s encompassing 
worldview. Put in Heideggerian terms, there have been fundamental shifts in the 
‘metaphysical’ background assumptions that govern our understanding of being, and 
these fundamental shifts explain the ‘ontic’ changes in society’s attitudes and practices. 
In the next chapter I will examine Heidegger’s view of metaphysic in greater detail. The 
point of bringing this up now is to show that part of the problem with the changes in the 
historical and cultural interpretations of death, is the difficulty in determining which of 
these interpretations that approach death in the most truthful way. That is, how can we be 
sure that the modern attitude towards death is somehow more destructive or inhibitive 
than the attitude in the Middle Ages, when both attitudes emerge from a set of 
background understandings of being that is difficult or impossible to assess?  
To refute the points in Carman’s argument, we need a more concrete example of 
deep and enduring changes in the public opinion, which is also closer to us in historical 
time. A familiar example of radical alterations in the public opinion is how Western 
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people have changed in their relationship to smoking cigarettes.115
However, the question remains: when the publicly conveyed norm is that 
smoking cigarettes is not harmful, how is it then possible for anyone to realise that in fact 
the opposite is true? Thus, how is it possible to ‘know’ the facts about smoking cigarettes 
before they start to materialise in either lung cancer or other related health issues? Part of 
the problem here is that Heidegger defines meaning (Sinn) as “that which is articulated in 
interpretation, thus even more primordially in discourse” (BT 161). On this account, there 
seems to be no other choice than to wait for a change in the public interpretation of 
smoking based on its long-term negative health-effects, before one can fully realise that 
smoking is in fact bad for health. Thus, what needs to be shown is how the individual can 
acquire an immediate access to the phenomena as they truly are. Is it possible that if not 
meaning, then at least ‘truth’ can sometimes be acquired directly from the ‘thing itself’? 
In such a case there would be no need for interpretation or for discourse when 
approaching certain phenomena.  
 A few centuries ago, 
in the fifties in the United States as well as in Europe, smoking cigarettes was considered 
to be a both ‘cool’ and beneficial thing to do. (The harmful effects of smoking were not 
yet known, leading some medical doctors even to recommend their patients to start 
smoking.) Thus, the startling public norm at the time was that “smoking cigarettes is 
good for you”. Today, of course, the publicly accepted norm about smoking is 
completely reversed, in that almost everyone in society has incorporated the view that 
smoking is bad for health. This alteration in the public opinion has mainly occurred 
because the various long-term negative effects of smoking have now become revealed 
and accepted as part of our common knowledge. This, I believe, is an example of a 
public interpretation of a phenomenon that has furthermore moved in the right direction 
by being non-levelled and true. 
In the above example about smoking, simply by inhaling a cigarette for the very 
first time, meaningful and ‘true’ information about the harmful effects of smoking is 
instantly conveyed. As such, all the information one needs in order to know the facts 
about smoking is directly accessible from the ‘thing itself’. Now, one might protest to                                                         115 Heidegger is often criticised for not incorporating the human body in his analysis of Dasein. Heidegger 
does, however, use the ‘symptoms of a disease’ (Krankenheitserscheinungen) as an example of an 
appearance of the phenomenon in his explication of the concept of phenomenon (BT 29). Symptoms of 
disease thus ‘indicate’ something which does not show itself, i.e. the phenomenon of the disease itself. I 
have chosen the above example about smoking partly because it of its concreteness, and partly because I 
find that it exemplifies the problem of having access to phenomena. 
73  
this and argue that this is simply a banal, ontic example that does not hold for ‘real’ 
phenomena in the Heideggerian sense. Thus, one could argue that ontological 
phenomena are always subject to interpretation and discourse, and it is therefore a 
constant risk of levelling and distorted understanding of them. One might also point out 
that there are plenty of counter-examples to the above example about smoking, in that 
not every physical phenomenon is accessible in such a direct and naïve way.116
  Again, it must be stressed that Heidegger is correct in his view that most 
publicly conveyed information subjects us to banal, flattened out, and levelled language. 
Moreover, the public interpretations of phenomena are often far removed from the truth, 
and it’s a regrettable fact that most people never move beyond the grip of such 
subversive and untruthful public interpretations. A strong tendency is thus to be in the 
grip of such interpretations. This is a tendency that perhaps more than ever before in 
history prevails, partly because of the mass media’s dominant influence on the minds of 
modern people. The point here, however, is that prevailing tendencies are not necessarily 
indications of ontological structures pertaining to the human constitution as such. Thus, 
when it comes to the difficult and important task of understanding the human 
constitution, I think that what must also be included in the analysis are the outer limits, so 
to speak, of what is in fact possible to achieve for humans in terms of authenticity and 
self-realisation.  
 However, 
the general point holds, in that exposure to certain phenomena over a relatively short 
period of time can and will reveal its ‘true’ nature without the need for interpretation.   
 
4.4 The structural story of falling 
So far, my efforts in trying to disproof the ontological status of das Man has arguably 
yielded some positive results, in that it seems to be possible for human beings to escape 
the negative, levelling force of public interpretations. However, a fundamental structural 
dilemma remains to be solved. Heidegger asserts that the evasive actions (temptation, 
tranquillisation, and alienation) of das Man are the distinguishing marks of the kind of 
being called ‘falling’ (BT 254). The existential falling is thus presented as falleness into 
the everyday averageness of das Man. As shown in chapter two, falling is an element of 
the deepest structural layer in the existential web, which is Dasein’s temporality. This is 
where Heidegger lay out the three ‘ecstasies’ of temporality, past, present and future. The                                                         116 For example, taking drugs for the first time will give an intense pleasurable sensation   and tasting a 
bitter medicine.  
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ecstasie of falling is thus explicated as a movement of falling in the present moment, 
wherein Dasein becomes dispersed and absorbed into its world. Thus, falling is 
explicated as a mode of disclosure, that is, as an unquestioning and absorbed relation to 
the beings Dasein encounter. Thus, as part of the care-structure, fallenness is explicated 
as Being-alongside with other beings in the world. Together with existentiality as Being-
ahead-of-itself, and facticity as Being-already-in, fallenness belongs to the human 
constitution as an inescapable structural element. On Heidegger’s account, Dasein is 
constantly and inevitably part of a social levelling process which pertains to its own 
being, and as such Dasein is always and necessarily falling. It is because of this perpetual 
falling movement that Dasein for the most part exists in its inauthentic or everyday mode 
of being. Falling Dasein is thus unable to take an autonomous and critically investigating 
stance towards phenomena, as suggested in the earlier example of smoking cigarettes.  
  Now, it seems as though falling more than das Man is the deepest structural 
obstacle, so to speak, for Dasein to attain a non-relapsing state of authenticity. Why does 
Heidegger insist that falling into the present is a necessary component of human 
existence? There is no straightforward answer to this question. We may therefore first 
take notice of the resemblance between structural falling and the myth of the Fall, or to 
the Christian doctrine of original sin. According to this doctrine, human beings are the 
self-originating source of sin. Thus, at its core is the conception that human nature as 
such is tragically flawed or perverse, so to speak, in its very structure or constitution. In 
the traditional Christian account human beings are not only naturally capable of acting 
sinfully, but are always already turned against themselves, against the true and the good, 
by virtue of their very human constitution. Heidegger, however, explicitly denies that his 
structural account of falling has religious or evaluative connotations. Thus, he asserts: 
 
We would also misunderstand the ontologico-existential structure of falling if we 
were to ascribe it to the sense of a bad or deplorable ontical property of which, 
perhaps, more advanced stages of human culture might be able to rid themselves. 
                     (BT 176) 
 
 
As we can see, falling is not supposed to portray Dasein as if there is something 
inherently wrong with it. Furthermore, falling does not refer to a ‘fall’ from a purer or 
higher state that Dasein can recapture in one way or another, for example by divine 
intervention or by somehow making efforts for self-improvement. Rather, Heidegger 
says that Dasein is already fallen into the world, as something that belongs to its very 
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being. Thus, whereas the Christian doctrine offers an explanation for man’s fallen state 
by its account of original sin and man’s disobedience to God, no such explanation is 
offered on Heidegger’s existential account of falling. Furthermore, whereas the religious 
account offers redemption from our fallen state due to God’s grace, there seems to be no 
graceful escape from structural falling. As Dasein we simply are thrown into the world 
and thus we are fallen and continue to fall throughout our existence as a matter of fact: 
“Falling is a definite existential characteristic of Dasein itself” (BT 176).  
As we can see, Heidegger’s version of falling emerges from certain inexplicable 
and unpleasant facts about the human condition. This, however, immediately raises the 
question of why Heidegger’s structural account of the phenomenon falling should be 
accepted as more credible, ‘true’, or primordial than any religious myth.117 Moreover, 
commentators point to inconsistencies and a significant degree of terminological 
ambiguity in Heidegger’s explication of falling. For example, Dreyfus and Rubin shows 
that there are two different accounts of falling in BT.118
 As Christopher Macann points out, there seems to be an artificial contrivance 
about the structure of falling, and that this contrivance threatens to bring the basic 
ontological structures of BT into contradiction with themselves.
 First, in Division I Heidegger 
presents us with the structural version of falling which he attributes to the basic structure 
of intelligibility. Structural falling is what produces the constant ‘pull’ towards 
interpreting Dasein in terms of the world. This pull is the deepest cause of the generic 
drift of discourse, and it generates an abiding tendency in Dasein to flee in the face of 
death and anxiety. By contrast, the other version of falling that emerges in Division II is a 
motivational or psychological account. Here, ‘fallenness’ is the motivated result of 
Dasein’s temptation to flee from its own nullity in the face of anxiety. Thus, what 
generates falling on the motivational account is Dasein’s perpetual flight from itself, 
wherein Dasein resists listening to its inner voice of conscience.  
119
                                                        117 It is important to notice that there are other kinds of religious or metaphysical accounts of man’s fallen 
state than the Christian myth presented here. For example, in Buddhism the Sanskrit term ‘karma’ (which 
can be good or bad) is supposed to explain why so many people suffer for seemingly no reason.  
 The difficulties that 
follow from viewing falling as a structural part of Dasein is thus rather serious: if Dasein 
as itself ceases to be itself because of falling, then how can it ever become itself in the 
manner required by the theory of authenticity? Are there any solutions to these dilemmas 
118 Dreyfus and Rubin, “Appendix”, 334.  The contradiction arises because of Heidegger’s equivocation 
between the structural and the psychological accounts of falling. 119 Macann, “Who is Dasein? Towards an ethics of authenticity”, 223-24. 
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other than straightforwardly admitting that Heidegger presents us with an inconsistent 
and rather confusing existential account of falling? Carman points out that Heidegger 
need not revert to the motivational account of falling in order to explain Dasein’s 
fallenness, since he already has the structural account from Division I in place.120
When Heidegger describes the ‘movement’ (Bewegtheit) of falling, he employs 
vivid imagery such as “downward plunge” (Absturz), and “turbulence” (Wirbel) (BT 
178). More specifically, he says that as long as Dasein is what it is “it remains in the 
throw” (im Wurf), and “is sucked (hineingewirbelt) into the turbulence of das Man’s 
inauthenticity” (BT 179).
 Thus, 
since structural falling is a condition of intelligibility as such, no motivational story is 
required to explain that Dasein has already fallen into the average everydayness of das 
Man. However, in my view, it is structural falling that is the real problem,  
121 These images of falling are quite suggestive, and they seem 
to put falling on par with the powerful and sometimes violent forces of nature. Carman 
appeals to this imagery when he argues that the existential force of falling is comparable 
to the natural force of gravity. He thus promotes a view that exploits Heidegger’s 
description of falling as a force or an ongoing dynamic tendency that constantly steers 
Dasein away from itself.122
By recognising the discursive conditions of interpretation and by comparing 
falling to the force of gravity, Carman argues for the existential necessity of falling. 
However, rather than solving the problem, this view reveals an even deeper dilemma. 
For, if Dasein‘s falling is understood as a case of inexplicable necessity on par with the 
laws of nature, this brings out what might be characterised as an enigma in Heidegger’s 
analysis. This a priori enigma stems from the central claim that Dasein is a thrown 
 Thus, in the similar way as we are constantly exposed to 
gravity as a law of nature, as socially conditioned creatures we are inevitably and with 
necessity falling. 
                                                        120 Carman, “Must we be inauthentic?”, 17.  121 Carman, “Must we be inauthentic?”, 17. Macquarrie and Robinson translate the German term wirbel as 
“turbulence”. However, Carman’s alternative use of the translation “spiralling” is probably more 
illustrative for his argumentative purposes in the particular case of falling.  Carman also exchanges the 
English translation “sucked” with “whirled”.  122 Carman, “Must we be inauthentic?”, 24-25. Carman argues that authentic existence is constituted by 
the very forces against which it has to push in its effort to grasp itself in its facticity: “Just as a good jump 
is at once conditioned and inhibited by gravity, so too authentic resoluteness consists in resisting the 
movement of falling from within the levelling process that is at work in all discursive idioms”.  
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projection into the world.123
At the heart of the dilemma lies Heidegger’s explication of falling as a primordial 
structural element belonging to the temporal ecstasie of the present. When falling is 
presented as a primordial structure, this creates an inconstancy in Dasein’s self, and it 
thus renders it impossible for Dasein to maintain a state of authenticity. Fallen Dasein is 
precisely not itself. But if Dasein is originally not itself, then what is Dasein restored to 
when it is restored to itself by being authentically resolute? One way to solve this 
dilemma would be to rearrange the primordial structures in BT.
 The simple fact that one exists thus creates the philosophical 
riddle of the completely obvious. Furthermore, there’s a deep ironic twist to this view: if 
Dasein is falling by necessity, this threatens to render it more of a present-at-hand 
actuality than a possibility. But this seems to be exactly what Heidegger wants to avoid 
by making the future into the primary element of Dasein’s temporality, thereby breaking 
with the pre-eminence of the solidifying presence which is characteristic of traditional 
metaphysics.  
124 If falling is viewed as 
a secondary rather than a primary phenomenon, this opens up the possibility that 
falleness into das Man could be presented as an existential modification of an original 
authentic self. To be oneself, whole and undisrupted, would then be the ontologically 
primary phenomenon.125
 
  
4.5 Falling, rising, and transcending  
In this chapter I have tried, trough various approaches, to refute the structural-ontological 
necessity of das Man. I started off by pointing out problematic features of das Man’s idle 
talk about death. Then, through a presentation of Ariès’ account of historical variations in 
the Western society’s public interpretation of death, it was suggested that das Man’s idle 
talk about death is a modern and contingent, and not a universal or timeless phenomenon. 
Next, I have tried to show that even public interpretations are able to disclose the truth 
about phenomena without necessarily relapsing back into false interpretations and 
levelled idle talk. I have also argued for the possibility that the individual in certain cases 
can approach phenomena directly, thereby circumventing the necessity of interpretation 
and discourse.                                                          123 Critchley, “Originary inauthenticity”, 138. Critchley argues that the enigmatic a priori in BT creates a 
fundamental opacity that both seems to resist phenomenological description and is that in relation to which 
the phenomenologist describes. 124 Macann, “Who is Dasein? Towards an ethics of authenticity”, 221. 125 Macann, “Who is Dasein? Towards an ethics of authenticity”, 242. 
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Because of the complexity of the existential web, there always seem to be yet 
another structural obstacle that must be overcome in order to establish the possibility for 
Dasein to remain authentic. The deepest obstacle so far is arguably the temporal 
movement of falling into the world. With regards to this structural obstacle, it seems as 
though we are left with two options: we must either accept falling as an inexplicable and 
primordial structural element and thereby accepting that Dasein can never become fully 
authentic. This is, in essence, Carman’s view. Alternatively, by embracing Macann’s 
solution, we can view falling as a secondary phenomenon, thereby causing a 
rearrangement in the deepest structural layer of existential web.  
Now, what Macann’s solution fails to mention is what will happen to Dasein’s 
temporality, and more specifically to the ecstasie of the present, if we choose to make 
this rearrangement. Does making falling into a secondary phenomenon entail that the 
present moment is somehow erased, or that being in the present is no longer possible? If 
this is the case, it would in fact threaten to overthrow Heidegger’s most fundamental 
project in BT, which is to show that the ‘meaning of being’ lies in primordial temporality. 
Ecstatic temporality is primordial because its makes the past, the present, and the future 
to emerge simultaneously as three interwoven ecstasies, as opposed to the linear 
representation of time.126
What the discussion of falling shows above everything else, in my view, is the 
immense difficulties that pertain to analysing human beings as structurally and 
inescapably part of the world, while at the same time explicating them as temporally 
‘ecstatic’ or potentially transcendent beings. According to Heidegger, the underlying 
structure of Dasein’s world is a wide web of socially defined concepts, roles, functions, 
and functional interrelations. Thus, Dasein has no other choice than to understand itself 
in terms of the world, which is also why it is inevitably falling. But why must being part 
 Instead of seeing the past and the future as extensions of the 
present moment, Heidegger presents the three ecstasies as co-originary, “equi-
primordial”, moments (BT 329). Thus, the ecstasie of the present must somehow be 
retained in order to not completely disrupt the deepest and most original point of 
Heidegger’s philosophical project in BT.  
                                                        126 Schürmann, “Heidegger’s Being and Time”, 106-107. Schürmann points out that Heidegger breaks 
with the linear representation of time because he breaks with the pre-eminence of the present. Typical for 
the traditional metaphysical representation of time is that the now-moment is a point of intersection 
between past and future moments.  
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of the world, or being-alongside other beings necessarily be understood in terms of a 
falling movement? 127
In order to fully retain the temporal dimension in Heidegger’s analysis we need  
to understand what might manifest in the ecstasie of the present moment differently. 
Rather than thinking that the present solely comprises the movement of falling, my 
suggestion is that it also opens up for a transcendent movement of rising whilst being 
with others in the world. Moreover, such a transcending movement can last in the sense 
of not relapsing back into inauthenticity, thus being continuous and non-corrupted by the 
negative aspects of the world. On this account it is not merely the future that opens up for 
Dasein’s possibilities, but also the present. 
 
Now, to transcend external or worldly limitations and negativities, as well as the 
inner the limitations that pertain to the human constitution, is after all what some people 
throughout the human history have tried to achieve. Furthermore, there are and always 
have been certain marginal practices available wherein the individual can resist the 
levelling forces of the society.128 Such marginal practices are ways of relating to the 
world and to phenomena from a different background understanding of being than the 
currently prevailing. Most typically, various representatives from religious and spiritual 
movements have tried to transcend the world and its limitations by withdrawing 
themselves away from it. However, there are also examples of people who seem to be 
able to rise and transcend while remaining involved in the world. Whether anyone ever 
has truly succeeded in such an effort, is an empirical question that needs verification. I do 
think, however, that there are examples of this, both in the historical past and at the 
present point in history that can attest to the genuine possibility of a non-corrupted 
authenticity and a continuing transcending movement.129
   
  
 
                                                         127 Stephen Mulhall, Philosophical Myths of the Fall (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 52-53. 
Mulhall points out that Heidegger is profoundly ambivalent about Dasein’s fallen absorption into das Man. 
Interpretative charity suggests that the ambivalence is corrected by consigning das Man and fallenness to 
the realm of the ontic, which is partly what I am trying to do here. Mulhall, however, rejects this solution.    128 Dreyfus and Rubin, “Appendix”, 329.  129 Dreyfus and Rubin’s chosen examples are Martin Luther King Jr., Jesus, and Florence Nightingale. To 
this I would like to add a few examples from other cultural traditions, such as Mahatma Gandhi and the 
current Dalai Lama. These people exemplify the possibility of becoming authentic within their particular 
cultural traditions. More importantly, they exemplify that being authentic     
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5. Metaphysics and Death 
 
We have arrived at the last theme to be discussed in this thesis, which is death as a 
metaphysical concept. In BT Heidegger insists that his analysis of death is non-
speculative in the sense of being entirely ‘this-worldly’. My main aim in this concluding 
chapter is thus to scrutinise Heidegger’s claim that his analysis of death is non-
metaphysical. I will in fact argue that Heidegger’s notion of death is ‘metaphysical’ in 
accordance with his own understanding of the term. However, it is first necessary to be 
clear about the meaning of the term ‘metaphysics’. More specifically, there is a need to 
examine Heidegger’s own understanding of metaphysics. In the first section I will thus 
map out Heidegger’s complex view of metaphysics, which is developed in contrast to 
what he thinks is the problem with traditional metaphysics.     
In the previous chapter I tried to show that certain phenomena are directly 
accessible just as they are in themselves, outside the circles of interpretation. This direct 
accessibility, however, is not possible with death as a phenomenon. We have earlier seen 
that on Heidegger’s methodological account, death remains beyond a direct 
phenomenological grasp. Death can thus only be grasped indirectly, as an immanent but 
hidden part of Dasein’s structural design. This opaque nature of death is what makes it 
especially exposed to theoretical speculations and methodological projections. 
 In order to bring out the ‘metaphysical’ nature of Heidegger’s notion of death, I 
will analyse and discuss a few of Heidegger’s assertions about death in greater detail, and 
thereby try to exhibit the metaphysical presuppositions and assumptions they emerge 
from. My main effort in this chapter is thus to show that Heidegger’s analysis of death in 
BT emerges from different and partly incompatible background understandings of being. 
This is, in my view, the real cause behind all the commentary confusion and debate that 
surrounds Heidegger’s notion of death. 
 Towards the end of this chapter I point out that even though it can be shown that 
it is possible to attain a lasting state of authenticity that is also ethical, this rarely 
becomes a reality for human beings. Part of the problem is worldly, factical limitations 
we are all subject to, and the obvious inequality in terms of resources and possibilities for 
reaching the full human potential. It thus seems be a need for the belief in an afterlife, 
since in most cases there is simply not enough time to become authentic and morally 
fulfilled.        
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5.1 What is metaphysics?  
In order to examine and evaluate Heidegger’s claim that his notion of death in BT is 
entirely non-metaphysical, there is a need to be clear about the meaning of the term 
‘metaphysics’. However, to establish a definite understanding of metaphysics is difficult 
because it is an ambiguous term that can be defined in variety of different ways. Thus, 
metaphysics can be understood in a wide range from; a speculative constructed 
philosophical system dealing with the first principles; a science of supersensible or 
transphenomenal entities; an attempt to provide an absolute non-perspectival account of 
reality; an answer to the old question of why there is something rather than nothing; a 
mode of thinking founded upon the logic of binary oppositions; an attempt to answer the 
perennial questions concerning the meaning of factual human life; or, simply a 
systematic reflection on the nature of existing reality.130
It is well known that in modern twentieth century philosophy, most of these 
understandings of metaphysics and their uses have acquired a very bad reputation. That 
is, most modern philosophers – especially within the so-called analytical tradition – shy 
away from engaging theoretically with anything that can be associated with systematic 
metaphysical speculations. The avoidance and dismissal of traditional metaphysics is 
thus arguably one of the predominant tendencies within modern philosophy.
 
131
Metaphysics as a traditional form of Western thinking has been called into 
question not only by the so-called explicitly anti-metaphysical thinkers. Heidegger also 
believes in the need to criticise and eventually overcome the metaphysical tradition. In 
the introduction to BT Heidegger announces his project of ‘overcoming’ (Uberwindung) 
metaphysics. As earlier shown (in section 2.5), one of the most salient features of this 
overcoming is the subversion of the traditional metaphysical priority of actuality over 
possibility. For Heidegger, phenomenology is the philosophical method that enables us to 
discover that our very being is possibility rather than actuality. Phenomenology is in this 
sense the ‘first philosophy’ that permits us to overcome the traditional hegemony of 
presence and actuality, which is characteristic of all earlier metaphysical systems. Thus, 
through phenomenology we discover ourselves as beings in time, continually moving 
  
                                                        130 See Dan Zahavi, “Phenomenology and Metaphysics”, in Metaphysics, Facticity, Interpretation: 
Phenomenology in the Nordic Countries, edited by Dan Zahavi, Sara Heinamaa and Hans Ruin (Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), 14.  131 For the twentieth century logical-positivists and in general for thinkers belonging to the analytical 
tradition, assertions are meaningless unless they have some sort of empirical content. And, assertions that 
have empirical content belong to the empirical sciences.   
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beyond the actual givens of the present towards the future, but also towards the past. In 
this sense, Heidegger’s thinking on the ‘possible’ represents a radical departure from 
traditional metaphysical theories.  
Heidegger thinks, on par with many modern philosophers, that traditional 
metaphysical thinking must be overcome. However, the only way to do so, is by thinking 
through the history of metaphysical efforts to understand the being of what is. According 
to Heidegger, the history of the West consists in a series of ways in which the being of 
what is has been unconcealed to human beings.132
On Heidegger’s account, metaphysics is the attempt to think and name the being 
of what is. In this sense, by doing fundamental ontology in BT he is trying to do the 
‘metaphysics’ of metaphysics, so to speak. Heidegger sees the effort to restrict 
philosophy to conceptual or logical analysis, thereby ignoring or dismissing metaphysics, 
as a sign that modern philosophy is more subject than ever to the errors in the 
metaphysics of the past. Philosophy as a method of mere conceptual and logical analysis 
does not genuinely eliminate metaphysics; it simply ignores it.
 Metaphysics, in this view, affects 
much more than philosophy itself. In fact, all ‘ontical’ variations in the content of human 
history (thoughts, words, experiences, deeds, etc.) are determined by a background 
understanding, which shapes and constitutes the foreground activities. As shown in the 
previous chapter, the variations in the Western society’s attitudes towards death, 
exemplifies such gradual shifts in the metaphysical background understanding and 
assumptions about being. 
133
In light of what have just been said about metaphysics, what does it mean to say 
that death is a metaphysical concept? If we first consider Heidegger’s view on the 
 Thus, in Heidegger’s 
view one cannot simply stop treating metaphysics as a serious and worthwhile branch of 
philosophy. Eliminating metaphysics in this way will, in fact, only heighten our oblivion 
to the way our understanding of the world is based on a background understanding of 
being. 
                                                        132 According to Heidegger, the history of being which is traceable in the work of metaphysical thinkers, 
falls into four distinct periods: the Greek, the Medieval, the Modern, and the Technological. Throughout 
these four historical periods, being has become increasingly concealed in the sense that human beings have 
become increasingly oblivious to the fact that their ‘ontic’ activities are grounded in a background 
understanding of being.    133 Rudolph Carnap, “The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language”, in 
Logical Positivism, edited by A. J. Ayer (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1959), 80. In Carnap’s 1932 essay 
he criticises Heidegger’s writings for being utterly meaningless. Heidegger’s response to Carnap, in a 
series of notes with the title “Uberwindung der Metaphysik”, is that Carnap’s conception of metaphysics 
will prevent us from understanding that to which the metaphysical tradition has been a response, namely 
the background understanding of being. 
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subject, saying that death is metaphysical would mean that the way we understand and 
relate to death is always guided by a certain inescapable ‘metaphysical’ background 
understanding of being. That is, all theories and assertions about death – philosophical as 
well as scientific – refer to a background understanding of being that is being more or 
less acknowledged. Furthermore, as we can see, this should imply that even Heidegger’s 
notion of death in BT refer to such a background understanding.  
Secondly, and put in general terms; saying that death is metaphysical entails that 
death is outside the reach of human epistemic capacities. In Heideggerian terms this can 
be translated to the inability to disclose death as it is in itself, which is why death as a 
phenomenon only can be approached indirectly. Finally, saying that death is 
metaphysical means that it as a philosophical concept is especially exposed to 
speculations and projections based on metaphysical background assumptions. This is 
probably why death always has been an essential part of speculative philosophical 
systems, such as in theological eschatology or in Eastern religious and philosophical 
systems, such as Buddhism and Hinduism.     
 
5.2 ‘Metaphysical’ assertions about death 
Heidegger insists that his analysis of death is not ‘metaphysical’ in the traditional 
sense.134
 
 That is, whatever is disclosed and explicated about death in BT lies within the 
confines of disclosure of (authentic) Dasein, and is therefore supposedly not based on 
any groundless or lofty metaphysical speculations. Heidegger asserts the following about 
the purely non-metaphysical character of his analysis of death: 
But our analysis of death remains purely ‘this-wordly’ in so far as it Interprets that 
phenomenon merely in the way in which it enters into any particular Dasein as a 
possibility of its Being. Only when death is conceived in its full ontological essence 
can we have any methodological assurance in even asking what may be after death; 
only then can we do so with meaning and justification. Whether such a question is a 
possible theoretical question at all will not be decided here. The this-worldly 
ontological Interpretation of death takes precedence over any ontical other-worldly 
speculation. Finally, what might be discussed under the topic of a ‘metaphysic of 
death’ lies outside the domain of an existential analysis of death. 
                     (BT 248) 
 
                                                        134 Joanna Hodge, Heidegger and Ethics (London: Routledge, 1995), 176. In BT Heidegger refers to the 
notion of traditional metaphysics with quotation marks. As Joanna Hodge points out, the difference 
between ontology and ‘metaphysics’ is that ontology addresses entities in their relation to being, whereas 
‘metaphysics’ fails to identify this relation and erases ontological difference.  
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This quote raises several interesting questions concerning death as a metaphysical 
concept. First, there is the question of whether phenomenology as a philosophical method 
is completely non-speculative in its approach to the phenomenon. Is phenomenology 
metaphysically neutral or without metaphysical bearings, or is phenomenology, on the 
contrary, a form of metaphysics itself?135
 Second, Heidegger asserts that death must first be conceived in its full ontological 
essence, before the classical metaphysical question about the afterlife can even be asked 
with meaning and justification. But why, we need to ask, should death conceived in its 
full ontological essence necessarily brings us any closer to an answer to the question of 
afterlife? Heidegger briefly mentions what he considers to be the traditional metaphysical 
topics about death; such as how and when death came into the world, and what meaning 
it can have. He then asserts, correctly in my view, that these questions “presuppose an 
understanding of Being that lies outside the scope of Dasein’s disclosure” (BT 248). 
However, the question is whether a complete this-wordly understanding of death is 
possible to achieve. Furthermore, is death in “its full ontological essence” non-
speculative or metaphysically neutral? 
 Edmund Husserl describes phenomenology as a 
purely neutral investigation; the aim of phenomenology is thus to describe and 
understand the ideal structures of knowledge. In Husserl’s view, the general task of 
phenomenology is to describe that which is given, exactly as it is given, rather than to get 
lost in metaphysical constructions. Heidegger, however, disagrees with Husserl in that 
phenomenology as a philosophical method can be performed entirely without 
presuppositions. Because phenomenology as a method is also hermeneutical it will 
always carry with it certain presuppositions and background assumptions. The essential 
question, then, is to what degree Heidegger’s analysis of death carries with it 
‘metaphysical’ background assumptions. 
 These questions show of us why it is necessary to closely scrutinise Heidegger’s 
claim that his analysis of death is entirely non-metaphysical. Furthermore, as I earlier 
argued in chapter two, Heidegger’s notion of death is a composite of both a ‘what’ and a 
‘how’. The ‘what’ in Heidegger’s notion of death thus refers implicitly to the traditional 
metaphysical understanding of death as the ‘end of life’. What is the essential problem                                                         135 Zahavi, “Phenomenology and Metaphysics”, 18. Zahavi raises the question of whether phenomenology 
as a philosophical method is metaphysically neutral or without metaphysical bearings. According to 
Zahavi, to argue that transcendental phenomenology is metaphysically neutral is to make it more lame and 
tame than it really is. The true paradox is that to hold such a view is exactly to give in to a certain kind of 
traditional metaphysics.    
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with this traditional understanding? Typical for the metaphysical model of death – which 
is by far dominant in the history of philosophy and theology - is that death is posited as a 
transition to a nonhuman form of reality, whether as physical corruption or metaphysical 
transcendence in the form of an afterlife.136
Now, what I am suggesting is that the ‘what’-part in Heidegger’s definition is 
more conspicuous than acknowledged by the philosopher himself. Thus, Heidegger not 
only describes how we should relate to death in order to become authentic; he also 
determines the ‘how’ or the being-towards somehow in relation to the ‘what’. Hence, I 
argue that Heidegger’s notion of death is ‘metaphysical’ in accordance with his own 
understanding of metaphysics as a background understanding of being.  
  
As mentioned, the perhaps most prominent metaphysical background assumption 
in BT is expressed in the assertion “possibility stands higher than actuality”. This 
background assumption is what constitutes not only Heidegger’s interpretation of death 
as a possibility, but also his view of Dasein as temporal thrown projection. In addition to 
this major metaphysical assertion, Heidegger expresses several other views about death 
that might be characterised as metaphysical. In order to expose the underlying 
metaphysical dimensions in Heidegger’s notion of death, I will in the following analyse 
some of his assertions about of death in greater detail.137
 
 
5.2.1 We are constantly dying 
Some of Heidegger’s assertions about death are particularly meant to disclose it as a 
phenomenon of life. First, Heidegger lets the term “dying” (Sterben) “stand for that way 
of Being in which Dasein is towards its death” (BT 247). In a similar vain, he asserts:  
“Factically, Dasein is dying as long as it exists, but proximally and for the most part, it 
does so by way of falling” (BT 251). Furthermore, he asserts: “Dasein, as thrown Being-
in-the-world, has in every case already been delivered over to its death. In being towards 
its death, Dasein is dying factically and indeed constantly, as long as it has not yet come 
to its demise” (BT 259). The thread running through these assertions is the view that 
                                                        136 Ireton, An Ontological study of Death, 3. 137 I am well aware of the danger of analysing Heidegger’s characterisations of death as isolated assertions 
taken out of context. This is a tactic often used by Heidegger’s critics, in order to expose weaknesses and 
logical blunders in the text.  Paul Edwards and Herman Philipse, two of Heidegger’s perhaps fiercest 
contemporary critics, have in a similar way analysed many of Heidegger’s assertions about death, and 
rather violently tired to pick them apart. My intention here, however, is not first and foremost to criticise 
Heidegger’s ontological assertions about death, but to expose them as ‘metaphysical’.  
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death is not simply the end of life, but rather that we are ‘constantly dying’ as long as we 
exist.  
The assertion that we are constantly dying has been severely criticised by certain 
commentators. Philipse argues that the assertion that we are dying all the time is nothing 
but a persuasive redefinition of the word “dying”.138 Since the only sense in which death 
can be a mode of existing is death as “dying”, as opposed to death as being-dead, this 
yields Heidegger’s conclusion that we are dying as long as we exist. In Philipse’s view 
this conclusion is wrong, simply because Heidegger through his redefinition confuses our 
attitude toward our own death with dying itself. Moreover, as Paul Edwards points out, 
Heidegger’s doctrine that we are constantly dying certainly sounds like a new and 
spectacular discovery that appears to conflict with commonly accepted beliefs. However, 
this appearance is deceptive.139
It is quite obvious that Heidegger by this assertion does not mean to say that we 
are in a perpetual state of mortal illness, or that we are constantly dying in the permanent 
or irreversible sense, as in demise or perishing.
 For Edwards, Heidegger is just playing out platitudes and 
verbal tricks on us; in reality he adds nothing new to our knowledge or understanding of 
death by asserting that we are constantly dying. On both Philipse and Edwards’ accounts 
the problem with Heidegger’s assertion that we are constantly dying seems to be a matter 
of both semantic and logical confusion.   
140 Rather, what Heidegger means to 
express is that we are constantly ‘dying’ in the existential sense. As we saw several 
examples of (in chapter two), there are several interpretations of existential death. In my 
view, Mulhall’s interpretation hits the mark when he interprets ‘dying’ as a matter of 
stripping out false necessities, thereby coming properly attuned to the real modalities of 
human existence.141
                                                        138 Philipse, Heidegger’s Philosophy of Being, . Philipse concludes that by redefining the word “dying” 
Heidegger has not solved any of the methodological problems he has conjured up, and that it is not the 
discovery of a new phenomenon: death in life.  
 Thus, to be constantly dying is a way of relating to life, in the sense 
that there is no moment of one’s existence in which one’s being is not at issue. On this 
account, there seems to be a deep sense of urgency, as if every moment of one’s life 
counts with the utmost importance.  
139 Paul Edwards, Heidegger’s Confusions (New York: Prometheus Books, 2004), 74-75. 140 The irony here is that the assertion that we are constantly dying fits remarkably well with a scientific or 
physical view of the incessant processes of change and decay in the body. These biological processes start 
from the moment we are born; physical transformation and decay is thus one of the constituent elements of 
not only the human body, but of everything that exists physically. 141 Mulhall, “Human mortality”, 305-06. 
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Now, what kind of background understanding of being is expressed in the 
assertion that we are constantly dying? First of all, I think it can be argued that this 
assertion reveals a profoundly secular understanding of human existence. Why is that? 
Even though Heidegger in BT never explicitly expresses this view, he seems to think that 
human existence is utterly finite in the sense that there is no afterlife or no saviour God. 
Thus, since there is only one life and accordingly a limited span of time and possibilities, 
every moment of our finite existence is conferred with an immense importance. If this is 
correct, it not only explains what is meant by the assertion that we are constantly dying in 
the existential sense; it also tells us what Heidegger’s critics are missing out on. 
The assumption that we are utterly finite beings is what makes the assertion that 
we are constantly dying ‘metaphysical’, in the sense that it fits nicely into a secular 
worldview. However, what we need to ask is whether it is actually true that we are 
constantly dying. The irony here is that this assertion concurs with the scientific-
biological view of the ongoing processes of transformation and decay in the body. These 
processes are initiated from the moment we are born, and physical change and decay are 
constituent elements of not only the human body, but of everything that exists physically. 
Thus, in the physical or biological sense we are indeed dying constantly as long as we 
exist. But is this also true of existential death? This question, I believe, can be answered 
both affirmatively and negatively. For the most part, Dasein is constantly dying because 
it is falling, and thus it has “…always decided itself in one way or another (BT 259). 
However, if my earlier argument to refute the necessity of ‘falling’ holds, then it is at 
least conceivable that a person will not, as a matter of predetermination, undergo a 
progressive closing down of possibilities during her lifetime. Rather, with a transcending 
movement, new and richer possibilities can progressively open up as long as one exists. 
This view implies that one can be more ‘alive’, so to speak, towards the end of one’s life 
than at the beginning of it.142
 
  
5.2.2 Death as certain and indefinite 
The second of Heidegger’ assertions that is up for analysis consists of two separate 
statements about death. On the one hand, Heidegger asserts that death is certain: “So far 
as one knows, all men die”, and that death is “an undeniable fact of experience” (BT                                                         142 Dreyfus, foreword to White’s Time and Death, xxi-xxii. This is in essence Dreyfus’ claim that the 
constant closing of possibilities could not be the kind of ontological dying Heidegger has in view. On the 
contrary, as Dreyfus points out, possibilities are also always opening up for Dasein as part of its 
constitution as a thrown projection.  
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257). Now, the question is; what kind of death is Heidegger referring to when he asserts 
that death is certain? The simple claim that demise or perishing is certain seems hard, if 
not impossible to disproof. Since there is no known example in human history to 
contradict it, we should expect this claim to be true with a very high degree of (at least) 
inductive certainty. Thus, Heidegger asserts “To be certain of an entity means to hold it 
for true as something true” (BT 256). However, Heidegger makes the point that even 
though death is probable in the highest degree for every man, it is not ‘unconditionally’ 
certain. Thus, ‘only’ empirical certainty may be attributed to death, but this fact, 
Heidegger adds, “is in no way decisive to the certainty of death” (BT 257). 
There is according to Heidegger something inherently wrong with the everyday 
understanding of this certainty, in that das Man only “knows about the certainty of death, 
and yet is not authentically certain of one’s own” (BT 258). In this way, das Man covers 
up what is peculiar about death’s certainty, namely that it is possible at any moment. In 
other words, along with the certainty of death goes the indefiniteness of its ‘when’: 
death’s characteristic way of being certain is that it is possible at any moment.143
The assertion about death’s certainty as indefiniteness shows, more than anything 
else, the composite or double nature of Heidegger’s notion of death. Because das Man 
holds a distorted view of death as an event in the distant future, this distorted view must 
also be what Heidegger tries to correct by pointing to death’s certainty as indefiniteness. 
This becomes evident when we place the assertion about death’s certainty as 
indefiniteness, together with the first assertion that we are constantly dying. If it is true 
that we are constantly dying in the existential sense, it would amount to a straightforward 
contradiction to say that existential death is also indefinite and therefore can happen at 
any moment. If something is already happening constantly as we speak, then it cannot 
also happen at any indefinite moment in time, simply because it is already happening. 
This is the main reason why the notion of death’s indefiniteness refers to the ordinary 
conception of death as the moment of demise. 
 Death’s 
character as a distinctively impending possibility is thus what das Man covers up and 
evades in fear.  
Why is this problem so important to solve, and in what way is it related to 
metaphysics? First, as shown above, if Heidegger is not referring to two kinds of death 
(the ordinary and the existential), then the sum of his characterisations of death amounts                                                         143 Heidegger’s notion of death’s indefiniteness here resembles the old adage mors certa, hora incerta: 
“death is sure to come about, but its when remains indeterminate”. 
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to a contradiction. Second and more importantly, the fact that Heidegger refers to the 
ordinary conception of death as indefinite opens up for the possibility that das Man might 
be correct in its interpretation of death after all. To see why, we first need to inquire more 
about the ‘metaphysical’ background assumptions behind Heidegger’s view of death as 
indefinite.  
Now, the authentic and true understanding of death’s certainty is that it is 
indefinite and thus possible at any moment. But is this really how death ‘acts’? A useful 
distinction can be whether it is logically or empirically possible that death is indefinite.144 
The logical possibility of death’s indefiniteness seems to entail that any person, even the 
young and healthy, are at risk of dying at every moment of their lives. Death thus strikes 
suddenly, without as much as a sign of warning. If we begin to contemplate the full 
implication of this view, however, we soon realise that it is not a self-evident or trivial 
truth about death. Rather, the logical possibility of death as indefinite is founded on a set 
of background assumptions that pertain to a specific worldview or outlook on reality. 
One such background assumption can be that things in life, such as illnesses, accidents, 
bad luck, but also fortunate events, happen randomly. On this picture death is thus the 
ultimate accident, striking blindly and randomly.145
What about the empirical possibility of death’s indefiniteness? From an immanent 
human perspective people certainly die suddenly and for no seemingly explainable 
reason. Sudden deaths are particularly hard to explain when it comes to accidents or 
incidents that have seemingly no traceable cause or origin in the diseased person. We see 
this happen all the time, and the indefiniteness of death thus seems to verify itself 
repeatedly as an unavoidable part of how ‘reality’ is constituted. Interestingly, most of 
Heideggerian commentators seem to agree upon the view of death’s indefiniteness 
without hesitation, as if it were a self-evident truth. The seeming obviousness of this 
assertion, however, reinforces the possibility of it being ‘metaphysical’ in the sense that 
certain background assumptions of reality are taken for granted. As in the case of the first 
  
                                                        144 Philipse, Heidegger’s Philosophy of Being, 366. Philipse brings up the distinction between logical and 
empirical possibility of death in his critical discussion of Heidegger’s notion of death as a possibility. He 
argues that the logical possibility that we may die any moment is a trivial truth. The empirical possibility 
that we may die any moment is true or false depending on one’s background assumptions.  145 James P. Carse, Death and Existence: A Conceptual History of Human Mortality (New York: John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1980), 41-3.The historian Carse has made an interesting comparison between the 
Epicurean view of death (and life) and modern science. On the Epicurean view both life and death is 
random; death thus strikes as an accident and must be conceived merely as random dispersion of the 
physical body. As Carse points out, such a view of death is inimical to friendship and social bonds and 
creates in the person an isolating detachment from all that is of consequence of in human existence.  
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assertion, death as indefinite points to a background understanding of being that is 
profoundly secular. 
It might be pointed out that Heidegger does not really mean to say that death can 
in fact strike at any moment. Rather, what he tries to show is how we should relate 
authentically to our own death by facing up to it as if it were a constant impending threat. 
Heidegger is correct in thinking that death should not be denied or evaded in fear, which 
is perhaps the most typical response to the thought of death. The question, however, is 
why we should relate to death as if it were a constant threat if this is not death’s ‘true 
nature’, so to speak. If death is not really an impending possibility, but rather happens 
from a specific but perhaps unknown chain of causes, then why should we relate to it as 
if it could strike at any moment? My point here is that there might be a middle ground 
between the fearful evasion of death and the constant facing up to it as a possibility. 
 
5.2.3 Death’s finality and the possibility of an afterlife 
As earlier shown, Heidegger insists that his analysis of death lies firmly within the scope 
of Dasein’s disclosure, and that it as such has nothing to do with metaphysical ‘other-
worldly’ speculations about death. In this respect, Heidegger remains silent on the most 
characteristic metaphysical questions, such as the meaning of death, the possibility of 
afterlife or survival, etc. As shown above, the first assertion point back to a secular 
background understanding of human beings as utterly finite. However, strangely enough, 
Heidegger also seems to be willing to leave the metaphysical question of an afterlife 
undecided, in that he asserts that death must first be conceived in its full ontological 
essence before there is any methodological assurance in asking about what may be after 
death. There thus seems to be a straightforward contradiction in Heidegger’s thinking 
about death’s finality and the afterlife.146 Philipse argues that Heidegger stresses that 
death is a total extinction, in that death does not leave us any possibilities of existing tout 
court.147
                                                        146 See, for example: Edwards, Heidegger’s Confusions, 117-118. 
 Thus, Heidegger asserts: “Death, as possibility, gives Dasein nothing to be 
‘actualised’, nothing which Dasein, as actual could itself be. It is the possibility of the 
impossibility of every way of comporting oneself towards anything, of every way of 
existing” (BT 262). The contradiction arises, because Heidegger does not explicitly deny 
the possibility of an afterlife. Philipse contends that this is not only a major inconsistency 
147 Philipse, Heidegger’s Philosophy of Being, 370 
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on Heidegger’s part, but that he also moves beyond the epistemic borders set by his own 
phenomenological method.148
The critique raised against Heidegger on this point is not entirely unwarranted. It 
is simply contradictory to on the one hand hold the view that human beings are utterly 
finite, while on the other hand holding the view that there is a possible afterlife. It is also 
contradictory to hold the view that the moment of death is indefinite, while at the same 
time holding the view that we are constantly dying, and by that referring to the same 
death. These contradictory views about the ‘nature’ of death cannot simultaneously be 
true, in that they zero each other out. However, what Philipse’s critique misses out on is 
why these contradictions arise from Heidegger’s explication of the phenomenon of death. 
In my view, this happens because there seems to be a contradiction in terms of the 
background assumptions in Heidegger’s analysis.  
  
When referring to death’s terminal nature, Heidegger can be interpreted as saying 
that death does not leave us any possibilities of existing in this world only. There might, 
however, be possibilities for a continued existence in another world or dimension, 
without us being able to verify or disclose them. Heidegger is, in my view, correct in 
keeping the possibilities of an afterlife open in that this is the most appropriate thing to 
do for him as a phenomenologist. Not until the day it has been completely verified that 
there is no such thing as survival of death in any form whatsoever, can this question be 
closed for good.  
  
5.3 Metaphysical death  
In the previous section I analysed some of Heidegger’s assertions about death and tried to 
expose them as ‘metaphysical’ in accordance with Heidegger’s own understanding of the 
term. With regard to most of Heidegger’s descriptions and characterisations of death, I 
believe that they are meaningful as they stand. Some of these assertions can even come 
across as platitudes about death. However, the crucial point with the assertions that have 
been up for analysis is that seem to lead to an aporia, in that there is no way to decide                                                         148 Philipse, Heidegger’s Philosophy of Being, 371. Philipse argues that Heidegger has no right to pretend 
that his analysis of death is compatible with a doctrine of survival after death, and he thus seems to think 
that Heidegger’s assertions about the terminal nature of death are entirely unqualified. Philipse, however, 
bases his critique on certain’ metaphysical’ background assumptions that are unqualified in the same way. 
These are background assumptions about death that Philipse shares with most philosophers in the 
analytical tradition. Thus, his argument runs: “By studying our being in the world we can discover many 
conclusive grounds for rejecting the doctrine of an afterlife. Our mental life turns out to be dependent on 
bodily functions, so that, when our body rots away or is destroyed by fire after death, no possibility of 
mental life can remain”.   
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whether they are ‘true’ or ‘false’ in isolation from the background understanding of being 
they emerge from. That is, these assertions about death can only be disclosed as ‘true’ 
from a specific set of metaphysical background assumptions.  
In essence, the problem with Heidegger’s notion of death is that it refers to 
incompatible or conflicting background understandings of being. While the first two 
assertions referred to a secularised understanding wherein there is no room for a 
continuance of individual existence after death, the last assertion seems to leave the 
question of an afterlife undecided. How can Heidegger allow this to happen? Why does 
he not simply deny the possibility of a continued existence after the moment of death? As 
John D. Caputo points out, it is “clear to everyone” but the most fanatic Heideggerians 
that Heidegger is Hellenising and secularising a fundamentally biblical conception of the 
history of salvation.149 Thus, the theological presuppositions of BT are unmistakable, and 
it turns on the existential motif of the call to personal conversion.150
What we have discovered behind the scenes of Heidegger’s analysis of death is a 
fascinating, but also a rather confusing fusion of background understandings of being. On 
the one hand, there is clearly an ambiguous, almost hostile and demythologising attitude 
towards Christianity and theological thinking. At the same time, some of the deepest 
religious intuitions and ideas about the significance of death are being retained. Then, 
there is also the possibility of an afterlife kept open, or at least not explicitly denied. This 
happens because Heidegger clearly is inspired by different theological sources in BT, and 
because his thinking about death is inextricably involved in the Christian tradition.
  
151 
The composition or fusion of partly incompatible background understandings of being is, 
in my view, the explanation for why Heidegger’s notion of death creates so much 
confusion, bafflement, debate, and why it is so difficult to grasp or to accept.152
                                                        149 John D. Caputo, “Heidegger and Theology”, in The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, second 
edition, edited by Charles Guignon, 326-344 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 336. 
   
150 See also: John D. Caputo, “People of God, people of being: the theological presuppositions of 
Heidegger’s path of thought”, in Appropriating Heidegger, edited by James E. Faulconer & Mark A. 
Wrathall, 85-100 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 87-88. Caputo here argues that 
Heidegger reads the texts of the ancient Greek philosophers religiously, or as texts that demand our self-
transformation.  151 Ireton, An Ontological Study of Death, 261-264. As Ireton points out, it is only logical that Heidegger’s 
notion of anticipation of death has its origin in theological discourse, given his studies of Kierkegaard, 
Augustin, and Luther.  152 Hodge, Heidegger and Ethics, 172-173. As Hodge points out, the problem for many of Heidegger’s 
readers is the reluctance to accept the importance for Heidegger of the Christian tradition, and of the 
concepts and terms that Heidegger derives from it.  
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As earlier mentioned, Heidegger thinks that the problem with twentieth century 
analytical philosophy is that it tries to ignore metaphysics. It is not surprising then, that 
most of Heidegger’s critics either have a strong affinity with, or belong to the so-called 
analytical branch of modern philosophy.153 The contemporary analytical discussion of 
death has two characteristic features. First of all, they share many of the same 
background assumptions as with the natural sciences (such as naturalism, materialism, 
reductionism, and positivism), leading many analytical thinkers to, for example, simply 
presume that death is the final end of life on par with the Epicurean doctrine.154 Or, when 
this conception is not simply presupposed, it is more often than not, argued for.155 
Contemporary analytical discussions of death are often explicitly anti-metaphysical, in 
Heidegger’s sense of not acknowledging or recognising their metaphysical background 
assumptions. Typically, analytical thinkers tend to try to solve the questions and puzzles 
about death without touching upon the larger ‘metaphysical’ understanding they emerge 
from.156
We have seen that Heidegger thinks that traditional metaphysics needs to be 
criticised and eventually overcome, and that this can only be accomplished by an 
engagement with the metaphysical past. This kind of engagement is what the analytical 
philosopher typically lacks. And, such an engagement is arguably what Heidegger 
attempts to carry out in his own analysis of death. The expressed goal of eliminating 
metaphysics brings us back to the reasons for why it has been important to expose the 
metaphysical ‘nature’ of Heidegger’s notion of death. There is, in my view, reason to 
doubt that Heidegger has succeeded in ‘destroying’ the metaphysics in his own thinking. 
This is not only because there seems to be an unacknowledged contradiction in terms of 
different background understandings of being, but also because Heidegger claims that his 
 
                                                        153 Mark A. Wrathall, “Philosophy, thinkers, and Heidegger’s place in the history of being”, in 
Appropriating Heidegger. Edited by James E. Faulconer & Mark A. Wrathall (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 9-10. Wrathall presents the differences between Heidegger’s and the analytical 
view of metaphysics. 154 Philipse, Heidegger’s Philosophy of Being, 365. Being a typical example of this tendency, Philipse 
asserts: “Without a doubt, the best phenomenology of death was given by Epicurus”.  155 See, for example, Geoffrey Scarre, Death (Stocksfield: Acumen Publishing Limited, 2007), 15, 18. 
Scarre bluntly presumes that death is personal extinction, and that the various ethical and existential 
questions that the prospect of death raises are most profitably viewed from this perspective. Scarre also 
points out that most contemporary philosophy of mind is deeply inhospitable to notions of an afterlife, and 
poses challenges to the coherence and credibility of those notions that have not been, and seems unlikely to 
be met.  156 See John Martin Fischer (ed.), The Metaphysics of Death (Stanford: Stanford Univerity Press, 1993), 
for an overview of typical philosophical dilemmas about death within the analytical tradition: 1. The 
rational status of the fear of death; 2. The harm or evil of death; and 3. The tediousness of immortality.    
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analysis of death in BT is an entirely ‘this-worldly’ ontological explication of the 
phenomenon. My discussion has shown, however, that even the alleged ‘this-worldly’ 
assertions about death emerge from certain implicit metaphysical background 
assumptions. In other words, the concept of death is not metaphysical merely in the sense 
of causing the traditional metaphysical questions about what happens after the moment of 
death, the meaning of death, etc. Rather, the whole concept - from bottom to top – is 
metaphysical. Thus, every assertion made about death point back to and is intimately 
connected to metaphysical background assumptions about being. Furthermore, regardless 
of which methodological approach, death remains opaque; even the phenomenological 
approach leaves death in a cloud of mysteries. This raises the question of whether 
metaphysics can ever be ‘eliminated’ or overcome.  
 
5.4 Death’s full significance: a question of time and belief? 
The metaphysical ‘nature’ of death accentuates and reinforces the theme of death’s 
significance for human existence. The importance of this question becomes clearer when 
we take into reconsideration the possibility of death’s utter non-significance. Strictly 
speaking, the idea that death has any significance whatsoever for human existence may 
turn out to be pure nonsense. Thus, at one extreme end of the scale, death can be found to 
have no importance whatsoever. As the stoic philosopher Epicurus (340-270 BCE) stated 
over two millennia ago, death is ‘nothing’: “Accustom yourself to the belief that death is 
of no concern to us, since all good and evil lie in sensation and sensation ends in death. 
While we exist death is not present and when death is present we no longer exist”.157 
Epicurus denies the significance of death on the grounds that it is ‘nothing’ in a 
straightforward sense. The human soul is nothing more than an arrangement of atoms, 
which on death disperse. The agent of death is thus the very nature of the dispersal of 
matter itself. In this sense, the Epicurean doctrine of death shares many of the similar 
background assumptions as with twentieth-century scientific thought.158
In contrast to the Epicurean doctrine, death has great significance for Heidegger 
as the key to Dasein’s authenticity. Death in BT also has the heuristic significance of 
revealing Dasein as a temporal and a finite being. Being-towards-death is thus a 
transcending movement of self-authentication. However, the moment authentic 
 
                                                        157 Epicurus, The Extant Remains, translated by Cyril Bailey (Oxford: Clarendon, 1926), 85. 158 Carse, Death and Existence, 36, 44, 50. Carse points out the affinity between the Epicurean doctrine 
and modern science in detail.  
95  
transcendence does not last, in that Dasein can never completely transcend its own 
facticity or its worldly limitations. Here, beneath the understanding of the inescapable 
human limitations pared with the simultaneous quest for transcendence, we are again 
faced with the double nature and the ambiguity in Heidegger’s analysis.  
From a secular point of view, it can be argued that Heidegger is making too much 
out of death, by turning it into the focal point of human existence. When death is 
portrayed as the singular most important phenomenon, it is also being glorified and 
upheld almost like a fetish.159
From the perspective of human capacity for transcendence it can, on the contrary, 
be argued that Heidegger is making too little out of death. By explicating Dasein as 
structurally predetermined to being inauthentic, a permanent state of authenticity is out of 
reach for it. As Heidegger points out, there are factical limitations to human existence, 
which can never be fully transcended. Thus, for Heidegger a complete freedom in the 
Sartrean sense of overthrowing all faciticty is a mere illusion. However, as shown in the 
previous chapter, it is in principle possible for Dasein to attain a lasting state of 
authenticity if the following two conditions are met: first, that the structural necessity of 
das Man is removed; and second, that the ecstasie of the present or Being-alongside is 
understood as a movement of transcendence, rather than merely as a movement of 
falling. Now, based on these conditions, what is the full significance of death? In my 
view, death’s full significance amounts to a complete ethical transformation of the 
individual within a single lifetime. 
 Death fetishism thus epitomises the heroic and single-
minded way of facing up to the one essential fact that we are all eventually going to die. 
As a fetish, death is being converted into the meaning of life, or into the ultimate test of 
life. As mentioned, existential death can take on this over-dimensioned significance 
because there is a fusion of different background assumptions in Heidegger’s analysis. 
The religious idea of death’s significance as the gateway to an afterlife is transformed 
into the existential idea that we are constantly dying, incompatibly paired with the view 
that death is a constant, impending threat. In Heidegger’s analysis, it is thus not the 
moment of death or what happens after death that is the focus of attention; rather, for him 
every moment in life is a moment of death, which explains why death in BT is bestowed 
with such an immense analytical importance. 
                                                        159 Robert C. Solomon, “Death fetishism, morbid solipsism”, in Death and Philosophy, edited by Jeff 
Malpas & Robert C. Solomon, 152-176 (London: Routledge, 2002), 162.  
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As I argued in the previous chapter, it can be shown that a lasting and non-
deteriorating state of authenticity, paired with the possibility for moral perfection, is part 
of the human constitution. However, in the real world such a state is seldom reached. 
Only in extremely rare cases will a person manage to remain whole and authentic, 
uncorrupted and unlevelled, and thereby fully morally fulfilled, while being in the world 
with all of its negative influences and confusions. In most cases, there are simply not 
enough possibilities, resources, or freedom for us as human beings to reach or maintain 
such a state within this lifetime. 
The undeniable ‘ontic’ limitations and inequality amongst human beings in terms 
of available possibilities, resources, and time for reaching their full human potential is, in 
my view, a plausible explanation for why there historically has been an urgent need for 
the belief in an afterlife. Thus, the religious doctrines of a continued individual existence, 
either as an immortal soul or as a reincarnated individual, are supposed to give some 
consolation by satisfying this need. Now, as earlier mentioned, from a phenomenological 
point of view Heidegger is correct in keeping the possibility of an afterlife open. To keep 
this possibility open is, in fact, the philosophically and scientifically pertinent thing to do 
as long as the opposite possibility – that of death’s absolute and non-reversible finality - 
has not yet been completely and definitely verified. There is, however, an even deeper 
reason for why the belief in a possible afterlife is best kept open. This is so, because 
without this possibility human existence and the worldly conditions we are all thrown 
into, comes across as a giant lottery with few lucky winners. Thus, the prospect of 
becoming a real, authentic person, who seizes upon life’s possibilities with wisdom and 
moral elevation, is not only based on the person’s wish and effort, but also in the final 
instance on a good portion of luck and fortunate circumstances.  
In Heidegger’s analysis there is an apparent lack of consideration for these ontic 
limitations, in that he seems to think that the authentic moment wherein the individual 
Dasein can transcend its worldly limitations and become whole, is something that in 
principle is available for everyone. A contrasting view to Heidegger’s is Kierkegaard’s, 
who thinks that the self must make an absolute commitment in eternity in order to 
become authentic. Thus, the authentic moment implies the notion of eternity and the 
belief in a God. In this chapter I hope to have shown that there is a possible middle 
ground between these two philosophers relationship to time, or to finitude versus 
eternity. We might not need God or eternity in order to become authentic. The authentic 
moment of transcendence, however, can be extended and last for a lifetime.   
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Epilogue 
 
This master thesis started off by introducing three interconnected themes about death. 
Through various approaches to Heidegger’s notions of death and authenticity in BT, I 
have tried to accentuate and elaborate the philosophical importance and relevance of 
these three themes about death. I have also tried to show that all the themes are implicitly 
present in Heidegger’s analysis of death. 
As mentioned in the main introduction, the fundamental theoretical purpose of 
this master thesis has been to question the view that metaphysics can or should be 
overcome. In the final chapter I argued that because of the way certain phenomena are 
constituted – and amongst them, most prominently death - it is doubtful that a complete 
elimination of metaphysics is possible, or even desirable. Death is a phenomenon that has 
the interesting double character of being concretely present in the world, as something 
we can both perceive and relate to. At the same time, death is opaque, inaccessible, and 
impossible to acquire definite knowledge of. In these senses, death is both of and out of 
this world, so to speak. We all know about death, and we can watch it happen to other 
people and living beings. However, we cannot really know what death is in itself, despite 
the fact that death always has been, and will always be an inescapable part of our 
existence.  
Furthermore, the way we relate to death, either in a conscious or in an 
unconscious and passive way, organise our lives more than we are usually willing to 
acknowledge. When the suicidal bomber prepares to die for what he or she thinks is a 
just cause, it is often accompanied with the strong conviction that such an act will bring 
about blissful immortality on his or her part. When the Buddhist monk or nun prepares 
for death through the rigors of a monastic life, it is accompanied with the belief that he or 
she will reincarnate into a higher existence, or attain nirvana, the state of full liberation 
from rebirths. In lives such as these, death and the way it is related to, has taken on a 
direct and straightforward significance for the choices that are taken and the actions that 
are made. 
For most people, their life is more implicitly affected by death. For example, 
death plays a significant role in the life of the secular individual, or for the non-believer 
who thinks that there is only one lifespan available for him or her. For such a person, 
every moment in life might take on the utmost importance, due to the realisation that 
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there is a limitation of time and possibilities. Thus, due to the basic conviction that we 
are finite, it becomes urgent to make the most out of this single life. This then, seems to 
be the essence of the Heideggerian view of death’s significance for human existence. In 
other cases, the non-believer’s life might take on an absurd dimension wherein nothing 
seems to matter anymore, with boredom and depression as possible consequences. 
When it comes to the question of death’s significance and how it affects our lives, 
what is it that unites both the believer and the non-believer? In my view, what unites 
them is the fact they are both ‘believers’, so to speak. By this I mean to say that both the 
believer and the non-believer base their lives on certain deep, and in most cases 
unacknowledged ‘metaphysical’ assumptions about death. However, whatever we choose 
to think or believe about death will not change or affect what death is. Death is what it is, 
regardless of our beliefs or convictions about it. Furthermore, it is not possible for us to 
have it both ways. For example, the assumption that life is utterly finite and the 
assumption that there is an afterlife cannot be simultaneously true. Hence, the human 
need to choose a fundamental belief about death. To choose a fundamental belief about 
death is, in fact, what most people do based on their implicit background assumptions 
about being. This choice, however, is rarely given much conscious thought or 
consideration. 
As readers may have noticed, Heidegger’s characterisation of death as non-
relational has not really been discussed in detail in this thesis. Heidegger describes death 
as Dasein’s ownmost possibility and as non-relational, because for him, the process of 
becoming authentic consists in movement away from other people and from the levelling 
sources of society. I think that Heidegger, to a certain extent, is correct in making a 
connection between death and the process of individuation. By facing up to death, we can 
as individuals become more of that which we already are, so to speak. However, in this 
sense death is not merely non-relational, it is also deeply relational. Death is that 
phenomenon in human existence that we must all eventually face, and as such it unites us 
to a mutual human fate. Furthermore, as shown above, death unites both the believer and 
the non-believer in the sense that none of them really knows what death is, or what lies 
ahead of it. In this sense, death makes us all into believers. Finally, death leads all human 
beings to the same fundamental question. This question is, put in Heidegger’s terms: 
what is the meaning of our being?     
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